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ABSTRACT
 Women’s Writing and the Poetics of Scientific Knowledge, 1620-1740 probes the 
porous boundary between science and literature, revealing that the methodologies 
undergirding scientific experimentation were developed communally and through a 
confluence of interdisciplinary and cultural concerns. Ultimately, it shows that our 
contemporary understanding of the natural world and the scientific method have a history 
that is largely one of fragments. Secondly, and more importantly, it demonstrates the 
value of reading imaginative writing alongside scientific developments of the day. 
Focusing on women’s imaginative writing in particular reveals the power and limits that 
ostensibly liminal voices have. As such, Women’s Writing and the Poetics of Scientific 
Knowledge, 1620-1740 continues, in part, the vital project of recovery. Concomitantly, it 
also suggests that it was women’s very marginality that enabled them to create a nexus 
between types of discourse and the larger scientific and literary milieu. Although barred, 
institutionally, from practicing experimental science, women remained active participants 
in contributing to the shape knowledge took. Chapters centered on political, microscopic, 
epistolary, and anatomical life show how women writers of the period—Margaret 
Cavendish, Aphra Behn, and Jane Barker, among others—experimented with hybrid 
narrative forms to account for and illustrate different ways of knowing; critiqued 
empirical practices and the illusion of objectivity; and used imaginative writing to offer 
an alternative model for understanding the natural world and one’s place within it.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
On February 4, 1645, John Evelyn recounts visiting a “collection of exotic rarities 
in the Museum of Ferdinando Imperati, a Neapolitan nobleman.” In his diary entry 
Evelyn inventories “the repository of incomparable rarities”: 
Amongst the natural herbals most remarkable was the byssus marina and pinna 
marina; the male and female chamelion; an onocrotalus; an extraordinary great 
crocodile; some of the Orcades anates, held here for great rarity; likewise, a 
salamander; the male and female manucodiata...papyrus, made of several reeds, 
and some of silk; tables of the rinds of trees, written with Japonic characters; 
another of the branches of palm; many Indian fruits; a crystal that had a quantity 
of uncongealed water within its cavity; a petrified fisher’s net; divers sorts of 
tarantulas . . . (225-226) 
In addition to cataloging the museum’s contents, Evelyn’s description points to the 
seemingly arbitrary nature that characterized most seventeenth-century collections. From 
shells to paper, crocodiles to herbs, curio cabinets and wunderkammerns contained an 
eclectic mix that placed the natural alongside the man-made and the exotic alongside the 
domestic.1 Evelyn’s description, likewise, encapsulates the epistemology that 
                                                          
1 Frequently, these categories were intertwined in singular objects. Nuts were carved into 
goblets and crystals into vases; even the natural whorls of wood and veins of agates were 
frequently incorporated into painted scenes. See Daston and Park 255. 
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characterized the seventeenth century and the period’s approach to natural philosophy. 
Within it, Evelyn conflates natural and man-made objects, represents knowledge as a 
collection of discrete, mobile facts, and imposes implicit systems on an otherwise chaotic 
and unorderly mass of information by way of juxtaposition, analogy, and perspective. 
As with Evelyn’s, descriptions of all kinds across genres and disciplines represent 
the world and everything in it as a mosaic; they work associatively rather than 
contiguitively and reveal a fascination with fragments. For instance, in Oroonoko (1688) 
Aphra Behn describes the titular character as follows: 
He was pretty tall, but of a shape the most exact that can be fancy’d . . . His face 
was not of the brown rusty black which most of the nation are, but of perfect 
ebony, or polished jett. His eyes were the most awful that cou’d be seen, and very 
piercing; the white of ‘em being like snow, as were his teeth. His nose was rising 
and Roman, instead of African and flat. His mouth the finest shaped that could be 
seen . . . The whole proportion and air of his face was so nobly and exactly 
form’d, that bating his color, there could be nothing in nature more agreeable and 
handsome . . . (20-21) 
While Behn’s linguistic dismemberment of Oroonoko foreshadows his actual 
dismemberment at the novel’s end, it is not unusual for the period. Like Evelyn, Behn 
relies on a process of layering singular and minute details by emphasizing smaller and 
smaller components of individual entities. For instance, Oroonoko’s eyes are reduced to 
the sclera (“the white of ‘em”). Consequently, the image of Oroonoko that slowly 
emerges—eyes, nose, teeth—is reliant on the accumulation of discrete parts, all of which 
are more clearly delineated than the whole. The period’s relentless attention to parts and 
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conception of knowledge as a process of accretion laid the groundwork for the language 
of nature to become that of system.2  
 Like Evelyn’s and Behn’s descriptions, Women’s Writing and the Poetics of 
Scientific Knowledge, 1620-1740 makes connections between different objects and ideas, 
teasing out and identifying the relationships between seemingly disparate texts and 
disciplines. In so doing, it probes the porous boundary between literature and natural 
philosophy. In the late seventeenth century, science and scientific discoveries were a 
common literary motif: travel narratives spread knowledge of indigenous peoples, flora, 
and fauna, poems versified atomic theory, and satires on the Royal Society proliferated. 
The relationship between science and literature was, however, not unidirectional. Science 
often borrowed the language of literature. Because there was no default convention for 
presenting fact, natural philosophers turned to and adapted available literary technologies. 
Francis Bacon went so far as to assert that poetic expression was part of the process of 
scientific discovery; as paraphrased by Sprat, Bacon saw simile and metaphor as not just 
useful but also essential: “the Comparisons which [experiments] may afford will be 
intelligible to all, because they . . . make the most vigorous Impressions on Mens Fancie” 
(qtd. in Preston 10). The desire to reform the previous century’s knowledge of the world 
based on direct observation heightened the importance of how to express that knowledge. 
“How to do science,” according to Claire Preston, “was not just an empirical question but 
also a rhetorical one: it was a question of how to say it” (10). And, as Preston notes 
“saying and doing in early-modern science are not wholly distinct, that literary 
                                                          
2 For more on the way system operated as a genre in the late seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, see Siskin. 
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expressions by scientists are often functional and recapitulate their scientific thinking 
rather than simply decorate it—that res and verba are of one house” (10). Consequently, 
contemporary critics generally acknowledge that the two disciplines—literature and 
science—were once not so far afield. As Jonathan Kramnick argues, while the two 
disciplines “have grown to seem far flung,” they were inextricably intertwined (11). What 
binds science and literature during the period is not simply content or rhetoric, however, 
but methodology. Both imaginative writers and natural philosophers represented a 
fractured and atomized view of the world. As such, the methodologies undergirding 
scientific experimentation that we accept as a priori today were developed communally 
and through a confluence of interdisciplinary and cultural concerns.  
 Of these concerns, understanding life—both its origins and operations—
predominated. From Bacon to John Locke, philosophers debated whether life was 
animated by God or was simply the byproduct of carefully arranged cogs or atoms. 
Experimental scientists, such as Robert Boyle, Richard Lower, and Robert Hooke, 
suffocated birds, vivisected dogs, and bought, sold, and collected preparations—organs 
that were preserved and suspended in jars—in their quest for natural knowledge. 
Simultaneously, imaginative writers populated their works with sentient atoms, 
metaphorically travelled through the body’s circulatory system, and imagined earrings as 
capable of containing multiple universes. More than anecdotes in the annals of weird 
science and literature, these experiments, texts, and material artifacts speak to the ethos of 
the age; following Bacon’s call for controlled experiments that constrained and altered 
nature by the “art and the hand of man,” seventeenth-century men and women 
approached the study of natural phenomena by separating them into their constituent 
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parts (Works IV:29). Consequently, they blurred the boundary between art and nature, 
living and dead. As Friedrich Engels says of the Baconian method:  
The analysis of Nature into its individual parts, the grouping of the different 
natural processes and natural objects in definite classes, the study of the internal 
anatomy of organic bodies in their manifold forms—these were the fundamental 
conditions of the gigantic strides in our knowledge of Nature which have been 
made during the last four hundred years. But this method of investigation has also 
left us as a legacy the habit of observing natural objects and natural processes in 
their isolation, detached from the whole vast interconnection of things; and 
therefore not in their motion, but in their repose; not as essentially changing, but 
as fixed constants; not in their life, but in their death (26-29) 
While seventeenth-century writers did distinguish between things that were natural and 
living and things that were artificial and lifeless, this binary division often breaks down 
on closer inspection. Hooke, for example, deemed the microscope an “artificial organ” 
that was instrumental in revealing “the hidden unknown texture of bodies” (204); Thomas 
Hobbes used a mechanical body—the wooden, clockwork automaton—to represent the 
social and political body (Leviathan 9); and, seventeenth-century anatomists, such as 
Walter Charleton, injected wax and mercury into various organs so as to preserve and 
uncover their microsystems.3 
                                                          
3 By the 1650s anatomists turned from air to wax injections, which served the dual 
purpose of highlighting and preserving the body’s hollow structures. In the 1680s 
mercury injections were used to further delineate fine structures. The practice was 
eagerly adopted; as William Hunter avowed, “there is no making a good practical 
anatomist without it” (qt. in Cunningham, Anatomist Anatomis’d 237); for a discussion 
on the use of mercury injections, see Hendriksen 529. 
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Poets and novelists also explored living systems through artificial means.4 For 
Alexander Pope, there was little difference between the two. As he writes in An Essay on 
Man (1733/34), “All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee” (I.X.IX: 52). By theorizing 
what it is that separates the human from the inhuman imaginative writers were forced to 
debate matters of existence, motivation, and feeling; as Kramnick notes, they often did so 
by applying principles from natural philosophy to questions of human action. Like the 
natural philosophers who parsed nature, erecting artificial systems so as to model its 
essential elements and laws of operation, imaginative writers mapped living systems onto 
social systems.  
The seemingly dizzying array of disconnected information and objects of 
fascination that made their way into the philosophical and imaginative texts of the 
seventeenth century all represented different ways to structure, acquire, and represent 
knowledge; in turn, the shape knowledge took was central to debates on how to 
apprehend the natural world. Among the numerous theories meant to describe the natural 
world, mechanism, vitalism, and atomism dominated during the period. Likening the 
universe to a clock, mechanism, as portrayed by Thomas Hobbes, Rene Descartes, and 
Isaac Newton, explains all matter and natural laws in terms of machines; the world and 
everything in it is designed and created with divine intent. As such, God is considered the 
master craftsman. Consequently, natural systems begin to look very much like artificial 
systems; if the world is natural to man but unnatural to God, man-made worlds can, 
likewise, be simultaneously natural and unnatural. For this reason, mechanistic 
                                                          
4 For more on the ways imaginative writers challenged the boundaries of the animate and 
the human, see Deutsch and Terrall. 
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philosophy underscores the ambiguity of the natural/artificial dichotomy and calls into 
question its presumed self-evidence.5 As R. Hooykaas has argued, mechanization 
includes not simply mathematical formulation but, importantly, “mechanical (nonnatural; 
artificial) instruments for the investigation of nature, the effacing of any radical 
distinction between the natural and the artificial, and the introduction of mechanical 
models of natural things” (40).  
Like mechanism, vitalism and atomism also derive their explanatory power from 
the belief that nature can be comprehended by artificially breaking it into its constituent 
parts. For instance, atomism argues that the universe is comprised of relatively simple, 
immutable, minute particles. The multiplicity of visible forms in nature is based upon 
differences in these particles and in their configurations. As formulated by Pierre 
Gassendi, atoms, of which God has created a finite number, collide in an empty space, 
resulting in the constitution of the physical world. In Philosophiae Epicuri Syntagma 
(1649), Gassendi, positing a middle ground between dogmatism and skepticism, argues 
that while knowledge of the essence of things is impossible, one can acquire probable 
knowledge of the natural world that is sufficient to explain and predict experience. A 
mechanistic atomist, Gassendi believed that, because the phenomenal world is related to 
the atomic world, there is no need to explain events in terms of Aristotelian teleology 
(Fisher). As with mechanistic philosophy, atomism muddies simple binaries between the 
natural and the artificial; because atomism is based on invisible particles, it is premised 
                                                          
5 In its medieval instantiation mechanistic philosophy was imbued with agency; as agents 
of the church, clockwork automata and other artificial mechanisms were thought to 
contain vital energy (Riskin Restless). For more on Descartes and mechanistic 
philosophy, see Daniel Garber and Snider. 
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on manufactured descriptions of natural processes. Consequently, natural and 
metaphorical explanations of the universe become one and the same for atomists.  
Impelled by a different a worldview, vitalistic philosophers, such as Francis 
Glisson, posited the existence of an aetheral flame to explain life. In Tractatus de Natura 
Substantiae Energetica (1672), Glisson redefines the relationship between the natural 
operations of the body and forms of sentient perception. Natural perception, according to 
Glisson, meant an act of vital reactivity embedded in matter, which plays a critical role of 
coordinating the operations of matter, life, and knowledge within a unified view of 
nature. For Glisson and other vitalists, living organisms are fundamentally different from 
non-living entities because they contain some non-physical element, i.e., a vital principle. 
Vitalism not only makes no distinction between animate and inanimate matter, it also 
suggests that the invisible can be made visible through artificial means (Cunningham 
English Manuscripts). As a result, the invisible became associated with matter and not 
merely the metaphysical, lending credence to vitalistic worldviews and explaining, 
perhaps, the popularity of anatomical theaters and public dissections at a time when 
sensory perceptions, especially sight, were deemed suspect.  
The competing theories proffered to describe and comprehend the natural world 
were more than just intellectual, however. As critics such as Peter Hans Reill and 
Michael Hunter have noted, attempts to understand life and the natural world were 
impelled by a desire to organize the workings of the social order (“Vitalizing”; 
“Introduction”). Because nature and society were considered interconnected a change in 
natural philosophy required “an equally strong realignment of social, political, religious 
and cultural sensibilities” (Reill, “Vitalizing” 369). Given that some of the most 
 9 
important effects of the scientific revolution and debates on how to comprehend nature 
were not just cerebral but also social, women had a large stake in defining the discourse 
of science; views of nature prescribed views of conduct. As such, women weighed in on 
competing scientific theories, and, most importantly, demarcated the consequences of this 
new knowledge for society as a whole and for women in particular. Numerous examples 
abound. Two of which do not fit the scope of this dissertation, but which are nevertheless 
apt, include Haywood’s Anti-Pamela (1741) and Frances Burney’s Evelina (1778). In 
Anti-Pamela Haywood engages with Newton’s intromittist theory of optics, which argues 
that the eye receives impressions that are subsequently imprinted on the mind; that is, the 
one who sees is the passive object rather than, as we tend to think today, the active gazer. 
As Rivka Swenson writes, Haywood applies the intromittist theory in Anti-Pamela to 
imagine potential agency for women while simultaneously pushing back against female 
objectification. Likewise, in Evelina, Burney equates femininity with the automaton to 
detail “the possibility of generating individual affect within the very confines of the 
mechanized subjectivity that appears to limit the depth of female expression” while 
critiquing it (Park 23). For Julie Park, the mechanical pineapple, which opens to reveal 
singing birds and which captivates the novel’s Madame Duval but not Evelina, is 
symbolic of the supposed model of ideal femininity and the mechanical and textual 
exemplars meant to extoll it: charming on the surface (38-39). For Haywood and Burney, 
as with many other female authors of the period, imaginative writing provided a forum in 
which observation and experimentation, both the of the literary and scientific kind, took 
shape. 
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Like most historians of science and literary critics, I take as a given the fractured 
and atomized view of knowledge, or what Bruno Latour calls “immutable mobiles,” 
within the period (7). I also recognize the confluence of literature and natural philosophy. 
My feminist approach to the history of science adds to these arguments, however, by 
making explicit the contributions of female, imaginative writers. In so doing, I follow in 
the footsteps of many feminist critics who, Jennie Batchelor and Gillian Dow assert, are 
“committed to making visible what was always there but was often, and still is often, 
obscured: the contribution of eighteenth-century women’s writing to all our histories” 
(14). Although barred, institutionally, from practicing experimental science and natural 
philosophy, women remained active in molding new forms of knowledge. From creating 
hybrid narratives in order to account for different ways of knowing to critiquing 
empirical practices and the illusion of objectivity it necessitated, female, imaginative 
writers created scientific knowledge and influenced the methodologies undergirding 
scientific experimentation. As such, Women’s Writing and the Poetics of Scientific 
Knowledge, 1620-1740 continues, in part, the vital project of recovery. As Hooykaas 
laments, “Since all of the great figures of the Scientific Revolution were male, women 
were almost completely absent from the historical narrative” (12).  Yet female writers, 
such as Behn, Margaret Cavendish, Jane Barker, Eliza Haywood, and numerous others, 
frequently applied, challenged, and explored scientific concepts within their work. In so 
doing, they did more than just adopt or register scientific ideas; they transformed them. 
Because the discourse of natural philosophy knew no disciplinary or generic bounds, the 
plasticity of scientific writing provided women with the opportunity to make their mark. 
And, as this dissertation shows, they did so in many different ways. 
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Concomitantly, this dissertation also suggests that it was women’s very 
marginality that enabled their contributions, the value of which should not be 
underestimated. Their exclusion from the halls of the learned and the esteemed enabled 
them to create a nexus between types of discourse and the larger scientific and literary 
milieu. As Catherine Gray has argued in regard to public life, “Women’s marginality to 
traditional institutions of church and state . . . made them crucial figures for imagining an 
expanded public culture beyond these very institutions” (2-3). It also made them, in a 
sense, the ideal scientists. Practicing science required space and place free of 
interruption—a near impossibility for gentlemen virtuosi, such as Boyle. Querulously 
describing his visitors as “those disturbers of my work,” Boyle often bitterly complained 
of his social obligations and was not alone in doing so (qtd. in Boas 21). As Preston 
notes, “the dream of some sort of intellectual removal or segregation, the shapely ‘fiction 
of retreat’” proliferated (25). From Bacon’s The New Atlantis (1627) and Abraham 
Cowley’s plan for a philosophical college to Evelyn’s elaborate design for a private 
laboratory, the fantasy of withdrawal, though rarely realized because financially 
prohibitive, filled the textual domain.6 As such, much of what characterized the literary-
scientific, according to Preston, “is an essential, constitutive idea of enforced or 
discretionary withdrawal, both physical and conceptual, a distinct and coherent domain of 
civil behavior where generic and rhetorical shape based on investigative activity and 
discovery was indistinguishable from its scientific content” (29). Although not free from 
numerous obligations of their own, women’s relative exclusion from the public sphere is, 
                                                          
6 For more on these imagined places of retreat, see Preston, pp. 90-157. For more on John 
Evelyn’s designs, which he included in his unpublished manuscript on gardening, 
Elysium Britannicum, see Harris. 
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paradoxically, what allowed them to enter these conceptual spaces and communities of 
learning so often written about. Women’s status coupled with the fragmented nature of 
knowledge is, then, precisely what allowed them to write for and imagine a public that, 
Mihoko Suzuki argues, “did not yet exist” (23). As Isobel Grundy notes, “Women’s quest 
for improvement in, or control over, their own lives has been bound up with the struggle 
not so much to find a voice as to find an audience” (2). Because facts, now conceived of 
as separate from overarching theory, could be recombined and reconfigured, they enabled 
analogical and metaphorical thinking. Consequently, the immutable mobility of these 
facts allowed people to put them together and disseminate them in a variety of formats 
and texts; and women, not bound by the same rules as their male counterparts, did just 
that, using fiction as their canvas.  
Women’s Writing and the Poetics of Scientific Knowledge, 1620-1740 has two 
aims. Firstly, it seeks to show that our contemporary understanding of the natural world 
and the scientific method have a history that is largely one of fragments. Secondly, and 
more importantly, it demonstrates the value of reading imaginative writing alongside 
scientific developments of the day. Doing so exposes the fluidity between fields that were 
intimately connected and recovers the vital contributions that otherwise marginalized 
texts made to both literature and science. Focusing on women’s imaginative writing in 
particular reveals the power and limits that ostensibly liminal voices have. Consequently, 
it asks us to recast the narrative of the scientific revolution as one in which women played 
a central role, thereby taking up Betty Schellenberg’s challenge: to imagine women 
writers “at the center rather than on the margins, as the sought-after literary figure rather 
than at the periphery of someone else’s circle” (84). And indeed, the three female figures 
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who serve as the primary focus of this study, Margaret Cavendish, Aphra Behn, and Jane 
Barker, did just that. Endowed with an aristocratic title, the money to back it up, and a 
supportive husband, Cavendish flouted the rules of propriety. She dressed flamboyantly, 
used her status to demand an audience with the Royal Society, and self-published 
philosophical and literary works of all sorts—casting herself at the center of the literary 
and scientific milieu. Like Cavendish, Behn too paid little mind to the dictates of her 
gender. She unapologetically wrote for money, frequently played with and questioned 
gender roles, helped pave the way for the novel, and did not shy away from taking on 
new science—both satirically as well as seriously. Rather than flouting society, Barker, 
by contrast, self-consciously opted out in many ways. Eschewing marriage, she desires, 
instead, her closet where she is able “to serve her God, enjoy her books and her friends” 
(“Virgin Life” l. 36). As such, Barker is closer to representing the hermetic ideal 
imagined by Boyle, Evelyn, Cowley, and others. Yet, her isolation, like theirs, is 
primarily fictional. Although she followed James II into exile, she maintained active 
correspondence networks throughout her life and, like Cavendish and Behn, created 
communities in which she could thrive.  
 The fractured and fragmented nature of knowledge that Women’s Writing and the 
Poetics of Scientific Knowledge, 1620-1740 traces is mirrored within the text itself. Like 
the epistemology that characterized the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, 
the discrete parts of this dissertation are made whole through the imposition of analogy 
and juxtaposition. Each chapter focuses on disparate and ostensibly disconnected texts 
and contexts and functions as an individual piece of a larger puzzle rather than a step in a 
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linear and monolithic narrative.7 Broadly speaking, the second addresses the way in 
which social and political bodies were organized according to the principles of natural 
philosophy; the third locates the experimental protocols of natural philosophy within 
manuscript culture; the fourth demonstrates that the episodic and miscellaneous nature of 
scientific description is indebted to epistolary culture; and, the fifth shows how the 
discourse of embodiment in fictional and anatomical texts represents the body as an 
organizing abstraction that is only ever implied by its parts.  
Although I am interested, primarily, in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries, many of the ideas and approaches to natural phenomena were being thought 
through long before. For this reason, I focus on texts published between 1620 and 1740. 
While placing works such as Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum (1620), Hobbes’s 
Leviathan (1651), and Hooke’s Micrographia (1665) alongside Barker’s “A Farewell to 
Poetry with A Long Digression on Anatomy (1688), Cavendish’s Blazing World (1666), 
and Behn’s Love-Letters (1684-87), among others, I note the similar methodologies each 
employs. Through the synthesis of a wide range of cultural evidence, close reading, and 
computational analysis I ask questions of these texts that extend beyond the traditional 
literary purview, show the cross pollination between literature and science, and 
demonstrate the way in which women actively participated in creating scientific 
knowledge. 
Chapter Two, “Fictional Facts and Artificial Systems: Thomas Hobbes’s 
Leviathan and Margaret Cavendish’s Blazing World,” describes in greater detail the 
                                                          
7 As many historians of science argue, the scientific revolution does not fit a linear 
narrative of progress. See, for example, Shapin Scientific; Dascal and Boantza; 
Cunningham and Williams; Dear Revolutionizing; and Wootton. 
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implications of approaching the natural world through artificial means, one of which was 
that philosophical systems operated much like literary texts. In particular, Chapter Two 
tends to the construction of fictive systems within Leviathan and a Blazing World, 
showing how both Hobbes and Cavendish use fiction to model their political and social 
worlds. As Mary Morgan writes, narratives, even those of the scientific cast, create order 
among materials and derive their explanatory power from their ability to answer how and 
why questions. In essence, narratives are simultaneously acts of world creation and 
reflections of the world as it is. By using narrative to put forth their respective theories of 
government, Cavendish and Hobbes erect artificial systems. Consequently, examining 
Hobbes’s and Cavendish’s use of fiction provides insight into what they deem to be the 
essential elements and laws of operation governing the natural world. 
In contrast to Hobbes, Cavendish overtly recognized the way in which fiction was 
integral to both her and Hobbes’s respective theories of government. Importing much of 
her natural and political philosophy into her pseudo-science-fiction text, Cavendish uses 
fiction to both dramatize and enact the tenets she lays out in her non-fiction treatises—
tenets that Hobbes addressed nearly ten years earlier in Leviathan. In so doing, Cavendish 
throws into relief the way in which Hobbes’s theory of government is premised on the 
subjunctive while simultaneously engaging with and amending theories of the mind. 
Cavendish’s use of fiction is in line with her pantheistic, vitalistic natural philosophy. 
Because Cavendish does not believe that nature can be broken down or understood in 
relation to is parts, she emulates rather than parses nature, turning to fictional rather than 
actual examples in Blazing World. As such, Cavendish’s fantastical, labyrinthine 
narrative parallels her description of “Nature’s Works”: “so various and wonderful, that 
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no particular Creature is able to trace her ways” (51). By depicting the natural world as 
“self-moving,” comprised of “inanimate, sensitive and rational Matter,” Cavendish 
further plugs her theory of pantheistic vitalism and alludes to what she could only see as 
irreconcilable problems in Leviathan (80; 81); namely that matter, like nature, is self-
moving and that it is through fiction rather than “chopt logick” that one can offer an 
expanded vision of the natural world (58). Though they be fictional, Cavendish’s worlds 
are “composed onley of the Rational, which is the subtilest and purest degree of Matter” 
(100). Consequently, her political theory parallels her natural philosophy and presents a 
view of reality that, for her, is closer to reality.  
Chapter Three, “Jane Barker, Manuscript Culture, and Epistemology of the 
Microscope,” examines scientific diagrams and scientific poetry through the figures of 
Robert Hooke, curator to the Royal Society and author of Micrographia, and Jane Barker, 
a gentlewoman whose work was both circulated in manuscripts and appeared in print. 
The experimental scientist’s practice of approaching nature through artificial means led 
to the acceptance of studying its constituent parts. This in turn, led to an understanding of 
knowledge as a collection of discrete, observable phenomena, which had to be 
corroborated before being considered fact. Microscopes, in particular, exemplified the 
need to verify findings through multiple witnesses and replication. Reliably unreliable, 
microscopes magnified the fraught nature of the senses and the vastness of the unknown. 
While seventeenth-century microscopes opened up a tiny world previously unseen, they 
were not only difficult to operate but also varied significantly; what one saw underneath 
its lens could, therefore, differ drastically from one microscopist to the next. In perhaps 
what is the earliest version of crowdsourcing, experimental scientists accounted for this 
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instability by diffusing authority—deliberately seeking out and amalgamating multiple 
perspectives. While scholars such as Walter Ong have traced the conception of facts to 
print culture, I offer a different analogy, arguing that experimental science and 
manuscript culture share a similar bias and social logic (308). In the same way that poets 
created knowledge communally by passing around and emending manuscripts, so too did 
scientists.  
In Chapter Three I show, in particular, how Jane Barker’s “A Farewell to Poetry 
with a Long Digression on Anatomy”—a manuscript poem in which Barker describes the 
circulation of the blood—and Robert Hooke’s Micrographia represent the acquisition of 
knowledge as a social process of accumulation. Like Hooke’s scientific diagrams, 
Barker’s poem enlarges the body beyond its normal point of recognition, thereby 
decentering the authority of human perspective. Barker does not reject sensory perception 
entirely, however; instead, she embraces multiple perspectives and experiences so as to 
circumvent the problems associated with the senses; namely, that they are an inaccurate 
measure of reality at best. For Barker it is only through the combination of multiple, 
inevitably flawed perspectives that we can arrive at anything resembling truth. 
Consequently, Barker creates new knowledge by synthesizing old and often contradictory 
anatomical views with contemporary theories, especially William Harvey’s. In so doing, 
she anticipates and preemptively solves the problem of the nature and limits of human 
understanding that writers such as Locke would later grapple with. In embracing the 
multiple Barker embraces the belief that parts of a whole lead to greater knowledge. 
Chapter Four, “Promiscuous Experiments: Aphra Behn’s Love-Letters, 
Epistolarity, and the Problem of Description,” reads Behn’s epistolary romance alongside 
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the Royal Society’s project of presenting information via “the Scheme of Heads of 
Inquiry.” The Society’s scheme itemized natural phenomena, provided an agenda for 
further experiments, and codified a set of conventions for representing individual 
experience and observation. The form of writing that emerged consisted, primarily, of 
organizing experimental tracts by way of a list of topics that were meant to both 
proliferate an olio of observations centered on a wide array of subjects as well as a 
multitude centered on singular items. In addition to providing suggestions for further 
research, however, the Society’s scheme, which is most often associated with Boyle, 
frequently prescribed what and how experimentalists were meant to see, giving them 
precise instructions on what to look for. As such, the written descriptions the scheme 
elicited did not represent individual experience or detached observation but, instead, a 
mastery of genre.  
The strictures that guided scientific writing and its miscellaneous nature have an 
obvious corollary in seventeenth-century epistolarity. As Roger Iliffe says, “To an 
overwhelming extent, the Society was its correspondence” (173). Philosophical 
Transactions was filled with printed epistles and natural philosophers relied on 
correspondence to share and acquire information across the continent.8 Boyle’s The 
Christian Virtuoso (1690), which Karen Bloom Gevirtz describes as a “declaration of the 
experimenter’s self,” opened with a letter and continues to address a correspondent 
throughout the text (31). Moreover, and as with scientific writing, letter-writing guides of 
the period established vocabularies and provided exemplars for how to represent 
                                                          
8 According to Atkinson, the letter represented the “single most common generic form” 
of articles published in Philosophical Transactions between 1675 and 1875 (81). 
 19 
individual, and subjective experience. In so doing, letter-writing guides, much like the 
Society’s scheme, fashioned subjectivity into a recognizable and conventional form. 
Consequently, the portrait of the author that emerges in letters, both public and private, 
was deeply influenced and shaped by generic conventions that governed the form.  
Recognizing the impact of genre on descriptions of individual experience, Behn 
uses Love-Letters to probe the limits of human knowledge but comes to a radically 
different conclusion than Jane Baker. Whereas Barker suggests that the instability of 
experience can be mitigated by the amalgamation of multiple perspectives, leading to a 
more accurate picture of reality and account of knowledge, Behn questions the project of 
empiricism and the methodologies underlying it. For Behn, the act of observing and 
experiencing are intimately connected to and influenced by the act of communicating. By 
adhering to the form of epistolary romance—in which generic conventions and formulaic 
descriptions are particularly salient—Behn illustrates the tension between subjectivity 
and representation. Ultimately, Behn argues that because genre influences perception, 
fictional and scientific descriptions can never offer unadulterated access to nature or the 
world. 
Chapter Five, “Distant Reading the Body, 1640-1699,” further parses descriptive 
practices, tracing linguistic representations of embodiment across fictional and 
anatomical discourse. The turn to systematicity and the fragmentation of knowledge, 
which I sketched in the previous chapters, led to a profound reorientation in the way that 
the corporeal body was theorized and discussed. In this chapter, I show how the body, 
once seen as a unified whole, became a physiological object defined by its parts and 
processes. This new understanding of the body is apparent in the period’s anatomical 
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descriptions as well as in its imaginative and philosophical writing. Armed with pens 
rather than scalpels, novelists committed to new notions of realism are largely silent 
about corporeality. Seventeenth-century authors tend to write more about the clothes 
people wore than about their bodies, omitting basic information such as the color of eyes 
and hair or the contours of faces. Even when their descriptions are evocatively physical 
and tactile, as with Behn’s description of Oroonoko, they are so focused on the body’s 
parts that the body as a whole ceases to come into focus. 
Curiously, the body’s illegibility came about at the exact moment that the body 
began to be known. Advances in anatomy promised access to the body’s interior recesses 
and the field flourished in the seventeenth century. Because the body of general 
knowledge was thought to be shaped and formed through the fragmentation of the 
physical body, anatomy had broad philosophical and political implications. The 
anatomical imperative nosce te ipsum—know thyself—permeated all aspects of 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century life, leading Johann Veslingus to assert that “he that 
knows himselfe aright cannot but know all the world, because he is an Epitome of it” 
(qtd. in Sawday, Body Emblazoned 34). To know the body was to know one’s own place 
in the world. Nevertheless, within fictional and anatomical discourse, the body is always 
only implied. Like much in the seventeenth century, the body becomes subservient to the 
smaller and smaller parts that comprise it, both at the level of description and practice. 
In order to unearth conceptions of the seventeenth-century body not visible at the 
level of close reading, this chapter applies computational semantics to two subsets of the 
publicly available EEBO-TCP corpus: one anatomical, one fictional. Parsing each 
document into smaller and smaller sections, as the anatomist does the body, reveals 
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word-use at the paragraph level allowing me to track precise patterns not otherwise 
apparent. Modeled computationally, the word body is a conceptual object with many 
semantic parts, only some of which are shared across the two sub-collections. What 
signifies the body is not physicality. As a referential figure that points to something other 
than its own corporeality, the fictional and anatomical body becomes an always-in-
motion vehicle of meaning and an organizing abstraction that can be inferred but never 
seems to be materialized on the space of a page. 
Katherine Binhammer has, somewhat polemically, announced the “death of 
women’s writing” (61). Arguments about it, once radical, are now well-worn: “this 
woman writer found her voice by claiming maternal authority or this woman writer 
claimed authority by refusing the maternal voice or this woman writer was constrained by 
a misogynist reception of her work or this woman writer was a savvy and active agent in 
print culture” (62). Women’s Writing and the Poetics of Scientific Knowledge, 1620-1740 
seeks to do more than elucidate the particulars of women who fit that pattern, however. 
Instead, it suggests that studying female, imaginative writers through the lens of the 
history of science can illustrate what Preston has described as “a co-dependent, mutually 
influential relationship between literary and scientific expression,” which, with a few 
exceptions, has been inadequately recognized (8-9). When read outside the narrow 
strictures of marriage plots, domesticity, and attempts to subvert the patriarchy we can 
begin to see that much of women’s imaginative writing responds to, challenges, and 
modifies philosophical ideas that dominate the history of science, including those of 
Hobbes, Hooke, and Boyle. As such, women’s writing exemplifies, and thereby makes 
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visible to us, the role literature played in instantiating and normalizing the 
epistemological turn that governed new science. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FICTIONAL FACTS AND ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS: MARGARET 
CAVENDISH’S BLAZING WORLD AND THOMAS HOBBES’S 
LEVIATHAN
 
Fact and fiction in the early modern period were notoriously difficult to 
distinguish. Along with numerous others, John Richetti, Catherine Gallagher, Adrian 
Johns, and Michael McKeon have all shown how early novelists often relied on claims to 
historicity and facticity.9 In this chapter I address how writers modeled their natural, 
social, and political environments by using the tropes and modalities of fiction. Locating 
an experimental modality in fictive discourse, John Bender writes: “fictions, be they 
hypotheses or novels, yield a provisional reality, an ‘as if,’ that possesses an explanatory 
power lacking in ordinary experiences” (Ends 22). This quality of fiction allows us to 
look at it as a kind of artificial system, which mirrors real systems by putting into play 
                                                          
9 Looking at Charlotte Lennox’s The Female Quixote, Bender examines “the new novel 
as a mode of fiction that dwells in fact” (Ends 24). Gallagher contends that it was as late 
as the midcentury that discourses of fictionality finally began to develop (“The Rise”). 
McKeon, examining a 1672 print catalog of books, too, notes “the absence of any will to 
distinguish ‘history’ and ‘literature,’ between ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’” (Origins 26). Calling 
the novel a convenient label that represents twenty-first century assumptions about 
imaginative fiction, Richetti argues that the eighteenth-century novel played with the 
“still blurry” division of fact and fiction, “often presenting fiction as fact and dramatizing 
fact in ways we would find more appropriate to fiction” (“Introduction” 2). Similarly, 
Scholar and Tadie argue that fiction in early-modern parlance was not identified solely 
with the novel as we are wont to believe and that the term was polyvalent. This is not to 
suggest that the theorization of fiction and its relation to the world in which one lived 
were not on the minds of many long before the seventeenth century, as Aristotle’s Poetics 
and Sidney’s response testifies. It is to say, however, that fiction as an epistemological 
category was only loosely defined; consequently, fiction often encompassed history, 
natural philosophy, and political theory. 
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their essential elements and laws of operation. In particular, this essay tends to the 
construction of artificial systems in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651) and Margaret 
Cavendish’s The Description of a New World, Called the Blazing World (1666). Because 
fiction organizes the workings of the social world and the natural order it provides a way 
to investigate what is essential to life. Consequently, examining the ways Hobbes and 
Cavendish use fictional modalities to create artificial systems enables one to examine 
what Hobbes and Cavendish identified as the most essential elements of life. For Hobbes 
the essential can be found in the state of nature and for Cavendish in “the most pure, that 
is, the rational parts of Matter” (Blazing “Epilogue”). 
Leviathan, which represents a systematic account of civil science according to 
Hobbes, is indisputably a work of non-fiction; it depicts a demonstrative and causal 
account of society that, Hobbes, believes, all knowledge should be premised on.10 And 
yet, as Quentin Skinner writes, Leviathan’s effects are strikingly different from the “self-
consciously scientific austerities” of the earlier work it borrows from: most notably 
Hobbes’s The Elements of Law (1640) and De Cive (1642) (4). Within it, Hobbes 
employs metaphor, analogy, and simile—hallmarks of the humanist rhetoric he had 
previously rejected—to a much greater degree than before. Victoria Kahn too notes the 
differences, writing that the first contract of Leviathan is not a political but a literary 
contract, thereby emphasizing “the fictional dimension of contract to a greater degree 
than before” (Wayward 6). Likewise, Patricia Springborg notes that “between the 
Elements and Leviathan, Hobbes had refined his theory [of psychological empiricism] to 
                                                          
10 As Hobbes describes in The Elements and De Cive, scientific demonstrations follow 
three basic steps: 1. ensuring that definitions and names are consistent; 2. creating 
syllogisms; and, 3. linking propositions (qtd. in Skinner 295-296). 
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provide a role for outrageous fictions” (276). Not surprisingly, then, within the text 
Hobbes also reevaluates the roles that fancy and judgement play in scientific 
demonstrations; rather than merely oppose them, he describes them as mutually 
constitutive. For Hobbes, fancy and imagination represent the residue of sensory 
information that can be combined and recombined in several ways to create similitudes. 
Hobbes therefore upholds the empiricist view that “there is no conception in a man’s 
mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by part, been begotten upon the organs of sense. 
The rest are derived from that original” (Leviathan 13). To that, however, Hobbes adds 
the element of language: arguing that understanding is “nothing else but a conception 
caused by speech” (Leviathan 30).11 While recognizing that words and the reality they 
represent are fully human constructions, Hobbes also recognizes that they shape the way 
we live, act in, and perceive the world.12 As Kahn explains, “the displacement of the 
object by the subject’s imagination or fancy means that nature itself is the product of our 
imaginative construction” (Wayward 144). In contrast, to have sound judgement or 
reason is to observe differences rather than similitudes, “which is called Distinguishing, 
and Discerning, and Judging between thing and thing” (Hobbes, Leviathan 51). For 
Hobbes, judgement is the faculty that enables scientific demonstration. In Leviathan, 
however, Hobbes upholds the use of fancy, writing: “In demonstration . . . Judgement 
does all; except sometimes the understanding have need to be opened by some apt 
                                                          
11 For more on Hobbes’s conception of sense and imagination, see Gert. 
12 Engells argues that for Hobbes, the imagination is a faculty that “actively forms our 
conceptions of the world, and, compounded and regulated to form an end or design 
governing its function, it becomes the process of artistic creation” (15). For more on 
Hobbes’s distinction between language, marks, and natural and artificial signs, see 
Nerney. 
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similitude; and then there is so much use of Fancy” (52). While many scholars have 
begun to point to the literary and rhetorical facets of Leviathan, fewer have explored how 
Hobbes bolsters his conception of artificiality, which is integral to his civil philosophy, 
through fictional modalities.13 Even fewer have addressed the implications of it on 
Hobbes’s conception of life. Hobbes not only creates a space for fancy within scientific 
treatises but relies on it to erect what is essentially a system of artificial life: the 
commonwealth. 
Like Hobbes, Cavendish, too, does not believe that nature can ever be fully 
known. However, for Cavendish nature is incomprehensible because man “himself is part 
of her” (Observations II.7: 24). As such, she too relies on fancy, turning her attention 
“from a Natural World, to an Artificial” one in Blazing World (96). Within the text 
Cavendish narrativizes the philosophical views that she laid out in her companion piece, 
Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, through the tale of shipwrecked woman 
who becomes Empress of a previously unknown world. In perhaps the narrative’s most 
fantastic twist, the Empress is later joined by the Duchess of Newcastle who, under the 
guidance of immaterial spirits, learns how to create her own worlds. Although Cavendish, 
like Hobbes, indemnifies much of her argument through similar claims to pure 
rationality, her philosophy’s fictional modalities are premised on pantheistic and vitalist, 
rather than mechanistic, assumptions. Because “Nature is but one Infinite Self-moving 
Body” it is in a state of constant flux and therefore cannot be understood through rigorous 
demonstration (Blazing 48). Instead, Cavendish forwards her discussion through overtly 
                                                          
13 Recent work on Hobbes and artifice include Prokhovnik;, the 2015 special issue of 
Hobbes Studies 28, no.1, which features articles on Hobbes, nature, and artifice; Epstein; 
and Cooper. 
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and purposefully constructed fictional tropes. Unlike Hobbes, who attempts to distance 
himself from this philosophical-fictional quagmire, Cavendish embraces it. As Diana 
Barnes has argued, Cavendish sees imagination and reason as “two different elements in 
a unified system” (161). Consequently, Cavendish sees fiction is an alternative model for 
understanding the natural world not because of its persuasive power but because it 
emulates rather than parses nature.  
In the first section I explore the concept of artificiality through the figures of 
Francis Bacon and Hobbes. As has been well documented, Hobbes not only served 
briefly as an amanuensis for Bacon but was influenced by much of his thinking.14 
Although Bacon and Hobbes frequently place “artificial” in opposition to “natural,” they 
regularly complicated the relationship between the two, mapping artificial experience 
onto natural phenomena to isolate and examine them. As I argue in the second section, 
Hobbes’s use of metaphor, which elides, or, at the very least, evades the differences 
between natural beings and automata reflects his revision of the natural/artificial 
dichotomy. As he moves from theorizing the commonwealth as an artificial body to 
theorizing the social body and legal persona, artifice and fiction merge; the covenant he 
relies on to make his case for government is simultaneously both. Although Hobbes uses 
fictional tropes to imbue Leviathan with explanatory power, he continues to insist that the 
text represents a purely systematic and scientific approach consistent with his mechanist 
philosophy. Cavendish, on the other hand, embraces fancy, repackaging Observations 
upon Experimental Philosophy in its fictional form. In the final section I argue that 
                                                          
14 In The Cambridge Companion alone Tuck, Sorrell, and Malcolm “A Summary 
Biography” all make mention of Hobbes’s relationship with Bacon. For a more detailed 
account of Hobbes and Bacon, see Bunce.  
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Cavendish employs fiction in much the same manner as Hobbes. Because her 
understanding of the natural world was premised on a version of pantheistic vitalism, 
however, she does so to a greatly different effect. Ultimately, this chapter aims to shows 
how, despite their different world views, both Hobbes and Cavendish offer extended 
inquisitions on theories of life and fiction that are based on the belief that living systems 
are best comprehended in their artificial forms. 
2.1 CONCEPTIONS OF ARTIFICIALITY: FRANCIS BACON AND THOMAS 
HOBBES 
 
In Novum Organum (1620) Bacon highlights an Aristotelian understanding of the 
dichotomy between art and nature.15 Writing that “the secrets of nature reveal themselves 
more clearly under the vexations of art than when they go their own way,” Bacon retains 
a distinction between the two that is premised on polarization (Works IV.1: 95). While art 
can help to reveal nature, it is separate from it. Within the same sentence, however, 
Bacon begins to blur the divide by aligning artificiality—the purposeful manipulation of 
natural phenomena as well as the creation of man-made systems that mimic nature—with 
experimental practice. Because artificiality provided a way to tease out properties that are 
otherwise intangible, it was instrumental to his reform; as Bacon writes, “things which 
strike the sense outweigh things which do not immediately strike it, though they be more 
                                                          
15 As laid out by Aristotle’s Physics: plants, animals, and simple bodies (“earth, fire, air, 
water”) are natural because “each of them has within itself a principle of motion and of 
stationariness.” By contrast, “a bed, and a coat and anything else of that sort, qua 
receiving these designations—i.e. in so far as they are products of art—have no innate 
impulse to change” (II.9: 236). As such, art could imitate nature but never surpass her 
because it did not possess internal principles of change and reproduction. However, as 
practices of grafting and other forms of fusing art and nature became more widely 
accepted, even if only under the auspices of wonder, alternative views became possible. 
See Daston and Park, especially pp. 255-301. 
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important” (Works IV.1: 58). For Bacon, there are several acceptable means of 
“conveyance”—bringing things to the senses—including adding or substituting 
something to an object if it cannot be seen (“as in communication by beacons, bells, and 
the like”); bringing to the surface things that are otherwise emerged (“thus the condition 
of the human body is known by the state of the pulse, the urine, and the like”); or, more 
commonly, investigating complex phenomena by breaking them into their constituent 
parts (Works IV.2: 194-195). Using milk as an example of a complex body, Bacon writes 
that the separate elements comprising it, “butter, curd, whey, &c.,” “are made manifest to 
the sense by artificial and skillful separations” (Works IV.2: 194-195). Although Bacon 
advocates throughout Novum Organum the principles of induction, he here emphasizes 
the integral role of artificiality to inductive processes. In its early-modern instantiation, 
artificial is not simply used in opposition to nature but also points to invention and 
system, which is why Bacon is able to assert that “by art and the hand of man [nature] is 
forced out of her natural state, and squeezed and moulded” (Works IV: 33).16 By 
squeezing and molding nature Bacon is essentially modeling it, breaking down complex, 
natural bodies, such as milk, so as to identify and study the operations of their particulars. 
In so doing, Bacon fuses the artificial with the natural, creating and studying artificial 
systems in order to better understand their natural counterparts. 
Describing experimentation, Bacon further argues that it is only such “nice tests 
of bodies whether natural or artificial . . . [that can] make manifest to the sense things not 
                                                          
16As Prokhovnik explains, in the seventeenth century “artificial” retained its positive 
classical and medieval association with “imitation” and had begun, by mid-century, to 
refer positively to systems and classifications as well as mechanical construction and 
manufacture (79). 
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directly perceptible, by means of those which are” (Works IV.2: 200). Asserting that 
experimentation is the only way to isolate and thereby understand natural phenomena, 
Bacon directly links experimentation to artificiality. In so doing, Bacon propounds 
studying a man-made version of nature, infusing that which is artificial into his 
observations of the natural world. As Richard Bauman and Charles Briggs write: “Bacon 
played a key role in the invention of nature, in the carving out of a domain that excluded 
humans and simultaneously seemed to be made just for them—to harness and control for 
their own mental and material progress” (19). Consequently, Bacon sees art as a “species 
of natural history”: although “it is the fashion to talk as if art were something different 
from nature . . . things artificial differ from things natural not in form or essence, but only 
in the efficient” (Works V: 506). Therefore, to omit “the experiments of the mechanical 
arts” from the history of animals and plants is to commit an egregious error (Works V: 
506). While Bacon uses the term “artificial” straightforwardly as an antithesis to 
“natural,” he implicitly subverts that distinction through his experimental philosophy.  
Bacon’s philosophical thought encompasses all sorts of artificiality broadly 
constructed.  In The New Atlantis (1627), for example, Bacon turns to imaginative writing 
to create an artificial environment, peppering it with objects that represent natural and 
artificial phenomena as well as objects in which the two are conjoined. The House of 
Solomon contains caves used for “the imitation of natural mines; and the producing, also 
of new artificial metals” (29), “a number of artificial wells and fountains, made in 
imitation of the natural sources” (30), orchards in which trees are made “by art . . .to 
come earlier or later than their seasons” (30), “birds and beasts which we use not only for 
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view or rareness, but likewise for dissections and trials” (31), and so forth. In Bacon’s 
utopian vision, nature is perfected by and best studied through artificial means.  
Just as artificiality is critical to Bacon’s research institute, it is also key to his 
narrative development, explaining, perhaps, why Bacon turned to fiction to illustrate his 
scientific ideal. As Erin Kathleen Kelly has recently argued, narrative functions much 
like Bacon's inductive process which “moves constantly between the paratactic mode of 
the list and the hypotactic mode of narrative” (149). Bacon’s lists, aphorisms, and “tables 
of discovery” organize information, or “particulars,” but do not lead to conclusions 
(Works IV.I: 96).17 Instead, they point to the incomplete, communal, and provisional 
nature of knowledge. In contrast, narratives, like lists and aphorisms, represent 
experience by illustrating relationships between phenomena but can further illustrate how 
such relationships develop over time. For Laura Dassow Walls, fiction, like science, 
gathers together “heterogeneous elements into a chimerical gestalt,” thereby “knitting 
together matter and meaning” (591-92). That is, narrative relies on and deploys 
particulars but contextualizes them in a broader, more generalizable scheme. 
Consequently, narrative works similarly to scientific practices as well as to artificial 
systems. And because it does, narrative, especially utopian narrative, is an ideal vehicle 
for imagining and constructing commonwealths.18 Narrative deploys discrete and 
ostensibly known phenomena in order to model possible futures. 
                                                          
17 See also Zittel et al.  
18As Kelly writes, utopias are both “no-where and no-when” (163). As such, utopia is 
capacious enough to represent a host of possibilities not easily refuted. In Rees’s words, 
utopian fiction “concentrates on what might be made of this world” thereby 
“reassess[ing] the basic definition of what it is to be human” (6). Consequently, utopian 
fiction throws into relief one’s understanding of the world and the living systems that 
constitute it. For more on utopian fiction in general, see Holstun. 
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Like Bacon, Hobbes too seems to retain the distinction between nature and 
artificiality. For example, he uses it as the basis for separating philosophy into two 
branches—“Consequences from the Accidents of Bodies Naturall” and “Consequences 
from the Accidents of Politique Bodies”—and explicitly calls attention to the 
commonwealth as an artificial construction (Leviathan 61). Moreover, Hobbes’s science, 
as with Bacon’s, has much in common with the doctrine of resolution and composition 
that was developed by the Paduan school of philosophy in the sixteenth century (Jesseph 
95). According to this theory, true knowledge is derived by first breaking complex 
phenomena into their constituent parts (which is necessarily an artificial act) and then 
reconstituting the whole from said parts, thereby leading to an understanding of the first 
causes and principles. Taken together, Hobbes’s conception of analytic reasoning—
which involved imaginatively breaking down (resolving) something into its component 
parts and common properties—and synthetic reasoning—adding the parts together 
(composing) to recreate the whole, usually by way of starting from right definitions—is 
notably similar. As Douglas Jesseph notes, Hobbes’s method was not new; what was, was 
the way he phrased the difference between the two modes in terms of cause and effect: 
analysis “proceed[s] from effects to (possible) causes, whereas the synthetic mode of 
reasoning follows the natural causal order and moves from causes to effects” (93). For 
Hobbes, demonstration is synthetic and hence the proper method of teaching; however, 
because analysis allows one to arrive at universal principles from which synthetic 
reasoning begins, it is the necessary starting point. 
Unlike Bacon, however, Hobbes elevates artificiality, seeing it as a valid system 
in and of itself rather than a technology that aids in experimentation. For Raia 
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Prokhovnik, “the concept of artifice is central, as a constituent part of his theorizing” 
(75). Likewise, Gary Browning writes that Hobbes, as a political theorist, “stressed the 
role of artifice in developing a political association” (14). Indeed, artifice is not simply a 
critical component to the theory Hobbes lays out in Leviathan but is crucial to his overall 
philosophical endeavor, as his embrace of Euclidean geometry demonstrates. Euclidean 
geometry represented, for Hobbes, the height of demonstrative knowledge; it proceeds 
from carefully defined terms, the causes of which are fully known, because “the lines and 
figures from which reason are drawn and described by ourselves” (Six A2r) to 
“Conclusions [that] have hereby been made indisputable” (Leviathan 34). By contrast, 
the causes of natural phenomena are based on hypotheses because our knowledge of the 
natural world is gleaned through fancy, the causes of which, because they are 
representations in the mind, are internal. As Victoria Silver has noted, Hobbes embraced 
Euclidean geometry because “it constituted its own artificial truth. That is, once one 
enters the system of proof, its sheer internal coherence fashions the sense of a 
proposition’s demonstrativeness” (“Hobbes” 332-333). Hobbes applied the insights he 
gleaned from geometry to his philosophical position writ large: one need only start from 
the right definitions in order to determine a phenomenon’s properties and causes. Hobbes 
believed that his civil philosophy qualified as a demonstrative science because, as 
Jesseph writes, the commonwealth, like geometry, “is created by man, [therefore], its 
causes are fully knowable by men” (88). For Hobbes, artificiality leads to sound science 
and true knowledge. 
Consequently, by describing the commonwealth as an “Artificiall Man” Hobbes is 
able to put forth what he considers an airtight theory and scientific demonstration of how 
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states come into being (Leviathan 9). The point Hobbes makes in his famous 
introduction, argues Noel Malcolm, is not that the commonwealth resembles a man but 
that it is artificial. Like the watch Hobbes compares it to, the commonwealth he imagines 
is a human artifact (Aspects 150-152).19 As Hobbes was well aware, to imagine such a 
government, perhaps any form of government, is to knowingly engage in an act of 
creation. After all, Hobbes wrote Leviathan while attending the exiled court of Charles II 
and the outcome of the Civil Wars in both England and France were uncertain. Leviathan 
therefore catalogs with great precision a society that did not exist. As Tom Sorrell writes, 
Leviathan was meant to show “how a state ought to be constructed to last, and not how a 
short-lived actual state is in fact constructed” (58). In order to do so Hobbes, like Bacon, 
relies on an opposition between nature and artifice. 
 However, Hobbes's commonwealth is premised on what only seems to be a binary 
between the natural and the artificial. Within the opening pages of Leviathan Hobbes 
effaces the dichotomy between the two in ways that align with his mechanistic 
conception of life. Conflating nature and art, Hobbes writes: 
 Nature (the Art whereby God hath made and governes the World) is by the Art of 
man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an 
Artificial Animal. For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the beginning whereof 
is in some principall part within; why may we not say, that all Automata (Engines 
                                                          
19 According to Malcolm, artifacts require “not just a different level of description but a 
different kind of description [than natural bodies]: description in terms of intentions” 
(Aspects 150). Malcolm’s point in this particular chapter is not to address the 
commonwealth as an artifact but, rather, Sorrell’s argument that Hobbes does not present 
a deductive scheme of the sciences. 
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that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificiall 
life? (9) 
Because nature is God’s “Art,” the world is natural to man and unnatural to God. 
Through this association Hobbes both obscures and lays bare the etymological relation of 
art as a skill and practice that transforms what is natural to something unnatural. By doing 
so, Hobbes is able to assert that “the Pacts and Covenants, which the parts of this Body 
Politique were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that Fiat, or the Let Us 
Make Man, pronounced by God in the Creation” (Leviathan 9). With this pronouncement 
Hobbes creates, as Jeffery Epstein argues, a system that is “both greater than and an exact 
replica of the natural human body,” thereby muddling the divide between nature and 
artifice that his very theory relies upon, in effect naturalizing sovereignty (133). Hobbes 
reinforces the simultaneously natural and artificial nature of the commonwealth through a 
similar analogy. Writing of the “Infirmities” that can infect commonwealths, Hobbes 
turns from the natural body to the “diseases of a natural body, which proceed from a 
Defectuous Procreation” and “vicious conception” (Leviathan 29-30). Read in 
conjunction with Hobbes’s earlier analogy, a weak sovereignty can, Epstein explains, be 
seen as “the offspring of sickly parents” (137). Whether weak or strong, Hobbes’s 
sovereign is therefore “conceived of as an artificial thing that is posited and 
simultaneously conceived, naturally, as is the child in the womb” (Epstein 137). In both 
cases, the mechanism of life underscores the ambiguity of the natural/artificial dichotomy 
and calls into question its presumed self-evidence.  
Further, Hobbes’s understanding of nature as God’s art enables him to describe 
nature in mechanistic terms: everything is reducible to completely mechanical principles 
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of motion and collision of matter. All phenomena can be explained in terms of 
mechanical laws. Hobbes was influenced by this view early on. In his description of a trip 
taken to Italy with the earl of Devonshire in 1635, Hobbes writes that he: 
began to think about the nature of things all the time, whether I was on a ship, in 
a coach, or travelling on horseback . . . I came to the conclusion that there is only 
one thing in the whole world which is real [motion], although it is undoubtedly 
falsified in many ways . . . which is why anyone who wishes to understand 
physics must first of all make a study of the laws of motion. (qtd. in Skinner 253) 
Not surprisingly, then, Hobbes claims that life is nothing more or less than “a motion of 
limbs,” which, in turn, enables him to equate man-made objects, like automata, with 
biological objects, like men (Leviathan 9). God’s creations are different from man’s 
creations only in degree, not in kind.20 Consequently, Hobbes suggests that the “Art of 
man” is as natural as the art of God (Leviathan 9).  
With this assertion Hobbes effaces the practical distinction between automata and 
men, artificial and biological bodies. In so doing, he echoes and amends Descartes who, 
in a 1649 letter to Henry More, writes: “since art copies nature, and people make various 
automatons which move without thought, it seems reasonable that nature should even 
produce its own automatons, which are more splendid than artificial ones—namely the 
animals” (Cottingham 366). Although using a similar line of reasoning, Hobbes diverges 
from Descartes by flipping the script. If men are “Engines that move themselves by 
springs and wheeles as doth a watch,” then both man and machine can be understood as 
                                                          
20 Hobbes rejects the Aristotelian separation between nature and art and, as Dear notes, 
sets up “situations in which nature will produce a desired result—so that art is the human 
exploitation of nature rather than an activity outside of nature” (Discipline 155).  
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forms of life (Leviathan 9). That Hobbes’s man-machine metaphor is multidirectional 
reinforces and highlights this somewhat outré claim. As Terrel Carver points out, it works 
both ways—the commonwealth is comparable to a man and the heart to a spring (126-
127).  
Hobbes’s equation of man and machine hearkens back to an earlier variant of 
mechanist philosophy. Fictional and actual automatons were by no means a seventeenth-
century invention. Immensely popular in medieval churches and cathedrals, automatons 
dotted the landscape, becoming attractions for tourists across the continent. As Jessica 
Riskin writes, medieval automata were primarily religious in nature, ranging from 
mechanical devils and angels to the especially popular mechanical Christ. Given their 
close association with the Catholic church, mechanical beings were not considered 
artificial mechanisms devoid of spirit. Instead, automatons were thought to exhibit a vital 
and divine agency (Restless Clock). In its earliest instantiation, then, mechanistic 
philosophy was imbued with agency that it would come to lack in the seventeenth 
century. Hobbes’s formulation thereby opens up a space in which to investigate life and 
the workings of the inaccessible but ever-present natural world.  
 The automaton was not merely an apt metaphor for Hobbes. It was the material 
and readily accessible product of a set of theoretical suppositions that Hobbes put into 
play in Leviathan. Automata were objects of curiosity and esteem precisely because they 
were more than just fabrications; by simulating living organisms they provided a way to 
comprehend natural systems of life. As Risken notes in her explication of Jacques 
Voucaonsone’s digesting duck, automata should not be understood as just simply 
representations. “Powered by a weight wrapped around a lower cylinder, which drove a 
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larger cylinder above it,” Voucaonsone’s mechanical bird simulated the motions of a 
duck and, most notably, ate bits of corn and grain that it later expelled (“Defecating” 
605).21 His flute player was likewise designed to model biological processes. More than a 
musical box encased in the hollow facade of a man, Voucaonsone’s flute player was an 
experiment in the theory of acoustics as well as the potential of mechanical simulation; as 
such, it “played a real flute, blowing air from its lungs and exercising soft, flexible 
fingers, lips, and tongue” (Riskin, “Defecating” 613). Simply put, what Voucaonsone did 
with mechanical parts Hobbes attempted to do with words: he created an artificial system 
that parallels the processes of natural systems.  
As the above discussion has shown, the divide between the artificial and the 
natural was evoked in traditional ways only to be simultaneously complicated. While 
Bacon upheld the notion that what is natural is that created by God, he simultaneously 
forwarded a program of scientific study that allowed one to parse nature. In essence, 
Bacon overlaid the necessarily artificial experience of natural phenomena onto them in 
order to bring them to the senses. For Hobbes, on the other hand, what is natural and what 
is artificial are two sides of the same coin. Because nature and the life forms it 
                                                          
21 Although the swallowing mechanism of Vaucanson’s duck was later revealed to be 
fraudulent—the grain did not travel into the stomach but stayed at the base of the 
mouth—it was otherwise a genuine imitation: “all the Duck’s movements (except the one 
just mentioned) were modeled upon exhaustive studies of natural ducks” (Riskin, 
“Defecating” 609). In attempting to model the processes behind life rather than merely 
representing them, Voucaonsone practices an early version of what we would today call 
the science of artificial life (Alife). In its simplest conception, Alife is concerned with 
constructing life in an artificial medium, thereby understanding the general principles that 
govern the living state. In the words of Christopher Langton, one of the principal 
founders of Alife, “you used computers to model basic biological mechanisms of 
evolution and life itself”—a process that requires abstracting life’s essential laws of 
operation (qtd. in Waldrop 201).  
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encompasses are nothing more than God’s art, man-made objects can also be forms of 
life. This insight enables Hobbes to view social relations as artificial and to thereby 
understand our experience of everything as unnatural.  
2.2 RHETORIC AS REALITY IN LEVIATHAN 
In the section above I discussed the way in which artificiality was constructed and 
complicated in the early modern period. This section explores how Hobbes uses fictional 
modalities to forward his theory of government. As Hobbes turns from artificial to social 
bodies, he moves from artifice to fiction. Although careful to distance himself from what 
he describes as the pernicious effects of language, Hobbes simultaneously employs 
affective language.22 As he argues, “there are few things, that are uncapable of being 
represented by Fiction,” including the commonwealth (Leviathan 113). The way in which 
he does so, however, is consistent with his larger thinking about poesis and imagination, 
which, Skinner asserts, is most clearly theorized in his “Answer” to Davenant’s poem 
(333). In “The Answer,” Hobbes argues that fancy “consisteth not so much in motion, as 
in copious Imagery discreetly ordered, and perfectly registered in the memory,” yet he 
situates it alongside judgement (131). Likewise, in Leviathan Hobbes writes: “Judgement 
begets the strength and structure, and Fancy begets the ornaments of a poem” (483). 
When guided by “the Preceps of true Philosophy,” however, fancy serves as more than 
mere “ornament”; it can produce “very marvellous effects to the benefit of mankind” so 
long as it does not exceed “no other than such as an imitation of human life requireth” 
(“The Answer” 131-132). Consequently, fancy can be part of a philosophical enterprise 
                                                          
22 For a thorough account of Hobbes’s use of rhetoric, see Skinner. 
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and in Leviathan Hobbes uses it accordingly, creating a fictional reality—an imitation of 
human life—in order to critique his contemporary reality and model an alternate future.  
 As such, the commonwealth Hobbes creates is not only represented by but 
dependent upon a fiction. As he writes in his appended letter to Francis Godolphin, “I 
speak not of the men, but (in the Abstract) of the Seat of Power” (Leviathan 3). His 
notion of a sovereign representative is therefore based on an “artificial man,” which, in 
turn, enables him to elaborate on his definition of what constitutes a person:  
he, whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing 
the words of actions of an other man, or of anything to whom they are attributed, 
whether Truly or by Fiction. When they are considered as his owne, then is he 
called a Naturall Person: And when they are considered as representing the words 
and actions of an other, then is he a Feigned or Artificiall person. (Leviathan 111)  
In his explication of Hobbes’s theory of authorization, David Gauthier rightly points out 
that Hobbes’s “artficiall person” is not “a non-human entity given in law the status or 
partial status of a man, but rather a real man or group of men, considered as representing 
some other man, group, or thing” (121). Nevertheless, in Hobbes’s definition of the 
natural and the artificial person, Hobbes conflates fiction with artificiality. The artificial 
man that emerges through the covenant is reliant upon a conceptual transfer of rights, an 
authorization that occurs through an imaginative act and exists in words rather than 
material exchange. And it is this conflation that strengthens his discourse of a legal 
persona.23 The commonwealth becomes, in Hobbes’s description, an automaton; it is a 
                                                          
23 As Skinner notes, Hobbes’s addition of artificial persons is an important refinement to 
his concept of the legal persona he had already introduced in The Elements and De Cive. 
According to Skinner, it enabled Hobbes to “insist even more firmly that any attempt to 
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single body who “maintains his resemblance with the Naturall; whose Veins receiving the 
Bloud from the severall Parts of the Body, carry it to the Heart; where being made Vitall, 
the Heart by the Arteries sends it out again, to enlive and enable for motion all the 
Members of the same” (Leviathan 175). Through metaphor, Hobbes highlights the man-
made nature of the commonwealth and, in so doing, the way in which the commonwealth 
represents both artificial and fictional constructs. 
This artificiality is indicated most strikingly in the book’s famous frontispiece 
(see Figure 2.1). Prominently featuring a crowned man, the body of whom is comprised 
almost entirely of other people, Leviathan’s title page is monstrous in its representation, 
not only abnormal in size, but also impossible in nature. Connecting the monstrous 
blazon to the Gallic Hercules—the mythical rhetorician who, as described by Lucian, 
“drags after him a great crowd of men who are all tethered by the ears”— Springborg 
calls the frontispiece “artful in the double sense of being constructed by art and using the 
art of rhetoric as his medium” (281). By contrast, Malcolm and Skinner posit the 
“perspective glass”—a tube with a faceted lens that reveals fragments of a scene—as 
Hobbes’s inspiration (Skinner 288; Malcolm “The Title Page”).24 Their assertion is 
corroborated by Hobbes’s “Answer,” which, Skinner writes, “strangely foreshadows” the 
frontispiece (388): “I believe (Sir) you have seen a curious kind of perspective, where, he 
that looks through a short hollow pipe, upon a picture containing diverse figures, sees 
none of those that are painted, but some one person made up of their parts, conveyed to 
the eye by the artificial cutting of a glass” (“Answer” 144). In either case, the engraving, 
                                                          
questions his inferences will lead to self-contradiction, and will thus give rise not merely 
to error but to absurdity” (337-338). 
24 For more on the perspective glass, see Terpak. 
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which was produced by Hobbes’s printer, Andrew Crooke, suggests that Hobbes’s 
explanation of the commonwealth could not be represented nor recognized in anything 
other than artificial and mythic, i.e., fictional, terms. 
Hobbes signals the social body’s fictionality in subtler ways as well, 
systematically employing the art of elocutio throughout Leviathan. With his frequent use 
of the subjunctive clause “as if,” Hobbes carefully marks his fictions as fiction while 
ensuring that what precedes or follows the “as if” can only be accepted as truth.25 For 
instance, in writing “Of the Causes, Generation and Definition of a Common-Wealth” 
(117) Hobbes says: “This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them 
all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such 
manner, as if every man should say to every man, ‘I Authorise and give up my Right of 
Governing my selfe’” (120; first emphasis mine) In so doing, Hobbes echoes Sir Phillip 
Sidney who, Judith Dundas writes, uses the phrase “as it were” to separate “the logic of 
his argument from his metaphorical illustrations in the Apology; or, in the Arcadia, to 
separate his verisimilar narrative from his metaphorical excursus” (271). While Hobbes 
distinguishes his metaphorical and fictional truths from an independent reality, he does so 
in order to guarantee that the notion of a commonwealth as a “reall Unitie of them all” is 
indisputable in definition. As Peter Dear asserts, when people treat them as such 
“metaphors . . . tend to turn into practical identities,” and the fictional and artificial body 
become one and the same (Discipline 159).  
Not without precedent, Hobbes’s coercive argumentation follows the advice of 
ancient rhetoricians. Just as Quintilian argues for the use of phrasing such as “that I may 
                                                          
25 A key-word search of Leviathan yields 66 occurrences of the phrase “as if.”  
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express myself” to excuse “expressions which are too daringly metaphorical,” Cicero 
asserts that metaphor, especially when deployed in prose, “ought to be introduced with 
diffidence” (qtd. in Dundas 272). Following Aristotle, who argued that “it conferres also 
to perswasion very much to use these ordinary forms of speaking, All men know; Tis 
confessed by all; No man will deny and the like,” Hobbes likewise variously describes his 
propositions as “universally agreed upon” or that “all men agree on this” (qtd. in Skinner 
381-382).26 As such, Hobbes’s writing resembles the writing of those he admonishes: 
those “Greek, and Latine Authors, [from whom] men from their childhood have gotten a 
habit (under a false shew of Liberty,) of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling 
the actions of their Soveraigns” (Leviathan 150). Naming Cicero, Aristotle, and others by 
name, Hobbes demonstrates, in his admonition, more than a passing familiarity with their 
work. And indeed, Hobbes had more than a passing familiarity with the rules governing 
classical rhetoric.27  
Enacting his theory on verbal constructs that can only impersonate truth, Hobbes 
“invents,” as Silver argues, “a comprehensive, systematic account of human society and 
                                                          
26 Hobbes’s technique did not go unnoticed among his contemporaries. John Wallis, for 
example, scathingly noted that Hobbes can “by a Manifestum est, save him the trouble of 
attempting a Demonstration” (qtd. in Skinner 381-382). Likewise, in 1672 John Eachard 
characterized Hobbes’s work as being “tailed together by far fetched contrivances” (qtd. 
in Sommerville 247). 
27 In addition to receiving a traditional humanist education, Hobbes published a 
translation of Thuycides’s History in 1629 and, as tutor to the earl of Devonshire, 
published the earl’s A Briefe of the Art of [Aristotle’s] Rhetoric in 1637. Further, Hobbes 
closely echoes Cicero at various points in Leviathan, especially in his presentation of 
oratio and ratio. For more on Hobbes and Cicero, see Skinner, 351-353 and Silver, 
“Hobbes”; for Hobbes, history, and his translation of Thuycides, see Borot; for Hobbes 
and Aristotle’s Rhetoric, see Rayner. 
 44 
government,” that is, “a science of words, not of facts” (“The Fiction” 356).28 While 
Hobbes’s theory masquerades as truth, it is nothing more than, in Silver’s words, 
“rhetoric realized” (“The Fiction” 356). Arguing that a man who locks his doors and 
chests “accuse[s] mankind by his actions, as I do by my words,” Hobbes equates rhetoric 
and reality because their implications are so similar (Leviathan 89). For Hobbes language 
constructs reality as we live it; consequently, reality as we experience it is an artificial 
system that simply mirrors living, natural systems. 
Describing “Law” as that which makes “Sin[ful]” the “Desires, and other Passions 
of Man,” Hobbes argues that words create legal constructs which are then codified in 
practice (Leviathan 89). As relative, artificial constructs disconnected from an 
independent reality, legal sanctions shape the actions of man and the way in which man 
perceives the world. Although not denying the existence of an independent reality, 
Hobbes hereby argues that we have no access to it: what is natural to man is unnatural to 
God. This is why he advises his “Counsellour” to “propound his advise, in such forme of 
speech, as may make the truth most evidently appear”: that is, “with as firm ratiocination, 
as significant and proper language, and as briefly, as the evidence will permit” (Leviathan 
179). While alluding to the existence of truth, Hobbes simultaneously suggests that it is a 
facet of language and reasoning—reinforcing his earlier point, “that truth consisteth in 
the right ordering of names in our affirmations” (Leviathan 28).29 In emphasizing the 
“forme” that speech takes, Hobbes throws into relief the way in which language is a 
                                                          
28 Citing De Cive, Hequembourg likewise notes that Hobbes’s political systems relies 
upon the transference of power by a figure of speech (101). 
29 For more on Hobbes and truth, see Duke; De Jong; and Duncan. 
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conduit that shapes perceptions of reality, suggesting that reality can be manipulated 
through speech, for example, through the use of law. 
Although arguing that “The force of Words” is “too weak to hold men to the 
performance of their Covenants” and thus must be backed by the sword, Hobbes 
nevertheless renders words powerful enough to create commonwealths (Leviathan 99). 
Additionally, Hobbes cautions against the way in which words incite war and lead to the 
dissolution of commonwealths, naming “the Reading of the books of Policy” as “one of 
the most frequent causes” of “Rebellion in particular against Monarchy” (Leviathan 225). 
Hobbes would have been all too aware of this given the time in which he was writing. As 
Joad Raymond has argued, the pamphlet culture of the 1640s inflamed political 
instability between the King and parliament. An easily printed and disseminated form, 
pamphlets brought together previously disconnected material, allowing for an 
amalgamation of information that was used in the service of partisan politics and 
fomenting rebellion.30 Hobbes, himself, fled to the Continent fearing reprisal for his 
royalist tract, The Elements of Law, which had been circulating in manuscript form. 
Further, Hobbes attributes his decision to publish De Cive (1642), which was intended to 
be the third section of his conceived Elements of Philosophy, before the first two: De 
Corpore (1655) and De Homine (1658) to the same unrest.31 Clearly Hobbes understood 
that words divorced from the sword are powerful in their own right. 
                                                          
30 See also Zaret; Zwicker; and Nigel Smith. 
31 In the Epistle Dedicatory to De Cive, Hobbes writes: “Whilst I contrive, order, 
pensively and slowly compose these matters (for I only do reason, I dispute not), it so 
happened in the interim, that my country some few years before the civil wars did rage, 
was boiling hot with questions concerning the rights of dominion, and the obedience due 
from subjects, the true forerunners of an approaching war; and was the cause which (all 
other matters deferred) ripened, and plucked from me this third part” (qtd. in Herbert 6). 
 46 
In brief, Hobbes adopts fictional modalities and rhetorical principles to 
manipulate a reality that is feigned but that, nonetheless, has profound political 
consequences. By writing of the state of nature as if it were self-evident in a 
philosophical treatise whose form aspires to an impersonality equated with objectivity, 
Hobbes constructs an artificial system while masking that it is a construction.  
2.3 RETHINKING LEVIATHAN: FICTION AS REALITY IN BLAZING WORLD 
Despite their personal differences, Cavendish’s natural and political philosophy 
belies a closer alliance with Hobbes’s view of nature than either were wont to admit.32 
For Anna Battigelli, “the figure of Thomas Hobbes looms behind Cavendish’s work” 
(63).33 Despite her rejection of mechanism, Cavendish, like Hobbes, is thoroughly 
materialist and believes that true knowledge is based in reason rather than in sensory 
information. However, her theory of motion, which is fundamental to her theory of 
nature, marks a stark divergence from Hobbes’s mechanistic philosophy. Whereas 
mechanism ascribes change to external force, Cavendish sees it as the internal 
                                                          
Sorrell, in particular, questions Hobbes’s assertion that his three parts were meant to be 
connected, suggesting that Hobbes’s political science and natural science should be 
considered independently. 
32 In a 1662 letter to Cavendish Hobbes expresses surprise that she would consider him a 
friend, suggesting a frosty relationship between the two. However, Hobbes “was an 
intimate though unofficial member of [the Cavendish] household, having been for years a 
deeply valued friend of her husband, William Cavendish” (Battigelli 64-65). Reese, too, 
notes their connection, writing that during the years of exile Cavendish made many 
intellectual contacts through her brother-in-law, Charles Cavendish, including that of 
Hobbes and Descartes. More than just intellectual acquaintances, Hobbes and William 
Cavendish were, as members of the Virginia Company, business partners. For an 
extended discussion on Hobbes’s work as secretary to William Cavendish, see Malcolm 
“Hobbes, Sandys.”  
33 For Hutton, Cavendish’s criticism of Hobbes and mechanistic philosophy points not 
necessarily to a difference between their thinking but rather to a close familiarity and that 
at its base, Cavendish’s pantheistic vitalism is materialist. 
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reconfiguration of the three degrees of matter (rational, sensitive, and inanimate). As 
Anne Thell explains, for Cavendish everything in nature is composed of rational and 
sensitive matter (the combination of which makes up animate matter) as well as 
inanimate matter. Rational matter thinks, that is, it “conveys to the parts general 
knowledge of the whole” while sensitive matter works, that is, “it follows the instructions 
of the rational and carries or moves the entire tri-partite apparatus” (9). Because the three 
degrees of matter are commingled and interdependent all of nature operates as a unified, 
self-knowing, and self-moving whole—or, as Thell writes, “something like a living cell 
network” (9). As such, Cavendish understands everything in nature to be intelligent and 
self-perceptive, whether it is the imagination or a stone. This enables Cavendish to assert 
that fancies take a material form: they are “not No-things, but as perfectly imbodied as 
any other Creatures; but by reason, they are not so grosly imbodied, as those creatures 
that are composed of more sensitive and inanimate matter, man thinks or believes them to 
be no bodies” (Philosophical 448). While recent scholars have begun to recognize the 
link between the natural and political philosophies of Hobbes and Cavendish, few, with 
the exception of Thell, have examined the way in which fiction and artificiality is integral 
to both authors’ theories of government. 
Whereas Bacon mapped artificial experience onto natural phenomena and Hobbes 
conflated the distinction between nature and artificiality, Cavendish staunchly upholds 
the dichotomy. For her, artificiality is, in its most insidious form, “chopt Logick,” which 
she contrasts to reason or, in her terms, “natural wit” (Blazing 58). In her conference with 
the Blazing World’s orators and logicians, the Magpie-, Parrot- and Jackdaw-men, the 
Empress emphatically declares that: 
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Art does not make Reason, but Reason makes Art; and therefore as much as 
Reason is above Art, so much is a natural rational discourse to be preferred before 
an artificial: for Art is, for the most part irregular, and disorders Men’s 
understandings more then it rectifies them, and leads them into a Labyrinth where 
they’l never get out, and makes them dull and unfit for useful employments. (58-
59) 
Voicing her assertion through the Empress, Cavendish excoriates artificiality in its form 
as rhetoric, going as far as to say that when employed in an attempt to comprehend 
nature, as Bacon and Hobbes advocate, “tis but a folly to think that Art should be able to 
regulate them [motions in Nature], since Art it self is, for the most part, irregular” (59). 
For that reason, Cavendish dismisses the mechanistic belief that mathematical 
descriptions of the natural world can provide certain knowledge.34 Although the Empress 
holds her “Mathematicians” in “great esteem,” she describes their “Imaginary points, 
lines and figures as Non-beings” (56). And, as the worm-men previously averred: “If it be 
no substance, it cannot have a being, and if no being, it is nothing” (73). For Cavendish, 
mathematical descriptions and Hobbesian rhetoric are of a kind because both conjure 
something from nothing, thereby seeming to represent the natural world but actually 
distorting it. 
 Instead, Cavendish offers an overtly fictional account of the world, which, 
because “framed and composed of the most pure, that is, the Rational parts of Matter, 
                                                          
34 As Riell writes, the overarching goal of mechanism was to transform knowledge into a 
form that resembled mathematical principles. Pointing to Galileo, who says “the book of 
nature is written in the language of mathematics,” Reill argues that mechanists were 
inspired to reduce things to “fixed, logically coherent principles” (Vitalizing 35). 
 49 
which are the parts of [her] mind,” is not only more real but, because a part of nature, 
more natural (Blazing “Epilogue”). Although often presenting herself as singular in mind, 
Cavendish is not alone in propping her philosophical beliefs on the ballast of fiction. 
Likening Cavendish’s position to that of Aristotle’s, Oddvar Holmesland argues that 
Cavendish’s “‘poetical description’ is a means of transcending the limitations of 
empirical observation” (464). Gabrielle Starr too argues that fancy is, for Cavendish, an 
“epistemic tool, because the frontiers of knowledge are subject to imaginative vision 
alone” (298). Yet Cavendish's understanding of fiction is more sophisticated than Starr 
and Holmesland acknowledge. Fiction is not simply a tool for Cavendish; it represents, as 
she writes in Nature's Pictures (1656), “copies of nature, or natural copies” (103). As the 
latter phrasing suggests, fiction does not just mimic nature; it simulates and is a part of 
nature. Simultaneously, fiction has the capacity to extend beyond nature: “though Nature 
hath not only made this World, but may be thought, in reason, to have made many others, 
and so a world of Worlds; yet Wit creates, in its imaginations, not only Worlds, but 
Heavens and Hells, Gods and Devils” (Olio 6). As Melanie Holm writes, Cavendish’s 
depiction of wit as a “process of natural (re)production” parallels her “vitalist portrayal of 
nature as a continual activity of creation, movement, and quickening” (14). 
Consequently, the fantastical, labyrinthine narrative that is Blazing World mirrors 
Cavendish’s description of “Nature's Works”: “so various and wonderful, that no 
particular Creature is able to trace her ways” (Blazing 51). For Cavendish fiction does not 
render an artificial depiction of nature but rather nature as it is and as it operates.  
 In the same way that Cavendish rethinks theories of fiction, she provides a more 
nuanced understanding of the concept of artificiality. Although Cavendish repeatedly 
 50 
refers to the artificiality of the Blazing World, writing of “Pillars, so artificially placed, 
that a stranger would lose himself” (12) and of diamonds “so artificially [colored], as it 
seemed but of one piece” (12), as well as of “Artificial Glasses” (28) and “Artificial 
delusions” (28), she is careful to distinguish between types of artifice. In the latter two 
examples, “artificial” takes on an explicitly negative connotation. Art leads men from the 
“Sense and Reason” nature endowed upon them while also creating strife (49). The 
glasses to which Cavendish refers, telescopes and microscopes, are rendered “meer 
deeluders, [that] will never lead you to the knowledge of Truth” (27-28). They cause 
difference in opinion so unbearable to the Empress that she commands the bear-men to 
destroy them. This vignette has been read as an attack on the Royal Society and the 
emerging science of optics, in particular, as an attack on Robert Hooke’s Micrographia 
(1665).35 It is likewise an attack on Bacon's experimental approach to nature. In contrast 
to Bacon, Cavendish understood nature to be comprised of universal, self-moving matter. 
As the Empress tells her chemists, the Ape-men: “Nature is but one Infinite Self-moving 
Body, which by the vertue of its self-motion, is divided into Infinite parts, which parts 
being restless, undergo perpetual changes and transmutations by their infinite 
compositions and divisions” (48). For this reason, Cavendish rejects telescopes, 
microscopes, and other experimental devices designed to isolate and dissect various 
components of natural substances. In an almost direct response to Bacon, the Empress 
declares it “vain to look for primary Ingredients, or constitutive principles of Natural 
                                                          
35 According to Spiller, Cavendish catalogs her ongoing disputes with the Royal Society 
in her Observations upon Experimental Philosophy. Using Hooke’s Micrographia as a 
guide, Cavendish systematically disproves his arguments while simultaneously attacking, 
albeit indirectly, members of the Society (Science 152). See also Clairhout and Jung. 
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Bodies, since there is not more but one Universal Principle of Nature, to wit, self-moving 
Matter, which is the only cause of all natural effects” (7). 
 However, Cavendish does not condemn artificiality wholesale. Writing of nature 
as organic, material, in constant motion, and, above all, unifying, she sanctions artificial 
devices when their effects parallel nature’s effect. When first describing the denizens of 
Blazing World, the Empress marvels over the construction of their ships’ engines, calling 
it “an extraordinary Art, much to be taken notice of by Experimental Philosophers” (7). A 
machine that “would draw in a great quantity of Air, and shoot forth Wind with a great 
force,” the engine is meant to simulate rather than dissect nature (7). Consequently,  
the artificial wind had the better of the natural; for, it had a greater advantage of 
the waves, then the natural of the Ships: the natural being above the face of the 
Water, could not without a down right motion enter or press into the Ships; 
whereas the artificial with a sideward-motion, did pierce into the bowels of the 
waves. (7-8) 
Likewise, and for the same reason, Cavendish lauds the design of the ships themselves, 
which “were so ingeniously contrived, that they could fasten them together as close as a 
Honey-comb” (8). For Cavendish, artificial designs ought only to emulate nature; they 
cannot stand in for nature nor serve as a vehicle through which to understand nature. As 
she makes clear throughout Blazing World, any device that pretends to do otherwise is 
useless. Upon seeing the magnified images of a flea and a louse, for example, the 
Empress asks “Whether their Microscopes could hinder their biting, or at least shew some 
means how to avoid them? To which they answered, That such Arts were mechanical and 
below the noble study of Microscopical observations” (31-32). Although she stops short 
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of overtly saying so, Cavendish groups telescopes and microscopes among the “useless 
work” (52), “useless Inspections” (53), and “useless Fancies” (74) that she highlights 
throughout her text. 
While Cavendish rejects artificiality as Hobbes and Bacon define it, she does not 
deny its utility altogether. Adopting many of the components of artificiality as developed 
by Hobbes, most importantly his conception of the legal persona, Cavendish, like 
Hobbes, creates a theory of artificiality that hinges upon her conception of life—a 
conception grounded in pantheistic vitalism. Using the worm-men to voice her views on 
natural philosophy, Cavendish writes that “Nature is Eternal and Infinite, and her 
particulars are subject to infinite changes and transmutations by vertue of their own 
Corporeal, figurative self-motions; so that there's nothing new in Nature, nor properly a 
beginning of any thing” (45). Although, as Holmesland explains, “turning to nature in 
search of a rational or moral principle was by no means a new notion” in the seventeenth 
century, Cavendish’s view of self-moving matter is in direct contrast to Hobbes’s view of 
matter as externally motivated (312). This departure is further amplified in her rejection 
of Cartesian dualism, which she underscores when she attempts to create a world 
according to Aristotelian thought: “remembering that her mind, as most of the Learned 
hold it, was Immaterial, and that, according to Aristotle's Principle, out of Nothing, 
Nothing could be made; she was forced also to desist from that work” (100). However, 
because Cavendish understands all natural entities as material she sees little difference 
between mind and matter. For Cavendish, productions of the mind are material, one 
instance of which is the text of Blazing World, itself. By this means, Cavendish is able to 
assert that her “natural wit” is both a product and a part of nature. 
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As such, Cavendish takes up Hobbes’s insight that the legal persona functions, in 
the body politic, as a natural body to argue against him. Echoing and then amending 
Hobbes, who says a “Proper Name bringeth to mind one thing only; Universals recall any 
one of those many” (Leviathan 26), Cavendish writes that “the Title of a Prince is more a 
Title of Honour, then of sovereignty; for, as I said before, it belongs to all that are 
adopted to the Crown” (94). Consequently, the commonwealth, a feigned body headed by 
a feigned prince, and hence a Universal name, is no more real than an imagined empress. 
If all life is artificial, as Hobbes suggests, writing a utopian narrative to understand the 
world is only logical. Cavendish, rethinking what it means to be a living thing in the 
world, offers an alternative mode to artificiality, something more akin to what we now 
call “fictionality.” Whereas Gallagher locates this epistemological shift in the mid 
eighteenth century, Cavendish, more than a hundred years earlier, adopts what Gallagher 
has described as the use of “a nonreferentiality that could be seen as a greater 
referentiality” (“The Rise” 372). In Cavendish’s hands, fictionality no longer turns on its 
explicit connection to examples in the world but, in Gallagher’s terms, “inheres in the 
creation of instances” (“The Rise” 372). Whereas Hobbes only implies that the 
relationship between subject and ruler is imagined, Cavendish does so overtly, writing: 
“if any should like the world I have made, and be willing to be my Subjects, they may 
imagine themselves as such, and they are as such” (Blazing “Epilogue”). In so doing, 
Cavendish offers readers a view of the social body that parallels her understanding of 
nature and fiction.  
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For Cavendish, change and creation are the result of internal action—the 
apotheosis of which occurs when the Duchess creates a world for and within herself. 
Using the Immaterial Spirits to forward her fictional model, Cavendish writes: 
 every human Creature can create an Immaterial World fully inhabited by 
Immaterial Creatures, and populous of Immaterial subjects, such as we are, and 
all this within the compass of the head or scull; nay, not onely so, but he may 
create a World of what fashion and Government he will, and give the Creatures 
thereof such motions, figures, forms, colours, perceptions, &c. as he pleases, and 
make Whirl-pools, Lights, Pressures, and Reactions, &c. as he thinks best; nay, he 
may make a World full of Veins, Muscles, and Nerves, and all these to move by 
one jolt or stroke: also he may alter that World as often as he pleases, or change it 
from a Natural World, to an Artificial; he may make a World of Ideas, a World of 
Atoms, a World of Lights, or whatsoever his Fancy leads him to. (96) 
Simultaneously, Cavendish engages with and argues against Hobbes; the Immaterial 
spirits’ reference to “Veins, Muscles, and Nerves” hearkens back to Hobbes’s description 
of life and, by his own extrapolation, to the commonwealth: “For what is the Heart, but a 
Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving 
motion to the whole Body, such as was intended by the Artificer?” (Leviathan 9). In 
aligning Blazing World with Hobbes’s Leviathan, Cavendish uses a variant of Hobbes’s 
“as if.” She thereby makes Hobbes’s use of fiction explicit, while also maligning and 
mocking it.  
As the Duchess’s subsequent description of her experience in creating an 
imagined world evidences, Hobbes’s theory of government and the simulation it enables 
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is distorted and disgusting. “The parts of this Imaginary World,” when made according to 
“Hobb’s Opinion”: 
came to press and drive each other, they seemed like a company of Wolves that 
worry sheep, or like so many Dogs that hunt after Hares; and when she found a 
re-action equal to those pressures, her mind was so squeezed together, that her 
thoughts could neither move forward nor backward, which caused such an 
horrible pain in her head, that although she had dissolved that World, yet she 
could not, without much difficulty, settle her mind, and free it from that pain 
which those pressures and reactions had caused in it. (100) 
Finally settling on creating a world composed “of sensitive and rational self moving 
Matter” Cavendish simultaneously plugs her theory of pantheistic vitalism and alludes to 
what she could only see as irreconcilable problems in Leviathan (101); namely, that 
matter, like nature, is self-moving, that “Fear, though it makes people obey, yet does it 
not last so long” and, finally, that it is through imagination rather than rhetoric that one 
can offer an expanded vision of the natural world (63).  
Appending Blazing World to Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, 
Cavendish physically, although not contextually, separates her philosophical from her 
fictional work.36 Calling Blazing World “meerly Fancy” and depicting herself the “Happy 
Creatoress,” Cavendish openly admits to its status as fiction (A4r). So too does her most 
avid and open supporter, William Cavendish, Duke of Newcastle. In his panegyric of 
                                                          
36 Keller and Spiller (“Reading”) argue that Observations and Blazing World represent a 
complete argument and should be considered as a singular text. For a concise survey of 
scholarship on the interaction between Cavendish’s fictional and philosophical texts, see 
Thell, n. 6. 
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her—which Cavendish includes in the paratextual material to Blazing World—Newcastle 
compares her to Columbus: whereas Columbus “Onely discovered” (l. 6) “this new 
World” (l. 5), i.e., America, Cavendish “thought it fit / To make [her] World of Nothing, 
but pure Wit” (ll. 9-10) and in so doing “Enlightens all” (l. 12). Echoing Abraham 
Cowley’s 1656 praise of Hobbes in which Hobbes is said to surpass “Columbus”(l. 56) 
for not only finding new lands but for having “planted, peopl’d, built, and civiliz’d it,” 
Newcastle registers their connection (“To Mr. Hobbes” l. 62). In so doing, Newcastle 
simultaneously points to the genre in which Cavendish’s tract is written, romance, while 
suggesting that Hobbes’s Leviathan is as equally fanciful.37 
At the same time, however, Newcastle fits Blazing World neatly into the early 
modern scientific paradigm. In describing Cavendish’s world as one that was made, in 
fact, privileging it because it was made, Newcastle points to contemporary beliefs about 
knowledge formation. As Elizabeth Spiller has argued, “a belief in the made rather than 
the found character of early modern knowledge unites poets and natural scientists” 
(Science 2; emphasis mine). Spiller further asserts that both early modern science and 
imaginative literature saw small worlds as “artificial representations that made it possible 
to create knowledge” (Science 16). Although Spiller falls short of calling it such, what 
she is here pointing to is the nascent specter of artificial life.  
Though they be fictional, Cavendish’s worlds are “composed onely of the 
Rational, which is the subtilest and purest degree of Matter” (Blazing 100). Her political 
theory thereby parallels her natural philosophy, and, as she writes it, presents a view of 
                                                          
37 For Kahn, Leviathan is in dialogue with romance; however, Kahn argues that Hobbes’s 
primary purpose is to demystify the fictions of the imagination (“Hobbes”).  
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reality that, because fictional, is closer to reality: “Art does not make Reason, but Reason 
makes Art” (Blazing 58). By opposing her work to that of Leviathan, Cavendish suggests 
that her art, Blazing World, is based on reason and can therefore depict herself a “plain 
and rational Writer” in a text that is seemingly anything but (89). As Cavendish writes in 
her address, Blazing World, though fanciful, is a record and reconfiguration of her 
“Contemplations” (A4r). 
Repackaging Observations upon Experimental Philosophy in a more palatable 
form, because “most Ladies take no delight in Philosophical Arguments,” enables 
Cavendish to offer her readers an entree into the world she herself was often barred from 
(A4r). While many critics have pointed to the proto-feminist tenor at work in Blazing 
World, such an emphasis obscures what I believe to be the more interesting aspects of the 
text and the way in which Cavendish implicitly theorizes fiction within it.38 Cavendish 
argues fiction is able to propound a provisional reality and possesses an explanatory 
power beyond that of reality itself. Cavendish thereby offers her readers a view of society 
that will not delude, as do telescopes, microscopes, and Hobbesian rhetoric, but enrich 
society.  
Although history has written Cavendish as “mad Madge” and Hobbes as a 
preeminent thinker, Cavendish, substituting fiction for rhetoric, writes of a world that is 
                                                          
38 Salzman, for example, sees the Empress as a “figure who fulfills Cavendish’s dreams 
of entry into the male world of science” and the character of the Duchess as 
representative of Cavendish’s desire to be taken seriously as an author (308); Jonathan 
Goldberg views the Empress as “a figure readers may well have assumed to be a fantasy 
projection of the author's” (433); Gallagher reads Cavendish’s conflation of Duchess and 
Empress as the “metaphorical equivalence of sovereign monarch and sovereign private 
person” (“Embracing” 140); Spiller reads Blazing World as an attempt to develop a 
theory of reading that allows for “a more active reader who is able to destroy as well as 
create knowledge” (Science 23). 
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all the more attainable because not premised on the subjunctive—Hobbes’s “as if.”39 As 
she writes in Blazing World, the “Art of Logick . . . consists onely in contradicting each 
other, in making Sophismes, and obscuring Truth” (101-102). Whether Cavendish was 
consciously thinking of Hobbes, the statement is easily applicable as he was a man who, 
according to Springborg, took it upon himself to persuade Newcastle “of the power of 
rhetoric in politics” (276). 
What was and continues to be at stake, however, is not just the proper way to 
render the natural world but in deciding what comprises it. Although Hobbes and 
Cavendish ultimately disagree on the basic elements of life and the ways in which nature 
functions, both use fictional modalities to explore reality. Just as theories of “‘vital 
energies,’ . . . rewrote the understanding of the human subject, and opened up ways for 
subconscious or unconscious acts to be contemplated or imagined,” fiction rewrote the 
way in which one approached reality (Packham 8). Whereas Steven Shapin, asking where 
and what constituted the laboratory in seventeenth-century England, turns to physical 
spaces, especially the gentleman’s home, this essay turns to fiction and contends that the 
laboratory may also be found within early imaginative writing (“The House”). Fiction 
represented an alternative method to organize and understand the workings of the natural 
world, and, as Hobbes and Cavendish suggest, the best way by which to do so.
                                                          
39 Within the past two decades Cavendish’s work has gained traction among literary and 
science scholars; nevertheless, surprisingly few take seriously her philosophical thinking 
(Thell 6). 
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Figure 2.1 Frontispiece, Leviathan40 
                                                          
40 Public Domain, via Wikimedia Commons. 
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CHAPTER 3 
JANE BARKER, MANUSCRIPT CULTURE, AND THE 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE MICROSCOPE41
 
In the seventeenth century, the microscope revealed worlds unseen and unknown 
while exposing the limits of the human eye. Once rudimentary magnifying glasses, 
microscopes evolved into powerful scientific instruments that enabled natural 
philosophers, such as Robert Hooke, Nehemiah Grew, Marcello Malpighi, Jan 
Swammerdam, and Antonie van Leeuwenhoek, to discover nature’s hidden structures and 
the basic units of life.42 Simultaneously, the protocols governing natural philosophy 
shifted from a reliance on geometrical proofs and logic to a collectivist epistemology in 
which facts—isolated particulars whose referents are empirical—were created through a 
process of agreement.43 Details of new discoveries filled the pages of print and 
                                                          
41 Mann, Rachel. “Jane Barker, Manuscript Culture, and the Epistemology of the 
Microscope.” Eighteenth-Century Life, vol. 43, no. 1, 2019, pp. 50-75. 
Reprinted here with permission of publisher. 
42 For a history of the microscope and leading seventeenth-century microscopists, see 
Fournier.  
43 By the mid seventeenth century, experimental scientists increasingly held that physical 
knowledge was, at best, probable. Scientific hypotheses were considered “provisional and 
revisable” and were, therefore, no longer rigidly distinct from opinion and individual 
experience (Shapin, “Pump” 483). In lieu of a systematic, overarching schema, 
exemplified by geometry and logic, experimentalists offered “matters of fact.” The matter 
of fact that emerged largely under Robert Boyle came to be understood as an 
epistemological unit that represented, simultaneously, “the complete separation of 
observed particulars from theories, and the elevation of particulars to the status of 
evidence capable of proving or disproving theories” (Poovey 92). See also Dear, 
Discipline 21-25. 
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manuscript, sharing a methodology that recognized the existence of multiple perspectives 
and the splitting of knowledge into facts. This essay explores that logic through the figure
 of Jane Barker, a gentlewoman who lived from 1652 to 1732, and whose work was both 
circulated in manuscripts and appeared in print. Like the microscopists who sought 
natural knowledge through shifts in scale and layering of perspectives, Barker accounts 
for the instability of human experience and the articulation of it by proliferating multiple 
points of view. In particular, in “A Farewell to Poetry with a Long Digression on 
Anatomy” she views the acquisition of natural knowledge as a multifaceted social 
process that relies upon correlating and combining dissimilar data.44 
First published in Poetical Recreations (1688), “A Farewell to Poetry” presents a 
veritable cosmopoesis via magnification and metaphorical vivisection.45 Within it, Barker 
narrates a fantastical tour of the body. Joined by William Harvey, Johannes Walaeus, and 
Richard Lower, she follows the circulation of the blood through the mansion of the 
human form. Throughout the journey, Barker rehearses existing models of medical 
knowledge, putting into conversation the mythical alongside the medical and 
metaphorical. Rather than endorsing a singular theory to help understand the body’s 
mysteries, however, Barker embraces all. In so doing, she not only advocates a 
collectivist methodology that acquires and represents knowledge from a fragmented base, 
but also performs this process in her poem. As such, “A Farewell to Poetry” is not about 
                                                          
44 Unless specified otherwise, I refer here and throughout to the 1688 version of “A 
Farewell to Poetry with a Long Digression on Anatomy,” from Poetical Recreations. 
45 Although the title bears 1688 as its publication date, the volume hit the bookstalls by 
December 1687. See King, “Jane Barker” 551-70, especially 551. 
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anatomy per se; “A Farewell to Poetry” is about how one arrives at a modern 
understanding of anatomy and approximates scientific certainty. 
Perhaps more than any other other scientific instrument of the time, the 
microscope exemplified the necessity of the collectivist epistemology that “A Farewell to 
Poetry” exhibits. Although not universally championed as an instrument of scientific 
discovery, the microscope became ubiquitous in scientific experimentation and in larger 
discussions about knowledge during the period.46 Due to the nature of microscopic study 
and the varying types, sizes, and magnifications of microscopes, specimens often looked 
different from one microscopist to the next.47 Consequently, an individual’s empirical 
findings were deemed valid only if corroborated by others; in short, experiments were 
performed in front of others, were repeated by others, and were written about with so 
                                                          
46 Those who opposed the use of the microscope in scientific study did so on grounds that 
can be loosely categorized as epistemological; the apprehension of the physical world, 
and, by extension, the structure and acquisition of knowledge, was at stake. Alexander 
Pope, for example, believed that knowledge could not and ought not be comprehended 
piecemeal because everything was connected in a “Vast chain of being” (I.VIII.4: 51). 
John Locke, in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), saw microscopy as a 
distraction that was irrelevant to understanding the nature of human life: “Were our 
senses altered, and made much quicker and acuter, the appearance and outward Scheme 
of things would have quite another face to us” (II.XXIII.12: 302). Margaret Cavendish, in 
The Description of a New World, Called the Blazing World (1666), raises a similar 
objection: After the empress is shown magnified images of a flea and a louse, she queries 
whether “microscopes could hinder their biting, or at least shew some means how to 
avoid them” (31-32). For Locke, Pope, Cavendish, and others, studying the minute 
compositions of nature and breaking down the universe into discrete parts does not lead 
to a greater understanding because knowledge cannot be built upon a foundation of small 
artifacts. 
47 Ratcliff argues that stable, microscopical knowledge was by necessity created 
communally because “using a microscope is essentially looking at an object that no one 
can see at the same time in the same way” (7). Reproducing experiments was one way to 
circumvent this particular problem. And yet, as Ratcliff further notes, because 
microscopes were made by individual artisans, it was “never certain that the reproduction 
of an observation would yield the same result” (7).  
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much detail and circumstantial language as to create virtual witnesses.48 The microscope 
thereby disrupted the notion that knowledge could be built upon a uniform perspective 
and demanded a form of representation that proliferated different views. 
The overt protocols that shaped microscopic study are akin to the tacit 
expectations of manuscript culture. Literary as well as scientific writing was passed 
among coterie members whose personal judgments, shared through private letters, 
became communal as they were exchanged, altered, and added to a text.49 Likewise, as 
Steven Shapin, Simon Schaffer, Mary Poovey, and others have shown, scientific 
advancement relied on a communal process of emendation and repetition. Because facts 
were not based on fixed texts but on social protocols that managed textual and empirical 
multiplicity, the information ecology of science looks rather like manuscript culture: both 
create forms of data—facts in the former, texts in the latter—through social negotiation.50 
Reading “A Farewell to Poetry” alongside scientific developments of Barker’s day, 
especially the turn to microscopic study, reveals a latent homology between putatively 
different forms of communication, such as scientific diagrams, like those in Robert 
Hooke’s Micrographia, and scientific poems, like “A Farewell to Poetry.” 
 
                                                          
48 See Shapin “Pump”; Shapiro; Bazermann; and Shapin and Schaffer. 
49 See Ezell; Love Culture and Commerce and Love “Oral and Scribal. For more on the 
way coteries “vouched” for texts, see Trolander and Tenger, especially 371-372. 
50 In her recent study of John Aubrey’s Naturall Historie of Wiltshire (1691), Yale 
demonstrates that scientific knowledge was grounded in “the material and social realities 
of communication” (19). Riddled with annotations, cut and pasted leaves, and notes 
written over decades, Aubrey’s Historie provides a material example of the relationship 
between knowledge as a conglomeration of facts and manuscript as a conglomeration of 
texts; as Yale notes, Aubrey’s text “mirrored the social organism, Aubrey’s 
correspondence, that produced it” (117).  
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3.1 THE MICROSCOPE AS EMBLEMATIC OF SEVETEENTH-CENTURY 
EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
 In his 1676 letter to the Royal Society, Antonie van Leeuwenhoek reported 
peering through a microscope and seeing “an incredible number of very small animals of 
divers kinds” (qtd. in Jardine Ingenious 94). Members of the society tried to replicate his 
experiment several times but failed, leading Daniel Whistler, physician and fellow of the 
society, to dismiss them as “imagined creatures”(qtd. in Birch 349, vol. 3). One year 
later, Robert Hooke reported success: Leeuwenhoek’s small animals “were seen by Mr 
Henshaw, Sir Christopher Wren, Sir John Hoskyns, Sir Jonas Moore, Dr. Mapletoft, Mr. 
Hill, Dr. Croune, Dr. Grew, Mr. Aubrey, and divers others” (qtd. in Birch 352, vol. 3). As 
a result, Hooke concludes that “there was no longer any doubt of Mr. Leewenhoeck’s 
discovery” (qtd. in Birch 352, vol. 3). In revealing nature as a complex system of 
invisible as well as visible components, the microscope exposed the instability of human 
knowledge. Thus, it served as an impetus for thinking through issues of how knowledge 
is acquired and recorded. 
Because microscopic technology was not yet standardized, differing drastically 
from one artisan to the next, and microscopes, in general, were difficult to use, 
observations could not always be verified or reproduced. As Leeuwenhoek comments: 
it doth happen often to me, that People looking through a Magnifying-glass, do 
say now I see this, and then that, and when I give them better Instructions, they 
saw themselves mistaken in their opinion, and what is more, even he that is very 
well used to looking through Magnifying-glasses may be misled by giving too 
sudden a Judgment, of what he doth see. (306)  
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Samuel Pepys experienced this frustration firsthand. Excited by Micrographia, Pepys 
purchased a microscope, which included plated specimens, from Richard Reeve’s 
London shop.51 As he records in his diary, it was only “with great difficulty” that he and 
his wife “could come to find the matter of seeing anything” (240, vol. 5). Even with later 
improvements to the microscope, users lamented the difficulty of discerning specimens. 
As late at 1771, George Adams comments on how challenging it was to see “animalcula,” 
even though they are “exceeding numerous” (qtd. in Frey 380). As a result, an 
individual’s findings lacked authority and status. So much so that even when John 
Wilkins, founding member of the Royal Society and Hooke’s early patron, described a 
deer hair as quill-like, Hooke was asked to replicate the findings. Hooke saw something 
different and subsequently demonstrated the hair’s sponge-like qualities. Importantly, it 
was not Hooke’s status that convinced the fellows, but, rather, his detailed drawings and 
textual explication, both of which served as a form of virtual witnessing that enabled 
others to corroborate his findings (Doherty 211-212).52 The visual microscopic fact and 
the textual account merge, each as suspect as the other until socially verified.  
 Microscopes not only led to an increase of viewings across individuals, but also 
magnified the ways in which an individual could view the same object differently or, 
sometimes, not at all. Consequently, microscopists often viewed specimens many times 
before committing their specs to paper. Hooke was no exception: 
                                                          
51 According to Pepys, Reeve’s instruments were among “the best in the world” (IV:241).  
52 Visualizations were of special import to experimentalists because the skill required to 
replicate experiments was rare, and the equipment prohibitively expensive. Detailed 
drawings alleviated the need. See Matthew Hunter 5. 
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In making [draughts], . . . I indeavoured (as far as I was able) first to discover the 
true appearance, and next to make a plain representation of it. This I mention the 
rather, because of these kind of Objects there is much more difficulty to discover 
the true shape, then of those visible to the naked eye, the same Object seeming 
quite differing, in one position to the Light, from what it really is, and may be 
discover’d in another. And therefore I never began to make any draughts before 
by many examinations in several lights, and in several positions to those lights, I 
had discover’d the true form. (sig. f2v.) 
As Meghan Doherty notes, looking is not a neutral act; Hooke was required to make “a 
series of decisions,” based off of a series of observations, “about what exactly it was that 
he was seeing while preparing his drawings,” and he turned to others to validate his 
observations (219). Earlier iterations of Hooke’s observations can be found in John 
Covel’s Natural History and Commonplace Notebook (ca. 1660), and, as Ian Lawson 
points out, drafts to Micrographia include initials in addition to Hooke’s, such as “R.G. 
being present,” “D.C. being present,” and, “E.T. Ocul. Testis,” that is, eye witness (20).53 
While the others appear to have been silent witnesses, E.T. Ocul. Testis colored the 
insect, adding information to the sketch (Lawson 20). Hooke’s illustrations are, then, both 
contrived and composite images rather than drawings by a “sincere Hand, and a faithful 
eye”; they combine information acquired from different sources and disciplines (Hooke 
sig.b1r).54 Created by Hooke with input from his fellow experimentalists and approved 
                                                          
53 For more on Covel and Hooke, see Matthew Hunter 125-131. 
54 Lawson notes that Hooke’s drawings are composites that combine information from 
Hooke’s own observations and from an “abstract knowledge gathered from books and 
communications” (20). Doherty argues that Hooke’s engravings captivated viewers 
because he “saw differently” rather than because of their subject matter (211). For 
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under the seal of the Royal Society, Micrographia is, in essence, a coterie publication 
that demonstrates the logic of microscopic knowledge.  
In relying on multiple observations as well as on isolated particulars, Hooke 
undermines the notion of a singular, monolithic worldview. Through the microscope, 
Hooke was able to see and therefore break down natural phenomena into their constituent 
parts. As a result, Hooke called into question the doctrine of correspondence. In the 
traditional scheme of correspondence, the microcosm was defined by its relationship to 
the macrocosm in what Michael McKeon calls a “hierarchical continuum of tacit 
distinction” (Secret History 403). Micrographia ruptures this relationship by 
systematically focusing on the smaller parts that constitute a greater whole. According to 
Hooke, microscopy was “of no inconsiderable use towards the invention of the Latent 
Scheme, (as the Noble Verulam calls it) or the hidden, unknown Texture of Bodies” 
(204). In Hooke’s optimistic formulation, studying the patterns of the microworld would 
unveil nature’s processes. In Micrographia, Hooke thereby tends to describe his 
specimens by their parts rather than their whole; observations center on “the Sting of a 
Bee” (163), the “Wings of Flies” (172), the “Teeth of a Snail” (180), the “Scales of a 
Soal” (163), and so forth. Even when Hooke renders a specimen in toto, he does so by 
parsing its discrete components. As a result, Hooke’s illustrations provide readers with a 
                                                          
Doherty, Hooke combined the skills of the portrait engraver with those of the 
experimental scientist. The formal visual techniques he learned at an early age while 
apprenticed to Dutch painter Peter Lely, alongside those garnered through books and an 
interest in print later in life, enabled Hooke to imbue his observations with a depth and 
texture unlike that of his predecessors (216-28). Hooke’s draughtsmanship explains, 
perhaps, why Micrographia was so much more popular than Henry Powers’s book of 
microscopic observations, Experimental Philosophy. Hooke’s success in generating new, 
microscopic knowledge can, then, be attributed to the way he accrued and combined 
different skills from different disciplines.  
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disjointed view of his specimens and depict them as systems of working parts, each of 
which needs to be considered separately (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2).  
Through his diagrams, Hooke dissects and artificially magnifies information. 
Hooke’s louse (Figure 3.2) is blown up almost beyond recognition and is described 
textually as a collection of letters rather than as a common pest: 
It has a head shap’d like that exprest in 35. Scheme marked with A . . . on either 
side behind the head . . . are placed its two black shining goggle eyes, BB . . . It 
has two horns that grow before it . . . each of these CC hath four joynts . . . from 
which to the tip of its snout D, the head seems very round and tapering . . . it 
seems in several Positions to have a resemblance of chaps, or jaws, as is 
represented in the Figure by EE . . . by having the lesser claw (a) set so much 
short of the bigger (b) when it walks on the skin the shorter touches not. (211-12) 
Hooke was not the first to turn to diagrams; early anatomists, too, populated their 
textbooks with diagrammatic drawings. Those in Andreas Vesalius’s De humani corporis 
fabrica libri septum (1543), a 663-page folio volume filled with stunning imagery, 
provide an important point of comparison, especially since they are considered 
representative of “the renaissance in science” (Harcourt 28). Many images populating 
Vesalius’s book, such as his muscle men (see Figures 3.3 and 3.4), tend to be 
contextualized: they are reconstructed coherently, situated in vaguely pastoral settings, 
and poised for action. The objects they represent are, in a word, recognizable. In placing 
the body against a familiar backdrop rather than against the white space of the page, 
Vesalius’s diagrams contextualize and familiarize the body, recalling something more 
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akin to still lifes.55 Other Vesalian diagrams, however, feature body parts disconnected 
from the whole. Like Hooke’s diagrams, they denaturalize and defamiliarize the objects 
they represent. In both books, then, the tension between fragmentation and wholeness 
that governs manuscript culture operates at the level of the diagram. 
One can approach these images from more than one direction. For example, the 
illustration of Hooke’s microscopes (Figure 3.1) lacks fidelity to both scale and hierarchy 
and does not impose a logical order. Rather, it demands the study of the microscope’s 
parts, which, in turn, generates new understanding through the correlation of sensory 
data. Hooke’s diagrams thereby restructure the relationship between subjects and the 
physical world. The white background on which the microscopes are set is integral to this 
process. As John Bender and Michael Marrinan argue, a diagram’s white backdrop 
creates “an arena of potentiality that fosters connections without fixing them or 
foreclosing thought experiments. It provides support for the composite play of imagery 
and cognition that is the motor-energy of diagram” (43). In displacing the self as the 
center of knowledge, Hooke’s diagrams surpass the limits of ordinary vision, 
proliferating images and closing off singular interpretations. Hooke’s diagrams rely on a 
spatialized conception of a world in which knowledge is a constellation of many parts 
rather than a monolithic whole. Hooke’s diagrams require readers to employ the same 
methodology Hooke used to approach his microscopic studies: they needed to look at the 
same specimen multiple times in multiple ways. 
                                                          
55 In his analysis of seventeenth-century natural history, David Freeberg traces the rise of 
the diagram in place of the picture, noting that the latter was no longer able to “yield the 
principles of order; these could only be achieved by penetrating beneath the surface, by 
counting and by reducing the fullness of pictorial description to their essential 
geometrical abstractions” (qtd. in Matthew Hunter 15).  
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Micrographia exemplified an understanding of knowledge that was based on 
repeated observations and ushered in a view of the natural world as a phenomenon that 
could be understood through attention to its discrete components. Micrographia’s visual 
and verbal anatomizations troubled notions of a unified understanding by parsing rather 
than imitating nature.56 Hooke’s diagrams were small epistemological units rather than 
wholes, units that encourage the reader to reassemble, and thereby re-see, natural 
phenomena. This view of the world relied on accepting the premise that knowledge was 
created by collecting small observations that, once socially verified, became small facts.57 
Jane Barker makes a similar epistemological argument. Like Hooke, she too 
regards the acquisition of knowledge as a social process that synoptically gathers, 
accounts for, and juxtaposes different perspectives. In “A Farewell to Poetry,” Barker, in 
particular, offers a synthetic take on two issues: (1) the multiplicity of perception, now 
imaginatively disjointed by microscopy, and (2) the fragmentation of scientific 
                                                          
56 To explain the structure of Micrographia as well as to justify the purpose of observing 
minute objects, Hooke writes: “We must first endevour to make letters, and draw single 
strokes true, before we venture to write whole Sentences, or to draw large Pictures” 
(sig.b1r—pagination begins on the next page, 2). 
57 This new understanding of socially negotiated, atomized knowledge and its connection 
to the microscope seeped into the larger cultural imagination, influencing imaginative as 
well as scientific writing. In “Of Many Worlds in This World” (1664), for example, 
Margaret Cavendish suggests that small objects have the capacity to be quite large. In 
describing earrings as capable of containing a world, Cavendish implies that size, and by 
extension, knowledge, are relevant and dependent upon perspective. Three years later, 
Abraham Cowley explicitly celebrates the connection between microscopic study and 
knowledge in his 1667 ode “To the Royal Society,” which is really an ode to the 
microscope. As Cowley explains, the microscope trained the human eye; it “taught the 
curious Sight to press” into Nature’s innermost crevices (l. 143). Cowley’s form of 
knowledge is, like Hooke’s diagrams, neither linear, fixed, nor apparent. To understand 
nature, one must understand the parts constituting nature; consequently, to create a body 
of knowledge about the physical world, one must first build a dataset made up of nature’s 
“imperceptible Littleness” (l. 145). For scholarly criticism on the intersection of 
microscopic study and literature, see Nicolson; Catherine Wilson; and Goodman. 
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knowledge through putatively social but unreliable and unrepeatable experiments, 
exemplified by the microscope and compensated for by the sociality of manuscript verse. 
3.2 EMBRACING THE MINUTE AND MULTIPLE: JANE BARKER AND HER 
EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
Jane Barker’s “A Farewell to Poetry” is a seemingly quirky poem in which she 
bids adieu to poetry so as to immerse herself in anatomy. Her goodbye is accomplished in 
six swift lines, after which she turns her attention to the body and the body of knowledge 
on which her understanding is based. Barker begins by glossing the ancients, among them 
Aesculapius, Hippocrates, Galen, and Aristotle, and is then taken under the wing of the 
renowned anatomist Bartholin—either Thomas or Casper. He proceeds to give the 
poem’s speaker a superficial tour of the body, showing her the bones, skin, muscles, and 
eyes. Shortly thereafter, William Harvey and Johannes Walaeus take over the tour. Under 
their guidance, the speaker enters the body, walking through the abdomen, heart, and 
brain. Upon returning to the heart, the trio is met by Richard Lower, who reflects that 
knowledge of the heart is not enough to prevent its failing. What follows is a three-part 
address to Barker’s deceased brother, Edward, and a reflection on human ignorance in 
light of God’s knowledge.  
Although Barker’s poem appears to end on a resigned note, it offers a 
methodology for approximating knowledge. Within it, Barker rehearses various, and 
sometimes competing, philosophies of life. She includes in the catalog of philosophical 
greats “with whom [she] must Acquaintance make” the mythical, metaphysical, and 
experimental (l.11). Barker puts into play the metaphorical white space against which 
Hooke’s diagrams operate. Rather than embracing a singular theory to comprehend 
nature and the body, she synthesizes old and often contradictory views. As Hooke does in 
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Micrographia, Barker privileges multiple viewings over uniform authority and magnifies 
individual parts of a system, such as the arteries, to describe the much larger circulatory 
system. 
Barker’s embrace of multiple perspectives may reflect her own experience in 
acquiring knowledge. As is commensurate with her time and station as a member of the 
minor gentry, Barker was likely instructed in “Physick” but denied a formal education 
(King, Exile 68-76). And yet, she was well versed in academic medicine, possessing 
knowledge that was not only rather unusual for a woman of her time, but that also took 
her into what her biographer, Kathryn King, calls “male-only intellectual territories” 
(Exile 70). Barker most likely came to this through her brother, Edward Barker. 
Supposedly a medical student, Edward served as her tutor, providing her with a 
seemingly erudite medical education and a sound grasp of Latin. Barker’s knowledge of 
Latin and her basic medical education enabled her to read and study Edward’s texts. In 
the 1680s, she appears to have turned her knowledge to practice, going so far as to 
prescribe medications to her London patients.58 While sound, Barker’s medical 
knowledge and expertise would have been gained haphazardly; given her circumstances, 
she had to scrape it together from a variety of sources and people. Through social 
                                                          
58 In A Patch-Work Screen for the Ladies (1723), Barker’s alter ego, Galesia, reports that 
“Dressing, Visiting, and other Entertainments, befitting a young Gentlewoman” did not 
get in the way of her “Study, in which [her] Brother continued to oblige.” Accordingly, 
Edward assisted her in “Anatomy and Simpling” to the point that she was able “to 
understand Harvey’s Circulation of the Blood and Lower’s motion of the heart” (82-83). 
Later in the novel, Galesia reports receiving “several People [who] came to me for 
Advice in divers sorts of Maladies,” and having “got to such a Pitch of helping the Sick, 
that I wrote my Bills in Latin, . . . as Doctors do; which Bills and Recipes the 
Apothecaries fil’d amongst those of the Doctors” (116). King, in Exile, contextualizes 
Barker’s fictions against common seventeenth-century practices and has found evidence 
suggesting Barker advertised and sold gout plaster (72-77).  
 73 
interaction and textual accretion, she acquired knowledge bit by bit—each bit of which 
was as important as the sum total.  
The material history of “A Farewell to Poetry” and its numerous iterations 
illustrates the way Barker proliferates and repurposes, rather than dismisses, existing 
forms of knowledge. “A Farewell to Poetry” was first published by Benjamin Crayle in 
Poetical Recreations, a two-part volume containing more than fifty items, which were 
“Occasionally Written by Mrs. Jane Baker,” and a verse miscellany written by “several 
Gentlemen of the Universities, and Others.” While there are no known manuscripts of 
Poetical Recreations, scholars believe that many of the poems in the volume were likely 
written for a coterie.59 As King has argued, “writing and exchange of verse was a vital 
part of Barker’s social existence,” and her early work was primarily social, “composed 
for a small but sympathetic circle (or circles) of fellow amateur poets” (Exile 29). 60 And 
indeed, nearly half of Barker’s poems in the volume are occasional and familiar verses, 
addressed to friends. Like King, Carol Shiner Wilson asserts that Barker exchanged verse 
with her companions, among them a group of Cambridge students whose verse makes up 
the second part of Poetical Recreations (xxii). Barker’s later assertion that the volume 
                                                          
59 King, in “Jane Barker,” for example, notes that the poems in Poetical Recreations 
“bear traces of their coterie origins” in their titles and believes Barker to have been 
“engaged in literary exchange with a number of fellow poets, including at least three 
Cambridge students and (probably) a London bookseller” (552-53, and 564).  
60 Even in Barker’s later, published work, she frequently aligned herself with coterie 
writers, especially Katherine Philips. For example, Love Intrigues opens with a request 
from Galesia’s friend, Lucasia, the well-known literary pseudonym for Anne Owens, 
Philips’s friend and fellow coterie member. Pages later, Galesia versifies her aspiration to 
“reach fair Orinda’s Height” (7 and 14). Likewise, in A Patch-Work Screen, Galesia 
scornfully dismisses Aphra Behn, “reply[ing], with a blunt Indignation, That they [Philips 
and Behn] ought not to be nam’d together” (108). In Barker’s final novel, The Lining of 
the Patch-Work Screen (1726), Galesia dreams of being led atop Parnassus so as to see 
“the Annual Coronation of Orinda” (174). 
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had been printed “without her consent” further supports King’s conclusion that the body 
of poetry may have been ushered into print through “a group of St John’s College men 
with whom she evidently exchanged poetry for many years” (Exile 34).61 Barker’s 
protestation is likely more than a claim to modesty; unlike her later print publications, 
Poetical Recreations contains no front matter or prefatory material, which suggests that 
she had no part in preparing it for the press. (King, Exile 32).  
More than a decade later, Barker copied the verse into the Magdalen Manuscript 
(ca. 1701), a three-part, eighty-poem collection she prepared while in exile at St. 
Germain. As King has written extensively, the manuscript offers considerable insight into 
Barker’s poetic activities, including manuscript exchange across different communitites, 
such as “a Cambridge poetic-exchange coterie of the 1680s (part 3) and an exiled 
Jacobite community in France in the 1690s (parts one and two)” (“Introduction” 3). In 
1723, Barker included “A Farewell to Poetry” in A Patch-Work Screen for the Ladies. In 
the novel, Galesia, a character many critics read as Barker’s alter ego, recounts the 
circumstances that impelled her to write the poem.62 Sounding much like Barker, Galesia 
explains that, devastated by the loss of her brother Edward, she pored over “those Books 
he had most studied” and “resolv’d” to put into verse the portions “on which I had seen 
my Brother most intent” (Patch-work Screen 84, 85). “A Farewell to Poetry,” then, exists 
                                                          
61 In The Magdalen Manuscript, Barker asserts that many of the poems from part 3, 
including “A Farewell to Poetry,” were “taken out of a book of Miscellany poems, . . . 
but without her consent, [and] were printed in 1688: now corrected by her own hand” 
(qtd. in King, Exile 34). 
62 See, for example, King, Exile 7; Carol Shiner Wilson, “Introduction” xvi; and Doody 
221.  
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on a least three different levels: as part of a printed copy of miscellaneous poems, as part 
of a handwritten manuscript volume, and as part of a novel. 
As it is recontextualized, Barker’s verse takes on different meanings. In Poetical 
Recreations, “A Farewell to Poetry” was one among many verses whose purpose 
appeared to be social and intimate. Its epistemological nature reflects that purpose. 
Barker suggests that knowledge is created by multiplying perspectives rather than by 
adopting a uniform view. The 1723 version, on the other hand, was enfolded into the 
larger narrative of A Patch-Work Screen for the Ladies. The poem is broken into two 
pieces and retitled “An Invocation to the Muses” and “Anatomy.” The final section of the 
poem, addressed to Barker’s brother, is further separated by a chunk of narrative in which 
Galesia reflects on “the Happiness he [Edward] enjoys by Divine Vision” (Patch-work 
Screen 90). Through the narrative enveloping the poem, Barker emphasizes the emotional 
toll of losing her brother; as a result, the poem becomes a homage to Edward rather than a 
commentary on acquiring knowledge. The narrative surrounding the poem becomes one 
of many in the novel, each one treated as a patch for a gentlewoman’s screen. Although 
the poem has changed from the 1688 to 1723 version, the overarching argument Barker 
makes has not.63 As she explains in her introduction to A Patch-Work Screen: “whenever 
one sees a Set of Ladies together, their Sentiments are as differently mix’d as the Patches 
in their Work. . . . This puts me in mind of what I have heard some Philosophers assert, 
                                                          
63 “An Invocation of her Muse” includes lines 1-14 of the original poem; “Anatomy” 
begins at line 15 of the original. As early as the Magdalen manuscript, Barker replaced 
the character of Johannes Walaeus with that of Thomas Willis. King, in Exile, suggests 
that Willis’s neurocentric model had special implications for women: “To install the 
sexless brain at the center . . . was to put in place a physiological paradigm that allowed 
for the possibility of less reductive models for comprehending female nature” (94-95). 
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about the Clashing of Atoms, which at last united to compose this glorious Fabrick of the 
Universe” (52). Barker’s nested narratives operate in a manner similar to her 1688 poem. 
Barker’s novel, according to Karen Bloom Gevirtz, “advocates a collectivist 
epistemology for maximizing knowledge” (74). Barker need not use the poem to forward 
her epistemological stance in 1723, because the novel that includes the poem already 
does so.  
The content of “A Farewell to Poetry” likewise parallels the logic of manuscript 
culture and its communal process of acquiring and organizing knowledge. The poem is 
informed by and rehearses different interpretations of existing anatomical knowledge: 
Barker’s own knowledge, Edward’s knowledge, and knowledge Barker acquired from the 
textbook she studied while writing the poem, Caspar Bartholin’s Anatomicae instituions 
corporis humani (Patch-work Screen 84). Written in 1611, Bartholin’s textbook was used 
widely by university students across Europe. In 1641, Thomas, Bartholin’s son, revised 
the manual to take into account recent findings, such as Harvey’s circulation of the blood, 
and in 1662, Nicholas Culpeper and Abdiah Cole released an English translation.64 
Retitled Bartholinus anatomy: made from the precepts of his father, and from the 
observations of all modern anatomists, the English translation emphasizes the 
collaborative nature of the work, which, as I will discuss at greater length below, Barker 
reflects in her poem. The textbook is subdived into four books: “Of the Lower Belly,” 
“Of the Middle Venter or Cavity,” “Of the uppermost Cavities, Viz The Head,” and “Of 
the Limbs”—in modern parlance: the abdomen, the heart, the brain, and the bones. The 
textbook follows the sequence adopted by anatomists who, working without means for 
                                                          
64 King, Exile 86-88; Hill; Bartholin The Anatomy House. 
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preserving cadavers, began with parts of the body most susceptible to decay rather than 
the ideal sequence, which would have ordered the body as a structure analogous to a 
building.65 In De humani corporis fabrica (1543), Vesalius argues that anatomists should 
approach and describe the body as they would a building: “First he describes the 
scaffold—the bony skeleton—then the muscles, the vascular system, the nervous system, 
the organs of nutrition and other abdominal viscera and lastly the brain” (qtd. in Sawday, 
Bodies by Art 65). The analogy of body-as-building and its explanatory power held 
steadfast throughout the sixteenth century and can be found in popular works such as 
Pierre La Primaudaye’s L’Academie française (1584 onwards), which went through 
several editions and was translated into English (Sawday, Bodies by Art 88-97). Notably, 
Barker incorporates both ways of organizing anatomical knowledge into her poem. She 
begins by rendering the body “Nature’s Architecture” (“A Farewell” l. 16), and, 
following a compressed version of Vesalius’s body, writes:  
How Pillars of strong Bones are made; 
How th’ Walls consist of carneous parts within, 
The out-side pinguid, over-laid with Skin; 
The Fretwork, Muscles, Arteries, and Veins, 
With their Implexures, and how from the Brains 
The Nerves descend; and how they do dispence 
To ev’ry Member, Motive Pow’r and Sence. (ll. 18-24)  
                                                          
65 Anatomical demonstrations were typically held over a period of three days with two 
lectures per day; each day was dedicated to a separate system: visceral, muscular, and 
osteological. See Cunningham, Anatomist Anatomis’d especially 26, 47, and 59; Cregan 
14-15; and Sawday Body Emblazoned. 
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Despite following Vesalius’s recommended order, Barker’s language echoes Bartholin’s. 
Early chapters of his first book are titled “Of Skin” (2), “Of Fat” (4), “Of Membranes in 
General” (7), and “Of the Muscles in General” (8). Her ordering of information and her 
analogy of the body-as-building hearkens back to a much older and well-worn conceit. 
Upon entering the interior of the body, Barker’s journey more closely follows that of 
Bartholin’s text; she moves from abdomen, to chest, to brain. By incorporating both 
models of organizing anatomical knowledge, Barker leaves open possibilities of 
interpretation. Like Hooke’s diagrams, Barker’s poem has various entry points and plays 
with perspective. “A Farewell to Poetry” thereby exemplifies her epistemological stance: 
that natural phenomena can only be understood by combining many observations, and 
that knowledge, in turn, represents a collection of discrete views rather that a monolithic 
body of information.  
By representing knowledge as a combination of discrete observations, Barker 
mitigates the problems she associated with sensory knowledge that relies upon one 
overview; as she notes in “A Farewell to Poetry,” one’s senses can mislead and delude. 
Reconfiguring the story of original sin, Barker describes the eyes as “tribly Glaz’d” with 
“Curtains drawn betwixt / Them and Earths objects” (ll. 26-27). For Barker, individual 
sensory knowledge can lead one astray as it did Eve: 
For ’twas the Eye that first discern’d the food,  
As pleasing to it self, then thought it good  
To eat, as b’ing inform’d it wou’d refine  
The half-wise Soul, and make it all Divine.  
But ah, how dearly Wisdom’s bought with Sin, 
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Which shuts out Grace, lets Death and Darkness in! (ll. 29-34) 
Although sight ostensibly promises knowledge, it is inaccurate at best and forbidden at 
worst. Notably, Barker describes one’s inability to take in the natural world as a 
biological inevitability. The “Glaze” she refers to corresponds to the vitreous, aqueous, 
and crystalline humors. Traditionally, these humors, the crystalline humor in particular, 
were thought to be the seat of vision.66 Barker, however, writes of them as partitions, 
obstructing access to “Earths objects.” For Barker, we can approximate knowledge only 
by combining several, inevitably flawed observations because we are not biologically 
equipped to do otherwise.  
Consequently, Barker not only turns to a multitude of people to construct “A 
Farewell to Poetry,” but also demonstrates the process within her poem. Just as she 
includes both methods of ordering anatomical knowledge, she rehearses various 
philosophies of life without endorsing one over the other. Immersing herself in anatomy 
requires acquaintance with: 
Wise Aristotle and Hippocrates, 
Galen, and the most Wise Socrates; 
AEsculapius, whom first I should have nam’d 
And all Apollo’s younger brood so fam’d. (ll. 7-10)  
As her litany suggests, Barker is not willing to adopt a single philosophical viewpoint 
governing natural systems in general and anatomy in particular. Instead, she chooses to 
become acquainted with all, despite their contradictions. Hippocrates focused on the 
humors to explain physiological causes; Aristotle believed that the heart was central to 
                                                          
66 See Lindberg Theories of Vision; Stuart Clark; Gal and Chen-Morris; and Lennox. 
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vitality and that the nerves originated in the heart; and Galen argued that the heart was 
secondary to the liver, which he identified as the source of blood.67 Galen serves an 
especially important function in Barker’s list; his views generally predominated until the 
mid seventeenth century and, more importantly, he was among the first to integrate 
Hippocrates’s, Aristotle’s, and Plato’s ideas into a unified theory of the tripartite soul. In 
order to do so, Galen merged medical and philosophical knowledge. He assigned Plato’s 
division of the soul to localized areas of the body; the rational soul is located in the brain, 
the spiritual soul in the heart, and the appetitive soul in the liver. These three points 
correspond with the location of Hippocrates’s humors: head (phlegm), heart (blood), liver 
(black bile), and gall bladder (yellow bile). In uniting Hippocrates’s theories with Plato’s, 
Galen connected the health of the soul to the health of the body.68 What Galen did in On 
the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato—combine existing theories—is akin to Barker’s 
own epistemological viewpoint and understanding of the way knowledge is created. For 
Barker, Galen exemplifies the way knowledge is derived by combining perspectives, 
which is inherently a social process.  
Barker brings the social nature of her epistemological model to the fore when, 
midway through the poem, William Harvey and Johannes Walaeus take over the tour—
joined later by Richard Lower. King argues that this moment indicates a paradigm shift 
between ancient and modern models of medicine (Exile 88). Prior to Harvey, blood 
circulation was attributed to the venous and arterial systems. Thought to originate in the 
liver, blood passed through the venous system into the heart where it was purified. Once 
                                                          
67 See Mattern, especially 139-86, and Jouanna.  
68 See Schiefsky; Mahdihassan; Gill et al.; and Lindberg The Beginnings. 
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refined, blood moved from veins into arteries by way of invisible pores, which were 
located in the septum, and continued its progress to the brain.69 In De Motu Cordis 
(1628), Harvey theorized that the blood originated in the heart and moved in a circular 
pattern. He dispensed with Galen’s two-system model and conceived of the heart as a 
pump rather than as a furnace. While Harvey’s findings came to be revolutionary, they 
were neither immediately nor automatically accepted. Those skeptical of Harvey’s 
discovery, such as John Riolan, jeered that they would “rather err with Galen than 
proclaim the truth with Harvey” (qtd. in Churchland 15). Walaeus, Harvey’s co-guide in 
“A Farewell to Poetry,” played a crucial role in transforming Harvey’s discovery from 
observation to fact. In his capacity as professor at the University of Leiden, Walaeus had 
his English student, Roger Drake, publicly defend Harvey’s theory. After James Primrose 
attacked Drake’s thesis, Walaeus penned a number of letters to Thomas Bartholin 
detailing experiments that confirmed Harvey’s theory. The letters were appended to 
Bartholin’s updated anatomical textbook in 1641, added to a new edition of De Motu 
Cordis in 1643, and published in a stand-alone volume in 1645. Through Walaeus, 
Harvey’s truth spread throughout Leiden and beyond (Schouten). Like Walaeus, Richard 
Lower also built upon Harvey’s discoveries. Lower’s major work, Tractatus de Corde 
(1669), summarizes a series of experiments he undertook with Hooke and details the 
workings of the heart and lungs, taking as its foundation the circulatory physiology 
established by Harvey (Felts). Harvey’s, Walaeus’s, and Lower’s appearances throughout 
“A Farewell to Poetry” illustrate the way modern science was a product of textual and 
social interplay. 
                                                          
69 See Windelspecht 22-23; Krebs 20-27; Furley and Wilkie; and Fuchs.  
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Barker reinforces the notion that knowledge is derived through a process of 
accretion by continuing to infuse her discussion on modern anatomy with Galenic 
science. Despite Harvey’s and Walaeus’s presence, for example, she uses a multitude of 
voices to describe the brain in distinctly Galenic terms: 
Here’s Cavities, says one; and here, says he,  
 Is th’ Seat of Fancy, Iudgment, Memory:  
 Here, says another, is the fertile Womb,  
 From whence the Spirits Animal do come,  
 Which are mysteriously ingender’d here,  
 Of Spirits from Arterious Blood and Air:  
 Here, said a third, Life made her first approach,  
 Moving the Wheels of her Triumphant Coach. (ll. 77-84)  
As she does with Vesalius’s theory of the body, Barker compresses theories of life and 
the brain. Per Galen’s physiological system, chyle is brought to the liver where it is 
transformed into blood and imbued with natural spirits. It is then transported via the veins 
to the right chambers of the heart where impurities are exhaled through the lungs. The 
blood then passes through the heart’s septum into the left chambers where, through 
inhalation of the lungs, it is further purified and imbued with vital spirits. The blood then 
travels to the brain (the “fertile womb”) via the arterial system; upon entering the brain, it 
is infused with animal spirits. These spirits pass through the brain via ventricles (the 
“Cavities”) and then to the nerves.70 In the poem, Harvey’s only response to this Galenic 
                                                          
70 For a concise survey of the medical and philosophical backdrop of pre-Galenic cerebral 
anatomy as well as a comprehensive look at Galen’s anatomical and theoretical work on 
the brain, see Rocca. 
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model of the brain is in relation to the origin of “Life.” Because Harvey believed that 
blood originated in the heart rather than the liver he tells Galen’s followers that “Life 
made her first approach” in the right atrium of the heart, that is, in the “deaf Ear on the 
dexter side” (l. 86). Resituating the heart as the origin of life is a major emendation to 
Galen’s theory. And yet Barker narrates it as a passing moment, writing: “Then there 
arose a trivial small dispute, / Which he [Harvey] by Fact and Reason did confute” (ll. 
87-88). In describing the dispute as “trivial,” Barker implies that Harvey has merely 
refined existing knowledge as facts are accrued and layered.  
Galen’s division of the body parallels Barker’s organization of knowledge. Under 
Galen, each of the body’s organs has an important role to play and contributes to a larger 
physiological process. The structure of Barker’s poem works similarly; she devotes one 
stanza to poetry, five stanzas to bodily processes, and three to her deceased brother and 
muse, Edward Barker. The final stanzas are labeled “I.,” “II.,” and “III.,” which further 
reveals that the poem consists of distinct parts. However, when they are taken together, 
the poem presents a larger, systematic argument: one can approximate knowledge by 
combining discrete particulars and several accounts. Barker’s poem, like Hooke’s 
diagrams or Galen’s body, thereby illustrates the smaller components of working 
systems. It does so, in part, by emphasizing shifts in scale. In the same way that Hooke’s 
microscope visually expands the louse beyond its normal point of human recognition, in 
the same way that Jonathan Swift describes Gulliver as miniscule in comparison to the 
Brobdingnagians, Barker enlarges the body. In the first shift, the body is blown up to the 
size of a building. In the second, the interior of the body becomes a physiological object 
capacious enough to hold the poem’s speaker and guides. Veins become “Labyrinths” 
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through which “winding streams wou’d sport” (l. 71 and l. 74), the pyloric section of the 
stomach becomes a “Kitchin” (l. 49), and the intestines become a “Dining-Room” (l. 51). 
Barker’s metaphors are more than acts of poesy. Although she enlarges the body 
beyond its point of recognition, she does so in order to make its parts all the more 
recognizable. By likening veins to “labyrinths,” for instance, she renders them visible 
while simultaneously making their function immediately knowable: veins are serpentine 
channels through which liquid flows. Likewise, the liver is both a “Court” and a “Port”—
two places familiar to seventeenth-century men and women—from which 
All necessaries are brought from far, 
For sustentation in both Peace and War: 
For War this Common-wealth do’s oft infest, 
Which pillages this part, and storms the rest. (ll. 43-48)  
Barker’s description of the liver-turned-clearing house connects the lived experience of 
the not-so-distant civil wars with the lived, but unnoticed, function of the liver. 
By rewriting parts of the body in accord with human experience, Barker relativizes our 
relationship to physical objects. Her blueprint of the body, like Hooke’s diagrams, 
renders physiological processes knowable through correlation and amalgamation. As 
Bender and Marrinan note, “Diagrams incite a correlation of sensory data with the mental 
schema of lived experience that emulates the way we explore objects in the world” (42). 
By emphasizing the civil wars that reshaped her world, Barker shows how individual 
parts of a system can be variously comprehended while always remaining codependent 
on other parts.  
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The final three stanzas of Barker’s poem shift again. She zooms back out, 
reflecting upon what her anatomical journey has taught her, namely, that we cannot 
decipher God’s works in any great measure. She writes:  
Should’st thou, my Dear, look down on us below, 
 To see how busie we 
 Are in Anatomie, 
 Thoud’st laugh to see our Ignorance; 
 Who some things miss, & some things hit by chance, 
 For we, at best, do but in twilight go, 
 Whilst thou see'st all by th’ most Transcendent light, 
Compar'd to which the Sun's bright Rays are night. (ll. 124-31) 
Taken in isolation, this stanza seems resigned to human ignorance. The preceding stanzas 
suggest otherwise, however, and when the poem is read in its entirety, the message is 
quite different. While we may never have a comprehensive understanding of the natural 
world according to God’s plan, we can approximate it by mitigating what “things [we] 
miss, & some things hit by chance.” Under Barker’s model, knowledge is, as Gevirtz 
argues, comparable to a fly’s eye: “Like the eye of the fly, each narrative provides one 
lens, one view, of an object or idea; a sense of that object or idea is only possible when 
the views through all the lenses are combined” (75). By recapitulating and putting into 
conversation different anatomical theories and perspectives, Barker’s poem provides and 
performs a collectivist method to organize and thus approximate knowledge. In so doing, 
Barker’s poem demands that readers do so as well. 
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Figure 3.1 Micrographia, scheme 1, opposite p. 171 
                                                          
71 Within the illustration, figures 4 and 5 are different instruments: a waterscope and a 
scotoscope. For a description of each, see Lawson, 27-31. Courtesy US National Library 
of Medicine. 
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Figure 3.2 Micrographia, scheme 35, opposite p. 21172
                                                          
72 Courtesy US National Library of Medicine. 
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Figure 3.3 De humani corporis fabrica libri septum, 2.17873
                                                          
73 Courtesy US National Library of Medicine. 
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Figure 3.4 De humani corporis fabrica libri septum, 2.18774
                                                          
74 Courtesy US National Library of Medicine. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PROMISCUOUS EXPERIMENTS: APHRA BEHN’S LOVE-LETTERS, 
EPISTOLARITY, AND THE PROBLEM OF DESCRIPTION 
 
This chapter examines the impact and influence of description on empiricism, 
ultimately revealing an interdependent relationship between observation and formal, 
stylistic conventions. In so doing, this chapter argues that the objective, direct 
observation and experiential investigation that new science was premised on was far 
more prescriptive than descriptive. Scholars tend to agree that seventeenth-century 
natural philosophers experimented with form as much as they did with their objects of 
inquiry. As Claire Preston observes, there was “no default convention or format for 
presenting matters of fact” (12). Consequently, natural philosophers turned to and 
modified existing literary forms, such as the letter and the essay, to meet their needs. 
Simultaneously, the changing nature of knowledge from theory to the directly observable 
meant that practicing science and expressing it were akin; in Preston’s words, “the res 
and verba are of one house” (10). Natural philosophers developed new, technical 
vocabularies and styles of writing to accommodate this new way of knowing as well as to 
mitigate the representational nature of language. Few scholars, however, have explored 
the way in which these vocabularies and protocols undercut the Society’s project of 
empirical research and reliance on individual experience as evidence. What one observed 
or experienced was largely indebted to the features one was expected to emphasize in 
their subsequent descriptions.  
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The Royal Society’s massive data-gathering campaign, that is, the “Scheme of 
Heads of Inquiry,” and the stylistic conventions it codified neatly illustrate the 
prescriptive nature of empirical science. The scheme, which provided an organizational 
structure for numerous scientific treatises, consisted of compiling and subdividing 
experimental tracts by way of a list of topics, or heads. These lists not only itemized 
natural phenomena but, importantly, also set and structured the agenda for further 
inquiries. In so doing, the scheme of inquiries trained an army of amateur scientists, 
especially, but not only, travelers and travel writers, in the art of observation. Such 
prescribed observation, though ostensibly detached and impartial, created a situation in 
which experiencing and representing experience were inextricable because tied to a pre-
established set of expectations and procedures. 
Whether intentionally so, the Society’s scheme borrows from and operates, 
methodologically, much like seventeenth-century letter-writing manuals and the products 
they shaped: letters. From prescribing rules of style to providing examples that 
functioned much like templates, letter-writing manuals dictated epistolary description, 
ushering in what become readily available and acceptable forms of expression. As such, 
and like scientific description, letters embody the tension between individual subjectivity 
and the strictures of form. Given the nature of letters and letter-writing manuals, it should 
not be terribly surprising that the seventeenth-century letter served as a model for 
organizing new knowledge; after all, much of new science was practiced via letters. In 
addition to creating and connecting an international community of observers, letters—
like dialogs and encyclopedias—offered a fragmented and pluralistic view of the world. 
Consequently, they were an apt form for a period that, Thomas Beebee writes, was 
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preoccupied “with the creation of meaning and with questioning the received order” (6). 
Additionally, the rigidly discursive protocols of letter writing ensured that “each letter of 
reply rewords the tropes of the letter to which it responds” (Barnes 84). As such, the 
fragmented and pluralist form of seventeenth-century letters speaks to the Society’s 
fragmented and pluralist approach to studying nature and their practice of prescribing 
how it should be described.  
By looking at the highly formulaic and readily recognizable genre of epistolary 
romance that Aphra Behn employs in Love-Letters Between a Nobleman and his Sister 
(1684-1687), we can see that amatory intrigue operates by a set of protocols that organize 
experience in way that is similar to those that organize natural description. In particular, 
Love-Letters exposes the influence that stylistic conventions have on shaping and 
describing one’s experience. Like Jane Barker, Behn uses imaginative writing to probe 
the limits of human knowledge but comes to a radically different conclusion. Whereas 
Barker suggests that the instability of experience can be mitigated by the amalgamation 
of multiple perspectives, leading to a more accurate picture of reality and account of 
knowledge, Behn questions the project of empiricism and the methodologies underlying 
it. Because the act of observing and experiencing cannot be separated from the act of 
communication and because communication was dictated by stylistic conventions, what 
one sees and what one therefore knows is entirely unreliable no matter the plurality of 
perspective. Consequently, in Love-Letters the characters are never certain of their own, 
much less another’s feelings, and the reader, faced with an edited collection of letters and 
an unreliable narrator in Book III, is not either. For Behn, dictating what one should 
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observe and how to report it led to insights that were akin to and as unstable as fiction, 
itself. 
4.1 PRESCRIBED OBSERVATION: THE SCHEME OF HEADS AND INQUIRIES  
The Royal Society’s adherence to detached observation and the creation of fact 
based on experience were undermined by the necessity of accounting for and ascribing 
meaning to individual sensory impressions. That representation was a concern is 
evidenced in the numerous discussions during the period centered on the slippery nature 
of language. In Two Treatises (1645) Kenelm Digby neatly encapsulates the problem: “It 
is true, wordes serve to expresse thinges: but if you observe the matter well; you will 
perceive they do so, onely according to the pictures we make of them in our owne 
thoughts, and not according as the things are in the proper natures” (2). The imprecision 
of language and its role as a mediating force between objects observed and the observer 
continued to trouble natural philosophers as the century progressed. Sounding much like 
Digby, John Locke writes in 1689 that “Words in their primary or immediate 
Signification, stand for nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them” (III.II.2: 
405). Locke’s and Digby’s assertions go beyond issues of rhetoric and were 
epistemological in nature; given that language represents one’s perceptions of events and 
only imperfectly so, description and epistemology form a kind of ouroboros.  
Concerns over language’s instability brought to the fore problems of 
representation and verisimilitude, but they also point to a related issue: the performative 
nature of scientific description. While seventeenth-century natural philosophers did not 
characterize their writing as such, preferring, instead, to see it as a representing “a close, 
naked, natural way of speaking” modern scholars argue otherwise (Sprat 113). For Peter 
Dear and Richard Scroll, performance is an inextricable aspect of seventeenth-century 
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science writing. As Dear notes, “an account of an experiment is an essential part of its 
performance” (“Narratives” 135). That is, an experiment cannot and does not take place 
without the act of ascribing meaning to it. Therefore, Galileo’s practice of rolling balls 
down a plane is not an experiment until contextualized as such. Because, for Dear, 
“language is not simply a transparent medium of communication, but a shaper (perhaps a 
realizer) of thought,” to do an experiment is always to engage in a discursive activity 
(“Introduction” 4). Richard Kroll, too, notes the connection between scientific knowledge 
and description: “The quality and scope of our knowledge of the world determines the 
quality and scope of our descriptions of the world; because to describe a thing is to 
appropriate, to know it, the quality and scope of our descriptions must also determine the 
quality and scope of our knowledge” (52). Consequently, descriptions of the natural 
world shape as well as reflect how it is perceived.  
When descriptive vocabularies are codified according to disciplinary conventions 
they coalesce and are enacted at the level of genre. Widely theorized as “sets of 
conventions that make communication between writers and readers possible,” genres 
both constrain and dictate what and how something is described (Broman 15). For 
example, new science’s emphasis on detached observation meant that descriptions 
frequently effaced individual subjectivity. From ingesting arsenic to tasting pancreatic 
juice, experimental scientists regularly inserted themselves into their own investigations 
of nature.75 And yet, in their accounts they deemphasize their physical role in 
                                                          
75 In An essay of the great effects of even languid and unheeded motion (1685), Boyle 
writes of a “skillful chymist, [who] having in [his] presence, tasted some prepared 
arsenic, was quickly invaded by such symptoms, as he thought would soon kill him” (74); 
in 1664, Dutch physician and anatomist Regnier de Graaf catheterized the pancreatic duct 
of a living dog, which enabled him to collect pancreatic fluid; because of the fluid’s taste, 
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experiments. Isaac Newton, for instance, describes a particularly shocking experiment in 
optics as follows:  
I took a bodkin (g h) & put it betwixt my eye and ye bone as near to the Backside 
of my eye as I could: & pressing my eye with ye end of it (soe as to make the 
curvature a, b c d e f in my eye) there appeared severall white dark & coloured 
circles r, s, t, etc. Which circles were plainest when I continued to rub my eye 
with ye point of ye bodkin, but if I held my eye & ye bodkin still, though I 
continued to presse my eye with it yet ye circles would grow faint & often 
disappear until I renewed em by moving my eye or ye bodkin. (qtd. in Gevirtz 
101) 
Although repeatedly inserting a needle into his eye, Newton represents himself as a 
detached, passive observer rather than an active, experiencing participant. In focusing 
solely on his eye and his method—although it is hard to imagine anyone wanting to 
replicate the experiment—Newton creates a distancing effect that allows one to forget he 
is simultaneously acting as experimenter and specimen. As Gevirtz notes, Newton’s 
detachment here is at odds with his “infamous pugnacity” (101). That is to say, his 
description is not characteristic of the man but rather of the genre. His account manages 
to be both precise and accurate while also wholly incomplete as his experience is filtered 
entirely through the prism of scientific description and the attendant expectations of it. 
                                                          
which he described as “most gratefully acid, sometimes almost insipid, sometimes, 
auster, often times salt, but most often acidly salt,” de Graaf posited that the pancreas was 
vital to digestive processes (qtd. in Ragland 16); Douthwaite aptly describes such self-
experimentation as “autobiographical empiricism” (72); and Schiebinger discusses the 
implications of it. For more on the way natural philosophers portrayed their embodiment 
as disembodiment, see Shapin, Never Pure, especially 237-258 and Gevirtz 64-70. 
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Scientific descriptions do not simply represent “the ideas in the Mind of him that 
uses them” (Locke III.II.2: 405). Instead, they shape what to look for and how to see. 
Brian Ogilvie’s work on natural history serves as a useful illustration of this process. 
During the Renaissance, botanists, faced with inaccurate descriptions of the natural world 
handed down from antiquity, took to the field, carefully cataloguing nature so as to 
develop a new, more accurate picture. The shift toward experiential description and 
observational report revealed a lexical shortage that, Preston notes, required the use of 
similitudes and neologisms (48). Consequently, late seventeenth-century natural 
philosophers of all stripes added a mass of information to that already known, created a 
technical vocabulary, and began to develop what Ogilvie terms “a science of describing” 
(7). The creation and acceptance of a readily available technical vocabulary did more 
than cohere a disparate discipline; it also trained the botanist’s eye. As Ogilvie explains, 
“what one observes is, to a large extent, a function of what one has been trained to 
observe and the vocabulary that has been elaborated to express it” (140). Seventeenth-
century botanists, therefore, “condensed but also recapitulated their own experience of 
nature” based on generic conventions and a regularized vocabulary (Ogilvie 141). For 
Ogilvie, this practice led to the development of scientific realism, which suppressed or 
distorted certain elements of a specimen to highlight others (201). Botanical descriptions 
and illustrations, for example, typically emphasize the shape and structure of plants more 
so than their color and odor (because the latter are difficult to relate) and collapse the 
particular into the general (Ogilvie 182). Consequently, description came to be a 
necessary but problematic component of empiricism. It simultaneously functioned to 
render in precise detail natural phenomena while never actually doing so. 
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The descriptive regime that emerged in the seventeenth century reflects and 
enacts disciplinary practices and concerns as much as it did the objects that were being 
described. In other words, scientific descriptions reinforced scientific methods. With new 
science’s adherence to matters of fact, descriptions tend to emphasize parts over wholes. 
In accordance with the Lockean view of knowledge as “nothing but the perception of the 
connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas,” those 
parts were, to the modern eye, rarely placed in a coherent and systematized narrative 
(IV.I.2: 525). In Occasional Reflections (1665), for example, Robert Boyle includes a 
“variety” of things “scarce imaginable,” including “Upon the manner of giving meat to 
his dog,” “Upon clouds rising out of the sea, and falling down in rain not brackish,” and 
“Occasional Reflections upon the Accidents of Ague” (13). Although Boyle describes his 
writing as “loose and desultory” and readily admits to “the incoherence of subjects,” his 
practice of describing natural phenomena was typical of the period (Occasional 
Reflections a1r). This is not to say, however, that seventeenth-century scientific treatises 
and practice lacked system. Quite to the contrary, Boyle’s writing exemplifies the 
programmatic and systematic form of description and approach to experimentation that 
the Royal Society adopted. Their “Scheme of Heads of Inquiry” served to systematically 
organize and elicit information from others. In routinizing and regularizing description, 
however, the Society made the detached observation they so prized all but impossible. 
Description became prescription and the direct testimony the Society required was, in 
effect, directed testimony, contingent upon style and form rather than a keen eye. 
While the method of organizing information around a list of inquiries is most 
often associated with Robert Boyle it was, as Michael Hunter has shown, practiced by the 
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Society long before and almost certainly inspired by Francis Bacon. In his Historia 
naturalis (1622) Bacon makes note of his method, writing that “in each Title, after an 
Introduction or Preface, Particular Topics or Articles of Inquiry are immediately 
proposed, as well to give light in the present, as to stimulate further inquiry” (qtd. in 
Michael Hunter, “Robert Boyle” 6). According to Dana Jalobeanu, Bacon’s lists “read as 
examples of well-ordered, disciplined experimental inquiries, i.e., that they are what 
Bacon hoped his readers would learn in order to be able to assemble properly constructed 
natural and experimental histories” (325). In addition to offering suggestions, however, 
Bacon’s lists provided a set of guidelines and instructions for how to observe, decipher, 
and write nature.  
Ultimately, Bacon aimed to create protocols for experimentation and a descriptive 
regime to accompany them. Suspicious of the empirics, Bacon put forth a fairly rigid set 
of rules so as to move from a “blind and stupid” form of empiricism to one that was 
educated (Works IV.I: :70). That is, he sought to differentiate “learned experience” 
(Works IV.I: 110) from the “woods of experience” (Works IV.I: 81). For Bacon one 
cannot successfully investigate the nature of anything in the thing itself because “the 
universe to the eye of the human understanding is framed like a labyrinth; presenting as it 
does on every side so many ambiguities of way, such deceitful resemblances of objects 
and signs, natures so irregular in their lines, and so knotted and entangled” (Works IV: 
18). Consequently, observation was to be understood as a skill requiring a trained and 
practiced eye. In order to accomplish such training Bacon drew up modes of inquiry, a 
fundamental part of which were lists meant to “formalize and extend patterns of ‘good 
and exact inquiry’ and to generalize them into a methodology of experimentation” 
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(Jalobeanu 339). Part of Bacon’s attempt to cultivate learned experience therefore rested 
on directions for further experimentation. While his instructions were meant to enable 
detailed descriptions, they created a situation in which experience and representing 
experience became inextricable and predetermined. For example, to test the effect of 
cold, Bacon tells experimentalists to “Take a small bladder of the thinnest skin you can 
find. Blow it up and tie it off, and bury it in nitre for some days; and then take it out and 
see if the bladder has gone down at all” (qt. in Jalobeanu 329). By telling 
experimentalists precisely what to look for Bacon is doing more than giving directions; 
he is prescribing the results of their experimentation. Afterall, by focusing on the change 
in size, an experimentalist might easily miss a change in color or odor. As such, Bacon’s 
process of inquiry is not a process of discovery; it is guided observation. His 
methodology is, as he writes, meant to act as a “corrective spice” (Works III.1: 226) that 
allows one to see in the “daylight of experience” (Works V: 231). Bacon’s forceful 
rhetoric implies that any other form of experimental method is wrong. A “corrective” 
requires and assumes an initial error. As such, doing anything other than what Bacon 
calls for is to accept, at least according to his terms, that you are in error. Experience, as 
Bacon deems it, does not involve observing and describing nature as it is but, rather, 
nature through the highly mediated lens of convention and protocol. 
Midway through his career, Boyle enthusiastically adopted Bacon’s use of heads 
(Michael Hunter “Robert Boyle”; Lynch). Describing the practice in his preface to New 
Experiments and Observations Touching Cold (1665), Boyle (wrongly) points to it as 
something new, writing that his “method is not exact” but was necessitated by “how 
comprehensive a Theme [he] had pitch’d upon, and how much more comprehensive, 
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future discoveries and hints might make it” (b4r). As such, Boyle opted to “draw up a 
company of comprehensive Titles, under which might commodiously be rang’d most of 
the Particulars [he] had observ’d, reserving those few, that were not so easily referable to 
any of those, to be thrown at last into a Section by themselves” (b4r). Like Bacon, Boyle 
not only provided an organizational structure for data but also structured an agenda for 
future experiments others might wish to take on; his “titles” served to provide hints for 
further inquiries. To justify his use of heads, Boyle argued that it was “highly useful for 
the discovery of the nature of a Body to consider how many wayes it may be examin’d, 
or (if you will) how many distinct Phaenomena and representations of itself, it may be 
made to exhibit” (qtd. in Michael Hunter, “Robert Boyle” 10). What Bacon and Boyle 
offered was not simply information but a method of describing.  
Boyle adopted Bacon’s notion of learned experience as enthusiastically as he did 
his heads of inquiry. As does Bacon, Boyle tries to mitigate issues with sensory 
impressions and experience through a program of reflection. For Boyle, the virtuosi: 
consult Experience both frequently and heedfully; and, not content with the 
Phaenomena that Nature spontaneously affords them, they are solicitous, when 
they find it needful, to enlarge their Experience by Tryals purposely devis’d; and 
ever and anon Reflecting upon it, they are careful to Conform their opinions to it; 
or, if there be just cause, Reform their Opinions by it. (“Christian Virtuoso” XI: 
292) 
Boyle’s word choice, here, is telling. Experimentalists are to “Conform their opinions.” 
That is, they are to revise their initial understanding of an experience or experiment 
according to a standard set of procedures or “tryals” which Boyle has defined. 
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Consequently, Boyle’s hallmark of a good scientist does not rest on unadulterated 
experience, authentic testimony, or spontaneous sensory impressions. In writing that the 
virtuosi “enlarge their Experience” by “tryals” and “reflecting upon it” he asks for more 
than detached observation. In so doing, Boyle simultaneously suggests that experience is 
the bedrock on which science should be based at the same time as he recognizes its 
instability. Boyle’s assumption that virtuosi “conform” or “reform” their opinions implies 
that without these trials experience is always flawed and must be corrected by their 
systems.  
Travel writing serves as an instructive example as to how the Society dictated, 
directed and, therefore, influenced observation according to the principles set out by 
Bacon and Boyle. As Hunter writes, in 1661 a body of sixteen fellows was selected for 
“considering of proper questions to be inquired of in the remotest parts of the world” 
(qtd. in Michael Hunter, “Robert Boyle” 14). Documents or lists of inquiries were drawn 
up for specific locales, such as the Americas, Iceland, Turkey, Guinea, etc., and published 
in Philosophical Transactions. Not relegated to land, sailors too received “Directions for 
Sea-men, bound for far Voyages” (qtd. in Michael Hunter, “Robert Boyle” 15). While 
these lists were meant to act as guides for the kind of information the Society was 
interested in, they undoubtedly influenced the reports they engendered.76 For example, 
Boyle directed travelers to record “latitude and longitude, the air, meteors, sea-water, 
rivers, tides and currents” along with flora and fauna as well as the “stature, Shape, 
Colour, Features, Strength, Agility, Beauty (or the want of it), Complexions, Hair, Dyet, 
                                                          
76 Carey argues that the relationship between natural history and travel was not as 
unidirectional as these lists might imply; the journeys people took and the items they 
brought back frequently suggested new courses of investigations and experiments.  
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Inclinations and Custums that seem not due to Education” of native peoples (qtd. in 
Michael Hunter, “Robert Boyle” 23). By dictating precisely what characteristics travelers 
should take note of Boyle almost certainly influences what and how they see. 
Consequently, a traveler following Boyle’s directions could not possibly provide the 
Society with an unmediated or detached observation. Instead, observers were to 
“conform” their opinions and limit their investigations to the guidelines set forth by the 
Society.  
Bacon’s and Boyle’s highly mediated approach to observing natural phenomena is 
mirrored in the language they use to describe nature writ large. Boyle echoes Bacon’s 
reference to educated experience in his description of “the World” as: 
the great Book, not such much as of Nature as of the God of Nature . . . crowded 
with instructive Lessons, if we had but the Skill, and would take the Pains, to 
extract and pick them out: The Creatures are the true Aegyptian Hieroglyphicks, 
that under the rude forms of Birds, and Beasts, &c. conceal the mysterious secrets 
of Knowledge, and of Piety. (Occasional Reflections 47) 
According to such descriptions, and there were many of this sort, natural philosophers 
defined their roles as readers. Like literacy, observation needed to be taught and required 
the habits of mind that Bacon and Boyle extoll. Observation, however, is only part of the 
process of creating knowledge. In order for one’s observations to be meaningful, one 
needed to relay them to another and did so in a disciplined and educated manner. As 
such, these accounts represent a mastery of genre more so than one’s experiences. 
Originally proposed by Bacon, enthusiastically taken up by the Society, and 
popularized by Boyle, this form of scientific inquiry prescribed the kinds of observations 
 103 
that were to be made. Bacon’s and Boyle’s scheme thereby initiated not just a practice of 
scientific investigation but also a mode of scientific description, subsequently ushering in 
a narrative form and working to solidify generic conventions to fit that form. For some 
scholars, Boyle’s patch-work frame and the vast array of subjects he treats within his 
treatises evidences his desire to identify new ways of writing that could accommodate 
new ways of knowing (Bratach 213). And while it is true that the seventeenth century 
saw an epistemological shift in the way in which nature was approached, the 
miscellaneous and episodic descriptions that characterized seventeenth-century science 
writing were not, formally speaking, new.  
As the next section demonstrates, the prescriptions put forth by Bacon and Boyle 
that influenced and ultimately came to dictate scientific observation and description have 
their most obvious corollary in seventeenth-century epistolarity and the letter-writing 
manuals that codified it into a cohesive practice. Boyle’s inquiries operate much like 
letters, which, Beebee notes, were “an ideal, readily available form for attempting to 
construct mini-narratives” (6). Both letters and heads of inquiry describe and narrate the 
natural world in an episodic fashion. Moreover, like descriptions of the natural world, the 
letter represents the world not as it is but through particular generic conventions and a set 
vocabulary popularized by letter-writing manuals of the period. 
4.2 DICTATING ARS DICTAMEN: LETTERS AS GENRE   
 It is tempting to see seventeenth-century letters, especially personal letters, as 
tantalizingly autobiographical. However, letter writing, as James Daybell has argued, 
involved far more than literacy; according to Daybell, “organization and persuasiveness, 
linguistic and verbal dexterity, rhetorical and social adroitness, as well as technical and 
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legal expertise” were among the skills letter writing required (5). Letter writing was 
guided by and indebted to strictures put forth by letter-writing manuals, such as John 
Hoskyn’s Direccions for speech and style (ca. 1599) or Heneage Finch’s Certain rule & 
observations for a secretary and Superscriptions and addresses of letters (ca. 1665). As 
the latter titles suggest, letter-writing manuals established set vocabularies, provided 
organizational schema, and even included instructions on how to properly fold missives. 
Because letter writing was seen as pedagogical, serving as a means by which to teach 
grammar, Latin, and composition, school boys were trained in the art of letter writing, 
which further reinforced the conventions set forth in manuals.77 In Right Teaching of 
Useful Knowledge (1649), for example, George Snell advocates “dictat[ing] to their 
Scholars models, and forms of well penn’d letters to everie degree of persons premised; 
that upon anie sudden occasion offer’d they taking pen and paper, may bee abel to 
dispatch a well-composed letter” (104). As such, students should be instructed in “the 
most useful phrases and forms of speech for Epistolarie stile,” “phrases of inchoation,” 
and “Interlocutorie forms,” and know how “to conclude letters” with a “subscription . . . 
filled with verie affectuous, and vigorous words” (Snell 104-105). Likewise, in his 
Scholars Guide (1665), Ralph Johnson too remarks on style. Sounding much like Sprat, 
Johnson argues that “all epistiles must be written in a low, short, and pithy style, without 
affectation, periphrase, or garrulity” and that “all Epistles shun Tautologies, by varying 
the phrase, when the same sense is repeated” (6). Casting his suggestions as “Rules,” 
Johnson makes clear that his advice is not to be taken as mere suggestion (16). 
                                                          
77 For more on the use of letter-writing manuals in academic and vocational training, see 
Mitchell. 
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Instructions for composing letters even occurred in texts not solely devoted to 
epistolarity, such as Thomas Blount’s The Academie of Eloquence (1654). In a section 
following a discussion of Bacon’s lesser forms, in which Blount addresses “the Portals 
and postern-doors of stile and speech, and of no small use,” Blount provides a “collection 
of letters and addresses” along with some “particular Instructions and Rules premised for 
the better attaining to a Pen-perfection” (A4v). As with many manuals of the period, 
Blount organizes his examples by way of heads, including “A passionate letter of 
affection” (156), “To a Lady upon her weaving hair-bracelets” (167), “Upon the late 
Commotions” (170), “Upon the New-year” (223), and so forth.78 In so doing, Blount 
provides both instruction and examples that could be easily identified and adapted. 
Blount’s demarcation highlights a keen sensitivity to genre, especially in the epistolary 
form. Not all letters were of a kind and therefore required a different vocabulary and 
approach. While Blount narrowly categorized letters based on specific situational use, 
others, like Johnson, divided them into more general categories: demonstrative (“such as 
respect praise or dispraise”), deliberative (“such as tend to persuade or dissuade”), and 
judicial (“such as accuse or defend”) (17-19). Although usually classed as familiar letters, 
even love letters were subject to generic prescription; based off of models set forth by 
Petrarch and Pietro Bembo, love letters were expected to contain “lofty tones” and 
“lengthy plaints on the exquisite agonies of love” (Cohen 193). All letters—including 
those of the personal and familiar variety—conformed to and were shaped by strict 
                                                          
78 Blount’s organizational structure was not uncommon for letter-writing manuals, even 
those in manuscript form. Green notes that one such collection, spanning from 1545-
1597, was “arranged under the heads of advice, answers to petitions, orations, and letters 
commendatory, consolatory, exposulatory, gratulatory orations, narratory, and 
supplicatory” (104).  
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interpretive models. Consequently, while letters supposedly represented a writer’s 
innermost thoughts, the way in which those thoughts were framed was regularized and 
regulated by letter-writing manuals.  
From teaching school boys grammar and Latin as well as providing models for 
correspondence, letter-writing manuals permeated early modern life.79 As Lawrence 
Green writes, collections of letters and exemplars proliferated by the end of the sixteenth 
century, mostly in manuscript form. While the print market for letter-writing manuals 
lagged behind its manuscript counterpart, there was an increase in demand by the mid 
seventeenth century; according to Green “from 1570 to 1650, the English averaged 
sixteen [letter-writing manual] printing[s] each decade, and from 1650 to 1700 they 
averaged twenty-seven” (105). The nearly two-fold increase can, in part, be attributed to 
the Restoration’s craze with all things French; with the return of Charles II many writers 
sought to import French culture, leading to the translation of numerous manuals (Green 
113-114). The increase in letter-writing manuals is also likely due to changing 
conceptions of the nature of letters. The humanist impulse of the Renaissance led to more 
flexible, personal epistolary forms than the medieval period allowed (Daybell 2). 
Consequently, letter writing began to be seen as a social behavior “through which one’s 
courtesy and civility were demonstrated and measured” (Schneider 43). As such, and as 
Cohen argues, letter writing was “a highly conventionalized undertaking”; letter writers 
were “necessarily directed by and made use of the ideas, forms, and words that their 
                                                          
79 The relative paucity of contemporary criticism centered on letter-writing manuals as 
compared to epistolarity belies the importance and impact of these guides. As Poster 
argues, “Letter-writing instruction has existed in a well-attested tradition from the earliest 
known Western cultures to the present” (1).  
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culture provided” (192). The prescriptive nature of letter-writing manuals solidified and 
codified epistolary conventions. Consequently, letters came to reflect the “easy, intimate 
style, and the expression of individual feeling of affection” that seventeenth-century 
letter-writing manuals encouraged (Daybell 6).  
Seventeenth-century letter-writing manuals suggest a firm understanding of how 
letters operated during the period. Despite the recognition that letters were frequently 
passed around and read aloud, however, some scholars read the “easy, intimate style” that 
letter-writing manuals prescribed as indicative of private correspondence. Consequently, 
and as Janet Todd notes, modern scholars frequently see personal letters as more 
authentic than public letters. This has led to assumptions that private letters somehow 
serve as a conduit to the writer’s innermost thoughts. In his study of letters in the 1640s, 
Gerald MacLean, for example, points to the intercepted letter, arguing that these “letters 
necessarily threaten to reveal their writers” (182). For MacLean, “Letters cannot help but 
risk exposing writers as they truly are” (182). Todd presents a contrasting view. She 
argues that such letters only served to reinforce the notion that even personal letters were 
public, asking “how could a letter be private when even a king’s intimate letters to his 
queen had in living memory been paraded before the public?” (426). Views of the private 
letter as private have led to the rise of dangerous assumptions. As Todd notes, the modern 
view of personal letters as authentic and autobiographical mean that “we value letters 
because they have the appearance of genuine, modern subjectivity, and because we often 
ignore their generic, rhetorical features” (418). Like Todd, Diana Barnes too notes that 
letter writing is “not a natural mode of writing in any simple sense” (5). For Barnes, the 
letter is a “sociable form that speaks for the group rather than the individual”; it “provides 
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the discourse and rhetoric to conceptualise a more inclusive vision of community” (1). In 
that way, letters, like the Society’s “Scheme of Heads of Inquiry,” represent and reveal a 
particular orientation to the world that is dictated by the protocols associated with its 
form. 
Amy Elizabeth Smith offers a more useful distinction than that of private and 
public. In so doing, Smith has argued that epistolary discourse is not monolithic and 
should not be read and theorized as such. Letters published in Philosophical Transactions 
and used to conduct and transmit scientific knowledge, for example, were written for a 
broader community, even if addressed to a sole individual; formal letters, as Smith calls 
them, “do not foster the illusion of private letters made public” (186). Familiar letters, on 
the other hand, were written, or purported to be written, for individual readership, even if 
widely disseminated or fictionalized. In pointing out the rhetorical differences between 
familiar and formal letters, however, Smith also points to the way in which letter writing, 
even that of the more intimate kind, was a highly stylized and conventionalized endeavor. 
Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century men and women were well aware of letters as such 
and read them accordingly. Although calling familiar letters “thoughts just warm from 
the brain without any polishing or dress,” Alexander Pope, for example, notes their 
constructed nature, referring to them as “the very dishabille of the understanding” (qtd. in 
Amy Elizabeth Smith 185). And, as any seventeenth- and eighteenth-century amatory 
writer and reader was well aware, dishabille is a carefully affected state that only hints at 
nudity. Letters, whether formal or familiar, represent more than just the expression of 
individual experience and impressions; they also represent a performative act that is 
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dictated by an already established set of expectations and, consequently, elicited an 
already established set of responses.  
From the practice of science to the upkeep of the social, letters served as objects 
of discussion as much as sites of information. Peter Conroy argues that such practices, 
especially the communal discussion of letters at literary salons, led to the “recognition of 
the letter as a genre, as a public discourse rather than a private one” (413). This 
recognition paved the way for the epistolary novel, which “took upon itself that particular 
way of rendering the outside world that the letter had already conditioned the reading 
public to accept as normal” (413). In other words, readers and writers were highly attuned 
to a particular form and style that both influenced and reflected the way they described 
and understood their surroundings. As such, letter writers frequently called attention to 
the mechanics of their own writing, reinforcing that they are constructing natural and 
social phenomena though purporting to simply note them. For example, in her 1717 letter 
to Pope, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu writes: 
I am at this present moment writing in a house situated on the banks of the 
Hebrus, which runs under my chamber window. My garden is full of all cypress 
trees, upon the branches of which several couple of true turtles are saying soft 
things to one another from morning till night. How naturally do boughs and vows 
come into my mind, at this minute? and must not you confess, to my praise, that 
‘tis more than an ordinary discretion that can resist the wicked suggestions of 
poetry, in a place where truth, for once, furnishes all the ideas of pastoral? (118)  
In her description, Montagu not only calls attention to her writing as writing but notes the 
way in which it impacts what she sees; the trees and turtle doves outside her window 
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become “boughs and vows.” Although she asserts that truth provides ideas of the 
pastoral, the formula is likely reversed. Undoubtedly, Montagu’s poetic view of her 
surroundings was impelled by her intended recipient: Pope. As Janet Gurkin Altman 
notes, the “awareness of a specific second-person addressee can alter the character and 
experience of the first-person writing self” (91). Because letters are carefully constructed 
artistic devices whose conventions were defined by strict guidelines presented in letter-
writing manuals, they blur the boundaries between the real and the fictional. 
Consequently, and like descriptions of the natural world, the letter represents the world 
not as it is but through particular conventions and vocabulary.  
The next section argues that in Love-Letters Behn uses the epistolary form to 
critique empiricism. Referring to the period as the “blessed Age of swearing, and the 
hopeful Reign of evidences,” Behn’s politics and mistrust of the law bleed into her 
mistrust of empiricism and the objectivity it ostensibly promises (A3r).80 In the context of 
the novel, Silvia’s and Philander’s letters supposedly attest to “the soft affairs of love” 
(A8v). What they actually demonstrate, however, is a mastery of formulaic description. 
Philander and Silvia seduce one another and readers alike. In Todd’s words, the whole 
thing is a “hoax” predicated on “an illusion of immediacy and directness through skill 
with the epistolary form” (424). Through Philander and Silvia's letters, Behn 
demonstrates that the episodic and miscellaneous representation of experience shows just 
how radically open to suggestion the course of knowledge could be; she further suggests 
that attempts to rein it in by way of generic conventions did little to ameliorate the 
                                                          
80 In regard to Behn’s politics, Todd writes “Behn did not have the later English and 
Whiggish respect for the law and had no sense that it comprehended truth; for her, the 
law gave verdicts not revelation, and embodied power rather than justice” (426). 
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problem. Ultimately, Love-Letters argues that there is no unadulterated access to nature 
or experience—and, indeed, adultery is a prominent theme throughout the text. 
4.3 EPISTOLARY ROMANCE: THE ‘CANT AND STUFF’ OF DESCRIPTION 
Love-Letters, published between 1684 and 1687, does not take new science as its 
primary topic of discussion. Instead, the three parts comprising it follow a typical 
amatory plot and serve as a roman a clef dramatizing the Monmouth rebellion and affair 
between Lord Grey, i.e., Philander, and his sister-in-law Lady Henrietta Berkeley, i.e., 
Silvia. Nor does it adhere to a strict epistolary form. Book I is made up of letters between 
the two lovers, Book II mixes letters with narration, and Book III eschews the letter form 
almost entirely. Although Behn does not explicitly address new science within the Love-
Letters, one should not discount the culture in which it was produced. As Anne Bratach 
has remarked, the relationship between prose fiction and empirical study in the late 
seventeenth century was widely accepted (209). Moreover, during the same period that 
she penned Love-Letters, Behn was actively and prolifically writing about new science. 
Even in works that were not explicitly about science, such as Love-Letters, Behn 
employed methodologies similar to those used in experimental science and the language 
of natural philosophy operates throughout.81 In her translation of Fontenelle’s A 
Discovery of New Worlds (1688) as well as in Oroonoko (1688), for example, Behn 
mirrors the natural philosopher’s approach to nature, inventorying and accumulating 
information for reflection. In Oroonoko, Bratach explains, Behn takes “empirical 
                                                          
81 According to Gevirtz, Love-Letters is “riddled with allusions to the latest scientific 
knowledge: Silvia explains how the motion of her blood changes with her emotions and 
feels Brilljard’s pulse to see if he is lying, Antonett describes a young clergyman wooing 
her with natural philosophy, and so on” (37).  
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investigation as the theme of her narrative, and, moreover, effectually turns her narrative 
into the site of generic experimentation” (211). Pointing to the narrator’s characterization 
of Oroonoko as a tale of “natural Intrigue,” Bratach connects Behn’s language of 
romance to that of philosophy, suggesting that both novelists and natural philosophers 
shared the belief that “unadorned nature” is entertaining enough without the art of 
embellishment (216). In Love-Letters, Behn suggests that description based on 
experiential observation are never unadorned, whether they occur in a philosophical 
treatise or a romance. 
Behn uses the tools of natural philosophy, most especially Boyle’s insistence on 
close observation followed by reflection, to expose the fault lines in the Society’s method 
of investigation. While the reflective habits of mind encouraged by natural philosophers 
supposedly democratized science, suggesting anyone could practice, they actually 
inculcated a system in which writing and observation were intertwined.82 As Karen 
Bloom Gevirtz notes, the narrative structure of Behn’s epistolary romance turned novel, 
that is, Behn’s shift from the multiple perspectives embodied in letters to the singular 
perspective of the third person narrative, allows Behn to probe the limits of language and 
the Society’s insistence that language bring “all things as near the Mathematical 
plainness, as they can” (Gevirtz 39-42; Sprat 113). By extension, then, Behn also 
interrogates scientific realism, ultimately arguing that there is no unadulterated access to 
nature or experience. The epistolary novel was an apt vehicle for Behn to challenge the 
premises of new science because it creates, in Altman’s words, the “illusion of reality,” 
                                                          
82 For more on Boyle and the habits of mind he attempted to cultivate in the wider 
population, see J. Paul Hunter “Boyle”; Harwood, “Introduction”; and Michael Hunter 
Boyle. 
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thereby mimicking the effect of scientific realism at the same time as it employs the 
episodic structure of Boyle’s heads (6). 
In Philander’s first letter to Silvia, and, indeed, the first letter of the novel, Behn 
illustrates the way in which formalized descriptions lose meaning and particularity. 
Within the letter, Philander calls Silvia an “unresistable Idea”—the ghost of whom is 
more present to him than when he “parted from [her]” (1). In so doing, Philander 
explicitly points to the way in which his subsequent description is a representation that is 
seemingly based on his own desire rather than on Silvia, herself. And yet, his rhetoric is 
remarkably formulaic. He describes her as possessing: 
all the charmes of blooming youth, with all the Attractions of Heavenly Beauty! 
Loose, wanton, gay all flowing her bright hair, and languishing her lovely eyes, 
her dress all negligent as when I saw her last, discovering a Thousand ravishing 
Graces, round white small Breast’s, delicate Neck, and rising Bosome, heav’d 
with sighs she would in vain conceal; and all besides, that nicest fancy can 
imagine surprising— (1)  
In comparing his vision to “when [he] saw her last,” Philander notes the constructed 
nature of his description and the quandary it creates: Silvia is an absent presence at the 
same time as she is just an “Idea”—an idea that, notably, is not unlike most descriptions 
of heroine’s bodies. It is as if Philander is following a set of protocols for observing and 
describing Silvia’s body—not unlike the natural philosophers who were likewise 
expected to align their descriptions with a set of established conventions and vocabulary. 
Although Behn was concerned with the instability of language, she takes her 
critique one step further. For Behn the issue is not simply one of language and 
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representation; it is an issue of genre. Philander’s description of Silvia follows the 
conventions of romance as well as natural philosophy. Silvia’s qualities are inventoried in 
list form and she is represented as a series of parts—"hair,” “eyes,” “breast’s,” “Neck,” 
and “Bosome”—that never add up to their whole. Moreover, on becoming too 
impassioned, Philander draws back—he “dare[s] not think on.” Like natural 
philosophers, Philander attempts to maintain distance, to sound rational and detached 
rather than “mad and raving.” Given the already arduous nature of his description, 
however, Philander’s reticence to continue points to the constructed nature of his 
description; he is simply following the conventions of amatory intrigue: the “Cant and 
Stuff . . . which Lovers serve themselves with, on occasion” (268). Through Philander, 
Behn, thereby points to the way in which descriptions, because guided by the dictates of 
genre, are never unadorned. Consequently, and as Behn demonstrates throughout Love-
Letters, attempts to ameliorate the instability of language by way of systematized and 
formulaic descriptions only heightened it.  
Using the highly formulaic genre of epistolary romance, Behn shows how 
dictating what one should observe and how to report it alters one’s experience. That 
Behn’s use of the epistolary form is “not necessarily innovative” on its own has, for 
some, detracted from the novel (Gevirtz 40). Robert Mayer, for example, argues that 
Love-Letters should not be read as a novel because nothing in it would have been seen as 
revolutionary or a new form of discourse (151). As Todd has noted, for critics like Mayer 
“something in Behn’s use and creation of letters does not pass modern muster” (419). 
And yet, as Todd argues, Love-Letters is “about letters” (423). In looking for innovation 
in Behn’s use of the epistolary form or authenticity in the letters themselves, we miss the 
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point. Behn’s conventional use of the epistolary genre is exactly to her purpose. Through 
it Behn problematizes the relationship between experience and description and thus 
empiricism in general. What Behn understands is that the impact generic features have on 
shaping the discourse of epistolary romance is akin to the impact of those that shape the 
discourse of science. In both cases the method is as unstable as the self on which it is 
premised.  
Behn’s characters are much like Ogilvie’s botanists or Boyle’s travelers. They 
know the genre in which they are writing and address themselves accordingly. Philander, 
for example, is well aware of the “Cant and Stuff, as this, which Lovers serve themselves 
with, on occasion” (268). He writes his letters accordingly, filling them with descriptions 
of his torment, tireless devotion, and desire to “press thee with kisses; folding thee in my 
transported arms, and following all the dictates of love without respect or awe!” (12). 
Likewise, Silvia explicitly demonstrates her knowledge of the “Rhetorick of Love,” 
describing its features as “half-breath’d, interrupted words, languishing Eyes, flattering 
Speeches, broken Sighs, pressing the Hand, and falling Tears” (27). As such, her “Soul is 
ever fixt” and she is able to end what “Discourse you please . . . all in Love!” (27). In 
calling their shared language “Rhetorick” Silvia points to the way in which the letters 
function, thereby emphasizing their form over their content. Eloquence of expression is 
not required, so long as they express themselves through the language of love. The 
excessively emotive nature of Philander’s and Silvia’s letters has led some critics to 
characterize them as tiresome; for John Richetti, Philander’s “unrelenting amatory 
rhetoric” is “of the most flatulent sort” (English Novel 22). More charitably put, 
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Philander’s unceasing linguistic foreplay is utterly trite. However, it is purposefully so. 
Behn leans heavily on the conventions of romance to expose that they are conventions.  
Silvia and Philander’s respective experience of one another as lovers and, in 
particular, their description of that experience is influenced by their mutual understanding 
of what lovers do and say. Their letters are integral to that process. As Green has written, 
the rediscovery of classical influences, like Cicero’s familiar letters, and the effort to 
incorporate and use this classical rhetoric to project the presence of the human writer led 
“to the realization that all such created senses of the human self are to some degree 
rhetorical fictions, that skilled writers can choose among available fictions and that 
recipients can participate in such fictions” (102). Therefore, when Silvia and Philander 
describe their actions and behaviors their descriptions often follow the formulaic 
language of epistolary romance. Silvia, for example, writes that she  
threw [her]self down on that bank of grass where we last disputed the dear but 
fatal business of our souls . . . There with ten Thousand sighs, with remembrance 
of the tender minutes we past, then I drew your last Letter from my Bosome; and 
often kist, and often read it over; but oh! who can conceive my torment, when I 
came to that fatal part of it, where you say you gave your hand to my sister? I 
found my soul agitated a Thousand different passions . . . I threw my self with 
fury on the ground, and prest my panting heart to the cold earth, then rise in rage 
and tear my hair, and hardly spare that face that taught you first to love. (4) 
Here she describes her “Torment” in terms resonant of what she has earlier termed the 
“Rhetorick of Love.” Although she claims that “no Arts of speaking could have talk’d 
[her] heart away,” her letter explicitly suggests otherwise (27). Silvia is in the throes of 
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passion precisely because she has reread Philander’s missive and she reconstructs her 
experience of doing so in terms that are reminiscent to his. In so doing, Silvia enacts and 
engages in the mutually reinforcing nature of description; returning to Barnes, Silvia 
“rewords the tropes” (84). Whether salacious or scientific, the representation of one’s 
experience is already prescribed and these prescriptions, in turn, influence the way one 
experiences or observes. Silvia and Philander’s adherence to the generic conventions of 
epistolary romance thereby continue to ensnare one another because it renders their 
experience recognizable. 
Behn emphasizes the way in which genre lends credibility to one’s assertions by 
dramatizing what happens when writers do not follow its dictates. When Philander strays 
in Book II, his epistolary philandering gives away the game rather than his actions. After 
all, Silvia’s suspicions are not new; in Book I she frequently questions his motives, 
lamenting his marriage to her sister and foretelling her own ruin. What is new, however, 
is Philander’s response to her. Though Philander still professes his ardor, he does so in a 
way that fails to satisfy the conventions of epistolary romance. In addition to being 
comparatively terse, his letter is devoid of the hyperbolic, florid descriptions that marked 
his earlier prose; instead, he asks Silvia’s “Pardon for leaving her” and writes that he has: 
“felt all your Pains, I have burnt with your Feaver, and sigh’d with your oppressions” 
(150). Silvia rightly readers Philander’s claims as disingenuous because, as she notes, 
they are not accompanied by detailed descriptions of his torment, that is, what feeling all 
her pains and burning with her fever consisted of for Philander. Silvia is therefore quick 
to tell him that his letter “‘tis all cold—Short—Short and cold as a dead Winter’s day” 
and lacking in “all thy pretty Flatteries of Love” (156). In his response, Philander accuses 
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her of loving “the Flatterer, and not the Man, the Lover only, not Philander” (199). As 
Silvia intuits and what Behn suggests is that the two are inseparable. As a surrogate for 
his physical being, Philander’s letters and the way in which he describes his experience 
of Silvia within them are inextricably intertwined. Philander the man and Philander the 
flatterer are one and the same. Whereas Philander’s accusation calls into question all of 
his previous letters, to suggest, even, that they were merely filled with “cant,” Behn 
implies otherwise. Philander’s feelings, though fickle, were nevertheless experienced by 
him as authentic. By taking on the persona of the lover he became the lover and in casting 
it off he became, among other things, a poor correspondent. 
 In coupling Philander and Silvia’s emotional distance with their geographical 
distance—he is in France and she in the Netherlands—Behn speaks to an issue of concern 
in the Royal Society: the verifiability of individual observations. As Daniel Carey has 
discussed, travel writing, though frequently consulted and taken as truth, raised the 
possibility of “lying by authority,” that is, the possibility that travel writers might take 
advantage of “the distance between their observations and confirmation of additional 
witnesses” (269-270).83 By juxtaposing Philander’s continued insistence of constancy 
alongside his confession to Octavio, that he is, indeed, pursuing another woman, Behn 
probes the limits of direct testimony and the difficulty of regulating it. Rather than 
reforming his ways, Philander simply attempts to revise his prose. Directly tying 
Philander’s misdeeds to stylistic conventions, the narrator notes that Philander’s “Stile of 
Letters” evidences “that first Symptom of a dying Flame” (202). In so doing, the narrator 
not only points out the way in which Philander has failed in meeting the expectations of 
                                                          
83 See also Shapin, Social History 245. 
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genre but also the way in which a mastery of genre can obfuscate truth. The problem with 
direct testimony, as Behn casts it, is that it is actually directed testimony. 
The tension between direct and directed experience plays out throughout Love-
Letters but is encapsulated by Silvia in Book I and made starker by Octavio in Books II 
and III. Early on, Silvia describes her thoughts as “unstudy’d” (208) and laments that 
“words do not enough express [her] soul” (34). Given the way in which her language of 
devotion mirrors that of Philander’s, however, study appears to be exactly what she is 
doing. When she strays from the subject of her devotion to Philander’s political activity, 
he offers her a gentle corrective—asking, “Where learnt her tender Heart the Notions of 
rigid Business: Where her soft Tongue, form’d only for the dear Language of Love, to 
talk of the concerns of National and Kingdoms?” (40). According to Todd, Book I shows 
“the intellectual growth of a letter writer and letter reader learning how to understand and 
manipulate signs, and how to represent herself so as to raise desire in the other” (428). 
That is, Silvia becomes, like Behn, a master of the epistolary form and filters her feelings 
through that lens. 
Silvia’s mastery of genre becomes even more apparent when compared to 
Octavio’s lack thereof. In Book II the narrator notes that Octavio writes in “haste and 
Disorder” as the reader “may plainly see by the Stile” (341). In pointing out Octavio’s 
style, Behn points out the nature of directed experience. Octavio’s letter appears 
disordered because he is. Were he to refine his prose the missive would be different—or 
at least different enough that his style would be of little note. Octavio, however, “knew 
no Guile” (322). By contrast, and as we are told in the opening to Book I, Silvia has been 
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“taught” to understand that the “pain and languishment” she felt “‘twas Love” and frames 
her experience accordingly (A7v).  
Whereas natural philosophers cast their descriptive practices as a project of 
decoding, Behn implies that description entails a process of encoding. As Todd notes, 
Behn’s background as a spy inevitably led her to associate letters as ciphers. For Behn, 
the letter does not represent “authentic subjectivity” but is, instead, “a kind of foe that 
must be mastered” (432). Not surprisingly, then, Silvia and Philander spend much time 
attempting to parse one another’s letters, attempting to see through “the little arts” each 
employs.84 Octavio’s reaction to Silvia’s rebuff in Book II further reinforces the point. 
After receiving from Octavio a gift of bracelets along with a confession of love, Silvia 
admonishes him, writing: “You but ill judge of my Wit, or Humour, Octavio, when you 
send me such a Present, and such a Billet, if you believe I either receive the one, or the 
other as you design’d” (175). As the narrator notes, however, Octavio reads her response 
“without a sigh, nor complained he on her Rigours,” because he knows “only she that 
sends him back his own Letters without reading ‘em can give despair” (177). By 
understanding the conventions of love letters, Octavio is able to read Silvia’s response for 
what it is—an invitation for continued correspondence—rather than for what it says. 
                                                          
84 In Book I, Philander responds to Silvia’s unease with his marriage to her sister, writing 
“your little arts might do well in a beginning flame” (20); in Book II, Silvia accuses 
Octavio of employing “little Arts” to woo her in Philander’s absence (154); later, 
Philander tells Octavio that once love has grown dull “we have recourse to all the little 
arts, the aids of flatterers, and dear dissimulation, (that help-meet to the lukewarm lover) 
to keep up a good character of constancy, and a right understanding” (188); in Book III, 
the narrator, commenting on Hermione’s hold over Cesario notes of a maiden Queen 
“who made herself idolized by that sole piece of politic cunning, understanding well the 
stubborn, yet good nature of the people; and gained more upon them by those little arts, 
than if she had parted with all the prerogatives of her Crown” (456). 
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For Behn, the issue is not a matter of language; the act of describing and 
reflecting on one’s experience with another has a material and bodily effect. When 
expressing apprehension at her upcoming tryst with Philander, Silvia writes: “My Soul 
bodes some dire effect of this bold enterprise, for I must own (and blush while I do own 
it) that my Soul yields obedience to your soft request, and even whilst I read your Letter, 
was diverted with the contrivance of seeing you” (22). In noting her response to 
Philander’s letter, Silvia describes her experience as one that takes place as a 
consequence of description—that “rhetorick of love” or “cant and stuff” Philander has 
sent—and casts her response within the conventions of the letter as well. She relates her 
feeling within the prescribed genre conventions to which she is responding. That Silvia 
purports to “blush” further suggests that the effects manifest beyond mental—they are 
experienced physiologically. As surrogates for themselves, Silvia’s and Philander’s 
letters are both material and immaterial in nature. In gesturing toward Silvia’s 
physicality, Behn highlights the profound materiality of experiential investigation that the 
epistolary form holds in tension.  
 Behn reinforces the point that Silvia and Philander’s romance is predicated on 
generic conventions by making it play out not only in utterly predictable, or 
uninnovative, ways, but also by creating a mirror effect in which the relationship plays 
out over and over with little variation. Silvia and Philander’s relationship is an analogue 
for Lord Grey and Henrietta Berkely’s relationship and in the context of the story, 
nothing but a repeat of Mertilla and Philander’s relationship. As the narrator explains in 
“The Argument” to Book I, Philander, struck by Mertilla’s beauty, “steals her away, and 
marries her. But see how transitory is a violent passion, after being satiated, slights the 
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prize he had so dearly conquer’d” (A7v). Book II becomes a re-enactment of the same 
premise, with a slightly different cast of characters. As he did with Mertilla, Philander 
whisks Silvia away, marrying her to his proxy, Brilljard, but living with her as her 
husband. Later, distanced from and disenchanted with Silvia, Philander turns his attention 
to another beauty. Philander is the epistolary lover and romance figure. He cannot be 
anything but. It is written into his very name and into his role. In casting Philander as 
such, Behn critiques the so-called reality that the epistolary form offers—suggesting that, 
as with scientific writing, it is a performance that precludes genuine experience or 
stability. 
The call-and-response nature of letters enacts the seventeenth century’s 
understanding of knowledge as a process of accretion, embodied by and impelled in 
Boyle’s scheme of inquiry. As noted, Boyle’s methodology not only provided 
suggestions for further study but also created and imposed a template for how to write up 
results, part of which was to point to areas of further study. Consequently, more and more 
information was amassed. In her translator’s preface to A Discovery of New Worlds, Behn 
points to the Society’s project of speaking in plain language, writing “by a certain 
Rhetorical Figure, peculiar to themselves,” the French “imply twenty Lines, to express 
what an English Man would say, with more Ease and Sense in five” (A7r). Love-Letters 
suggests that we might take this translation as tongue-in-cheek. While Behn might 
appreciate the Society’s emphasis on “deliver[ing] so many things, almost in an equal 
number of words,” she questions in Love-Letters whether theory matches practice (Sprat 
113). After all, letters beget more letters and along with Silvia and Philander, readers are 
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left to sort out and weigh their words. The amount of data and its subjective nature makes 
it difficult to do so. 
While Behn’s sensitivity to language is tied to her understanding of genre, she 
deploys it in Love-Letters to question the role of genre and method. The “incoherence of 
the subjects” addressed in natural philosophy lead, as Boyle says, to “a loose and 
desultory way of writing” (Occasional Reflections a1r). And just as the Royal Society 
organized the massive influx of data through an interpretive schema so too does the editor 
of Love-Letters, who, we are told, found the missives “in their Cabinets” and placed them 
“as exactly as possible” “in the order they were sent” (A7v). Behn’s fictional editor 
reveals his role in shaping the narrative at the same time as he attempts to conceal it. 
Given that experimental spaces took a narrative form, that is “an author organizes 
elements in much the same way as a scientist does,” the editorial reveal implies 
something about the way both fiction and science work (Bratach 221). In including the 
possibility that the letters may, in fact, be out of order and include only those found in the 
cabinet, the editor hints at the narrative’s incompleteness.  
Consequently, Behn notes the fragmented nature of Love-Letters from its very 
start. In so doing, Behn shows that, even when combined into a whole, the fragments are 
not particularly instructive because each letter by itself is a closed system. As Altman 
explains, “the letter retains its own unity while remaining a unit within a much larger 
configuration” (169). Behn’s individual letters, then, act similarly to Boyle’s individual 
inquiries. Both emphasize what J. Paul Hunter describes as a particular way of 
understanding the world: “immediacy, personal observation, subjectivity of response, 
circumstantiality, empirical modes of thinking, and the desire to systematize” (“Boyle” 
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276). For Hunter, new science opened up an availability of interpretations that early 
novelists capitalized on. A text was able to create a coherent reading of an otherwise 
disorganized, subjective mass of data. In Love-Letters Behn uses the epistolary form to 
critique the episodic and miscellaneous nature of science writing and to unmask its 
insistence on and veneer of objectivity. Like a trained novelist, a trained experimentalist 
is able to weave a masterful narrative that functions by a degree of verisimilitude but is 
fictional, nevertheless. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISTANT READING THE BODY, 1640-169985
For seventeenth-century men and women, to know one’s body was to know one’s 
place in the world. As Jonathan Sawday, Erin Goss, David Hillman, and Carla Mazzio 
have argued, the body represented a capacious amalgam of political, moral, and religious 
values; it variously represented “the possibilities of science” (Body Emblazoned 33-34); 
“the literary and social discourse of sensibility and sentiment” (26); and was “the most 
common vehicle for the making of social and cosmic metaphors” (xiii). The body was an 
abstract concept that encompassed the operations of systems and the relations among 
parts and wholes. Yet, when human bodies were described, they were often invoked 
synecdochically through their physically perceptible parts: their lips and muscles, bones 
and skin, or fingers and toes. We find this pattern most clearly in the practice of anatomy, 
where bodies became visible through dissection. Writing in 1698, Welsh physician 
Martin Lister describes the anatomy room filled with disconnected parts and pieces. After 
mentioning Mr. Bennis, a visiting Englishman, who was “working by himself upon a 
Dead Body, Breast and Belly gutted,” Lister shifts his description: “Here a Basket of 
Dissecting Instruments, as Knives, Saws, &c. And there a Form with a Thigh and Leg 
flayed, and the Muscles parted asunder: On another Form an Arm severed after the same 
                                                          
85 Mann, Rachel and Michael Gavin. “Distant Reading the Body, 1640-1699.” Accepted 
by Review of English Studies.  
Reprinted here with permission of publisher. 
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manner: Here a Trey full of Bits of Flesh, for the more minute Discovery of the Veins 
and Nerves” (63-64). Scattered across tables, mixed in trays, and pinned against blocks of 
wood, the human body is decomposed into a catalogue of parts in a way that, for 
example, the knives and saws are not. In effect, Lister’s description effaces the body’s 
structural integrity as well as its singular identity. It is unclear, and clearly unimportant, 
whether these “bits of flesh” and “Muscles parted asunder” came from the same corpse. 
Rather than presenting the body as a coherent physical entity, anatomists partitioned it 
into smaller and smaller pieces to better understand their interactions. 
Consider by contrast how Helkiah Crooke uses the word body in the opening 
chapter of Mikrokosmographia (1615): 
As the soule of man is of all sublunary formes the most noble, so his Body . . . [is] 
the measure and rule of all other bodies. There be many things which set foorth 
the excellency of it, but these especially among others. The frame and 
composition which is vpright and mounting toward heauen, the moderate temper, 
the equal and iust proportion of the parts; and lastly, their wonderfull consent & 
mutuall concord as long as they are in subiection to the Law & rule of Nature. (4) 
Whereas body parts are visible, touchable, and tasteable objects, the body is something 
else entirely. Here, it functions as a normative ideal and abstract whole—a form, a frame, 
a composition, a just proportion. 
In what follows, we explore how these two ways of writing about the body 
operate in seventeenth-century fiction and natural philosophy, especially in anatomy. Our 
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method is a kind of distant reading for conceptual analysis.86 We measure the diction of 
sentences like those quoted above to see how bodies were described, then use statistical 
techniques to identify patterns in those descriptions. Such patterns expose writers’ latent 
assumptions about the meanings of words and their proper use. Our corpus is drawn from 
the Early English Books Online collection, as transcribed and published by the Text 
Creation Partnership.87 From this dataset, we extracted two smaller corpora: one that 
gathers fiction, drama, and poetry and another focused on anatomical writing and similar 
works in medicine and natural philosophy. Our goal in analyzing these corpora is to 
uncover a common discourse of embodiment across these very different contexts. 
Scholars have long noted that particularized descriptions of human bodies rarely 
appear in seventeenth-century fiction. More often, fictional characters serve as vehicles 
of actualized but largely disembodied values. The body in seventeenth-century fiction is, 
in an important sense, absent. According to Goss, fictional bodies “can mean but cannot 
be” (124). In the analysis that follows, we argue that this apparent absence reflects a 
tension in the very concept of the body, which always presupposes a categorical 
distinction between visible parts and constituted wholes. Bodies are perceived and 
described through close attention to their parts, but when bodies are conceived as such, 
                                                          
86 For distant reading, see Moretti. Peter de Bolla pioneers the use of computational 
techniques for conceptual history. For the application of more advanced methods to this 
line of inquiry, see Gavin et al. 
87 The Text Creation Partnership was not entirely limited to EEBO, but also transcribed a 
smaller number of documents from Eighteenth-Century Collections Online and Evans 
Early American Imprints. See http://www.textcreationpartnership.org/. The documents 
themselves can be searched and accessed through the Oxford Text Archive 
(http://ota.ox.ac.uk/tcp/) or downloaded in bulk from Github at 
https://github.com/textcreationpartnership/. Data used in this essay will be made available 
prior to publication at https://github.com/michaelgavin.  
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they are described as abstract entities that organize the whole. This distinction is difficult 
to see at the level of close reading but unmistakable at larger scale. Deep conceptual 
structures at work underneath both anatomy and fiction, we argue, underlie a conception 
of the body that informs more particularized notions of mobility, sociality, and 
physicality. 
5.1 BACKGROUND 
The practice of natural philosophy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
depended on the development of protocols for scientific description that presented natural 
phenomena as systems of parts. As more and more of the natural world came to be 
known, more and more needed to be described. Simultaneously, previously accepted 
knowledge needed to be tested against new discoveries, leaving natural philosophers and 
historians with a mass of information to sift through and organize. Scientific descriptions 
of all kinds tended to break natural phenomena into smaller, more manageable pieces. 
Botanical texts, such as Nehemiah Grew’s The Anatomy of Plants (1682), for instance, 
describe in great detail various parts of plants rather than their wholes: “a Plant, as well 
as an Animal, is composed of several Organical Parts” (A3v). Likewise, Robert Boyle’s 
study of human blood addresses its “colours,” “tast,” “odour.” “heat,” “inflammability,” 
and “aerial particles,” as well as its composition of “salt” and “oyls” (Memoirs 11-12). 
Thomas Willis’s Practice of Physick (1681) advocates a view of the body that “resolves 
all bodies into particles of Spirit, Sulphur, Salt, Water, and Earth” because “this 
Hypothesis Determinates Bodies into sensible parts, and cuts open things as it were to the 
life” (2). With their relentless attention to parts, seventeenth-century scientific 
descriptions share consistent lexical patterns despite their very different objects of study. 
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This descriptive regime is best exemplified by the field of anatomy, which 
explicitly constructed knowledge of the body using new techniques of empirical 
description. Anatomy, as it was practiced in the period, was pioneered in Italy and is 
largely indebted to Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564), professor of surgery and anatomy at 
the University of Padua and, later, Imperial physician to Emperor Charles V. Prior to 
Vesalius, the purpose of anatomical demonstration was not so much to make new 
discoveries as to illustrate already known truths, usually Galen’s or Modino’s. Under this 
earlier model, the anatomist sat above the proceedings reading aloud from a text, the 
ostensor pointed out the body’s parts accordingly, and the surgeon performed the 
dissection. After noting errors in Galen’s anatomical accounts, Vesalius rejected textual 
authority and urged anatomists to turn, instead, to the “non-lying book of the body” (qtd. 
in Cunningham, Anatomist Anatomis’d 29).88 In so doing, he collapsed the three distinct 
roles of the anatomist into one; hands deep in viscera, the anatomist now simultaneously 
cut, showed, and taught. Anatomists across Europe adopted the Vesalian method, leading 
to the modern notion of autopsia, or seeing for oneself. By the early seventeenth century, 
conceptions of the body began to change accordingly. Under English physician William 
Harvey, the body began to be defined by its internal organization rather than as a static, 
unified entity. In Harvey’s Prelectiones Anatomiae Universalis, which he delivered while 
conducting public dissections as the Lumleian Lecturer for the Royal College of 
Physicians, Harvey presented a physiological orientation to the body that distinguished 
him from his predecessors, such as Vesalius. As Luke Wilson has argued, Harvey was 
concerned, primarily, with the “causes, functions, and purposes of anatomical structures” 
                                                          
88 See also French 145-7. 
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(62-95). Accordingly, for Harvey “the end of anatomy is to know, or to be thoroughly 
acquainted with, the parts and to know the very reason for their existence . . . in order to 
know why, one must study 1. The action and 2. The use of the parts” (qtd. in Luke 
Wilson 80). As the body became a physiological object, knowing the body meant 
recognizing the function, not just the form, of its parts. This shift led to important 
discoveries, such as the circulation of the blood, and dramatically changed how the body 
was conceived and the way anatomy was practiced. 
As anatomy grew in popularity and the body became central to demonstrations 
rather than subservient to anatomical texts, commercial demand for body parts increased. 
In England, the noose’s inability to keep up led to rampant corruption at the Tyburn tree 
where hangings took place up to eight times per year and the hangman delivered to the 
highest bidder.89 Anatomists began supplementing ‘fresh’ corpses with soft body parts 
preserved in jars. While methods for preserving dry preparations, i.e. skin, skeletons, and 
bones, had been used for centuries, methods for preserving wet preparations, i.e. soft 
tissue, were not commonplace until 1663, when Robert Boyle demonstrated the 
possibility of preserving human and animal tissue in alcohol (Cunningham, Anatomist 
Anatomis’d 231-251). Under Boyle’s method, organs were suspended in the “Spirits of 
Wine” (a distillation otherwise known as aquae vitae), which preserved them against 
putrefaction while making them available for visual inspection (Boyle, Some 
Considerations 26). Named after the preparation room in which they were preserved, 
preparations differed from specimens in important ways. As Simon Chaplin notes, the 
purpose of specimens was to preserve and, when necessary, reconstruct the outward 
                                                          
89 See Cunningham Anatomist Anatomis’d 223; Linebaugh; and Richardson 52-72. 
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appearance of animals (John 101-103). By contrast, preparations were meant to reveal the 
inner structures of humans, animals, and plant tissue and, as described by Samuel 
Johnson, were “made by process of operation” (qt. in Chaplin, John 103, n. 153). The 
market for preparations soared. By 1793, for example, John Hunter had amassed a 
collection of at least seventeen thousand.90 The use of preparations within anatomical 
demonstrations reflects Harvey’s understanding of anatomy’s aim: to study the action and 
use of the parts. As a result, the body was represented as an interchangeable system of 
parts rather than a unified whole at the very moment it became integral to anatomical 
study. 
Anatomical textbooks of the period are likewise dominated by efforts to portray 
the body as a series of micro-systems. Ostensibly, these micro-systems are interrelated 
and contribute to the integrity of the whole body (Cregan 5; Landers “Dissection”). As 
Crooke explains, delineating the body’s parts, which he defines as “a body cohearing or 
cleaving to the whole,” was the means by which to understand the body (28). Hence, 
anatomical textbooks, which detail the minutiae of the body’s parts, are divided and 
subdivided seemingly ad infinitum. Crooke’s compendium, for example, is divided 485 
times. For Matthew Landers, Crooke’s manifold divisions participate in a larger 
argument; each subject “represents a single partition within a larger philosophical 
discussion, for which the body of man is an analogue—a microcosm of universal 
knowledge” (Anatomy 58-59). However, at the same time that anatomists defined their 
practice as one invested in uncovering the whole of man, their language was caught up 
                                                          
90 For more on Hunter’s collection, see Cunningham “Quis custodiet” and Chaplin “John 
Hunter.” 
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entirely in the discourse of body parts. In Enquiries into Human Nature (1680), Walter 
Charleton recommends that anatomists attend to “the Conformation and Texture of every 
part” while tracing their “various Sympathies and Antipathies” (“Preface”). 
Tracing such “Sympathies” meant treating body parts as pieces of a common 
system, and so the anatomist’s discourse of parts was simultaneously tied to a discourse 
of motion. The primary purpose of dissection, according to French anatomist Andre du 
Laurens, was “to observe the motion of the internal parts” (qtd. in Guerrini 230). After 
Harvey theorized the circulation of the blood in 1628, the body was understood to be 
necessarily in motion, with nutrients, humours, and other fluids coursing through its 
veins. For Harvey and many others, action was, therefore, the means by which to reveal a 
part’s final cause and to understand the body in toto. As a result, Benjamin Goldberg 
explains, the practice of dissection was linked to that of physiology. Attempts to uncover 
an organ’s microstructure were attempts to map the movement of the body’s fluids. The 
concept of the body provided the underlying basis for that map; it served as a 
presumptively unified whole that drew each of its parts into knowable relation. Bodies in 
this physiological sense provided a space for the movements of other things. 
Anatomists were not the only ones to link body and motion. As Kimberly Skelton 
explains, from increased transportation routes and detailed atlases to the pendulum clock, 
seventeenth-century Englishmen and women increasingly understood their world and 
selves as being in a state of continuous motion. As a result, fictional bodies regularly 
traverse the countryside and, even when sedentary, are never static. Within imaginative 
writing of the period motion was deeply implicated in embodiment because it served as 
an explanation for the passions, morality, and changes in the body and mind. As such, the 
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vexed relationship between the body and its parts that characterizes anatomical writing is 
likewise present in seventeenth-century literature; as with descriptions in natural 
philosophy, fictional bodies became legible through their parts. In fiction and poetry, 
however, the individuated parts took on lives of their own, in many ways subsuming the 
body as such. Body parts were often foregrounded, but the body as an integrated whole 
rarely makes vivid appearance. Represented only through and by its parts, the body is a 
strangely non-specific, non-physical entity; to return to Crooke, it operates as a form, 
frame, and composition whose existence is rarely more than implied by its parts. In this 
way, the body is not so much a thing that moves but a space where movement occurs, a 
field of possibilities that can simultaneously represent social, moral, divine, and corporeal 
structures. 
Even in more explicitly pornographic texts and the illustrations accompanying 
them, the body becomes a site where corporeality and metaphor merged. Erotic woodcuts 
and engravings, Sarah Toulalan explains, “made use of visual metaphors and symbols” 
such as swords and voluminous drapery rather than featuring wholly naked bodies (233). 
Likewise, in Rochester’s “The Imperfect Enjoyment,” the anatomical penis is depicted as 
a “dead cinder” (l. 33), “dart of love” (l. 37), and an “all-dissolving thunderbolt (l. 10), 
standing in, simultaneously, for man’s soul, identity, and masculinity. In Kathleen 
Lubey’s reading, “the imagination itself recedes as an explicit topic as Rochester focuses 
on bodily eruptions of sexual action that are untethered to the generative mind, 
suggesting the imagination’s impotence to shepherd the body into intended forms of 
actions and intimacy” (61). Similarly, Jonathan Kramnick writes, “In one of literary 
history’s most celebrated evocations of impotence, the mind proves altogether unable to 
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provoke the body” (113). In fictional works the body tends to represent emotions and 
normative ideals that are often said to manifest physically but that are expressed mostly 
through action. 
For example, Charles Cotterell’s translation of La Calprenède’s Cassandra (1642-
1649) closely follows the heroic prose of the original, telling a tale of star-crossed lovers 
who are eventually united. Upon first meeting Oroondates, the prince of Scythia, 
Lysimachus is in awe of his social superior who, he says: 
the Gods had endowed with all the most excellent parts, that can render a person 
accomplished; his face was marvellously handsome, and through a beauty which 
had nothing of effeminate, one might observe something so Martial, so sparkling, 
and so Majestick, as might in all hearts make an impression of Love, Fear, and 
Respect at once; his stature exceeded that of the tallest men, but the proportion of 
it was wonderfully exact, and all the motions of his body had a grace, and liberty 
that was nothing common . . . and the union of so many excellent parts, added to 
the obligation he had to him, imprinted so true an affection in his heart, as neither 
length of years, nor the accidents which after happen’d to them, were ever able to 
diminish. (3) 
Lysimachus’s description, which registers Oroondates as a series of “parts,” speaks to the 
way in which descriptions of the body are fused with descriptions of social and ethical 
qualities. Notice how the first use of “parts,” which refers to Oroondates’s mental 
faculties, is quickly replaced by descriptions of body parts. Although Lysimachus turns 
his attention from Oroondates’s innate refinement to his physical appearance, his 
description of the latter serves to reinforce the former: Oroondates’s face is majestic and 
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his motions graceful precisely because he is a man of parts. Consequently, Oroondates’s 
“excellent parts” are “imprinted” upon Lysimachus’s (metaphorical) heart and would 
“make an impression” in “all hearts.” In this way, Oroondates’s body is typical of 
fictional bodies during the period. 
We do not mean to suggest, however, that anatomical conceptions of the human 
body as system were unknown to fiction writers, nor that narrative somehow occludes 
attention to organic systems. Indeed, the physician Walter Charleton, whom we cited 
above as an authority on anatomy, also wrote fiction. In the Ephesian Matron (1659), the 
title character lies emaciated and prostrate over her husband’s tomb. Upon ingesting 
wine, however, her body is revitalized and Charleton relies on a diction that is striking for 
its anatomical specificity: the matron’s “heart and arteries renew[ed] their intermitted 
pulses” and her “vitall Organs seemed to perform their offices aright” (22-23). Her lips 
are later described as “swelling with a delicious vermilion tincture,” and her cheeks as 
“overflowing with pleasing blushes,” while “Balmy-sweat exstill[s] from the pores” of 
her “snow-white skin” (47). Variously pulsing, swelling, and overflowing, the matron is 
“ingulphed in the delightfull transports of new Love” (48-49). By fusing the matron’s 
physical and emotional states, Charleton’s description blends anatomical and fictional 
discourse and points to an area where physiology converges with subjective experience. 
And yet, even when the human form is described in distinctly physical and tactile 
terms, as with Charleton’s matron, the body—in the holistic sense we think of today—is 
rarely more than implied. Aphra Behn’s Mertilla serves as yet another example. In “The 
Argument” for Book I of Love-Letters Between a Nobleman and his Sister (1684) 
Mertilla is described as a “shape excellent,” in possession of “a most agreeable stature,” a 
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“face a little inclined to round, soft, smooth and white,” “a Mouth curiously made, 
dimpled and full of sweetness,” “her Nose a little Roman,” with “Arms and Hands 
exactly shap’d” (A6r). According to the narrator, “nothing was wanting to compleat the 
joys of the young Philander” (A7v). As human readers, we subconsciously piece together 
Mertilla’s various parts. We are so good at understanding the body as a gestalt it does not 
even matter that, as far as bodies go, Mertilla’s is actually pretty incomplete. Where, after 
all, are her feet? The synecdochic formula of physical description means that the body, 
considered in its entirety, always remains hidden beneath its describable parts. 
The willfully naive perspective provided by strict attention to diction points to a 
tension in our concept of embodiment. In both fiction and anatomy, the body is an 
always-in-motion vehicle that is knowable through descriptions of its independent parts, 
systems, and actions. Consequently, many scholars read characters’ bodies as mere 
constructs: “register[s] for social anxieties” (Packham 29), metaphors for the larger social 
and political body (Gallagher “The Body”; Marjorie Garber), simultaneously biological 
and discursive (Canning), “constellation[s] of different kinds of sensory and perceptual 
engagement with the world” (Gallagher and Raman), and so forth. For Lyndal Roper, the 
fictional body is an “irritatingly non-physical abstraction” (17). The body’s subservience 
to the mind is so ingrained that to theorize corporeality requires, as Elizabeth Grosz has 
argued, “major epistemological upheavals not only for the humanities, which have tended 
toward idealism, but equally for the natural and social sciences, which have at least 
aspired to materialism” (x). In both fiction and anatomy, we find writers juggling similar 
conceptual problems. The “upheaval” Grosz anticipated may be better understood as a 
constant source of tension between ideality and materiality, a kind of fault line in the 
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conceptual structure of the body that came under new pressure in the late seventeenth 
century. In the analysis that follows, we offer semantic modelling as one possible way to 
uncover these conceptual pressures. 
5.2 DATA AND METHODS 
Our data is drawn from the publicly available EEBO-TCP corpus, which includes 
about 32,000 texts from the EEBO, Evans, and ECCO collections. These texts were 
transcribed and encoded with basic descriptive markup by the Text Creation Partnership. 
We focus on texts published from 1640 through 1699. Out of this larger collection (which 
totals 18,311 documents), we used an algorithmic process to create two smaller subsets: 
the first includes 100 documents of novels, plays, and poetry and the second includes 100 
documents related to anatomical discourse.91 When we say anatomical discourse we are 
not referring to human anatomy, per se, nor even necessarily to anatomical textbooks. 
Instead, we are pointing to a particular type of description and pattern of word use that is 
exemplified by anatomy but which occurs in a sweeping range of texts and contexts. Our 
analysis traces concepts related to embodiment through these smaller collections, 
contrasting word-use patterns over them and situating each against the context of the 
larger EEBO-TCP corpus. 
After selecting these 200 documents, we then carved those documents into pieces. 
They were edited by Text Creation Partnership (TCP) and encoded according to 
specifications by the Text Encoding Initiative (TEI).92 When encoded using eXtensible 
                                                          
91 For a complete list of documents included in the two collections, see 
https://github.com/michaelgavin/distant-reading-the-body/blob/master/README.md. 
92 For a brief rationale and description of the EEBO-TCP encoding schema, see 
http://www.textcreationpartnership.org/why-sgmlxml-encoding/. 
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Markup Language (XML), different sections of a document are tagged with descriptive 
markup.93 Front and back matter are differentiated from the main body of the text, and, 
within the body, textual elements like paragraphs, lines of poetry, tables, and figures are 
noted separately. Primary divisions like chapters are conventionally marked using a 
<div> tag that separates each document into its key elements. For our analysis, we 
extracted every <div> element from each text, treating them as separate bags of words. In 
the anatomical corpus, the <div> elements typically correspond to different parts of the 
anatomy, with chapters that survey major systems and organs separately. In the literary 
corpus, <div> elements typically correspond to novels (in a collection of novels), letters, 
groups of poems, or, in the case of drama, acts and scenes. The word frequencies for each 
<div> were counted and compiled into large matrices: the anatomical corpus measures 
the distribution of 18,304 unique word types over 10,463 sections, and the somewhat 
smaller literary corpus measures 12,577 word types over 7,425 sections. As one would 
expect, the vocabularies across these two collections vary significantly; they share only 
7,661 word types.94 
The ‘bag-of-words hypothesis’ refers to a specific concept from the disciplines of 
corpus linguistics and information retrieval.95 It says that the distribution of the 
vocabulary of a document will correlate with its relevance to a search query, independent 
                                                          
93 The fundamental principles of text markup were first outlined in Goldfarb. For a 
succinct and early account of markup as a tool for literary editing and analysis, see 
McQueen; see also Burnard et al. 
94 For the distinction between word types and tokens, as well as for a general overview of 
issues in corpus linguistics, see McEnery and Andrew Hardie. 
95 See Turney and Patrick Pantel. See also Stephen Clark. 
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of word order in that document (Salton).96 This allows researchers to represent 
documents—or, in our case, sections of documents—as sequences of numbers that reflect 
word frequencies. In our anatomical corpus, for example, each <div> section is 
represented by a sequence of 18,304 numbers, most of which are zeroes, that count the 
appearance of each word in that section. Correspondingly, every word can be represented 
as a sequence of numbers that reflect its use in each document. In the anatomical corpus, 
each word is defined by a sequence of 10,463 numbers, most of which are also zeroes, 
reflecting its frequency in each <div> element. 
 Representing texts as bags of words allows them to be compared geometrically. 
Any sequence of numbers can be thought of as a point in multidimensional space. 
Vectors with a similar distribution of values will sit near each other in that space; vectors 
with very different values will sit far apart. The distance between any two points in vector 
space is conventionally measured by taking the cosine distance that separates their 
vectors. Values of cosine distance range from 0, in which case the vectors share no values 
and are perfectly orthogonal, to 1, in which case the vectors sit on the same line.97 In turn, 
comparing words geometrically enables researchers to measure semantic similarity. The 
theory of semantic space posits that word meaning corresponds to relative proximity in 
such spaces.98 Rather than represent meaning by attaching terms to putative definitions, 
distributional models represent meaning by identifying clusters of proximate words in 
                                                          
96 For the history of how this theory developed following Salton’s 1975 publication, see 
Dubin. 
97 For a concise explanation of the cosine similarity measurement for information 
retrieval, see Turney and Pantel, and for linguistics see Stephen Clark. For a more general 
discussion of the theory of semantic space, see Widdows and Lowe. 
98 Sahlgren calls this the “geometric metaphor of meaning” (18).  
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multidimensional space. For example, over EEBO, the words most semantically similar 
to pancreas include glandules, intestines, membranes, spleen, and fibres. Such 
calculations do not provide a definition of pancreas but they expose latent connections 
among words and draw silhouettes of conceptual systems at play in a corpus. In an 
important recent study, Peter de Bolla has argued that such collocation patterns reveal the 
underlying structure of discourse, or what he calls the architecture of concepts. In early 
modern studies, the same theoretical principle has been used by Michael Witmore and 
Jonathan Hope to organize Renaissance drama into thematic clusters. 
By using the principles of semantic similarity we were able to build a 
representative collection of texts that feature what we are calling anatomical discourse, 
using a word-vector representing pancreas as our starting point. Because the pancreas 
achieved special importance during the seventeenth century, the word was used in very 
particular and precise ways, unlike the word anatomy, which had become, by this time, 
polyvalent in meaning. Johann Georg Wirsüng, Prosector of the University of Padua, 
discovered the pancreatic duct in 1642, sparking a flurry of follow-up experiments. In 
1664, Dutch physician and anatomist Reinier de Graaf catheterized the pancreatic duct of 
a living dog, which enabled him to collect pancreatic fluid; because of the fluid’s taste de 
Graaf posited that the pancreas was vital to digestive processes. In so doing, he countered 
previous anatomical understandings of the pancreas, including that of Vesalius who 
thought the pancreas was placed under the stomach “like a prop, or pillow” (qtd. in de 
Graaf 16). Once it was associated with digestive function, the pancreas become the focus 
for much anatomical and medical writing. Over the EEBO-TCP collection, the terms that 
co-occur with pancreas within a context window of five words are body (53), part (51), 
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sweet (46), vessels (46), called (40), bread (40), two (38), substance (36), parts (34), 
great (32), through (32), and use (31). We refer to this linguistic pattern variously as 
‘anatomical discourse,’ ‘anatomical writing,’ or ‘body talk.’ Without presuming to limit 
the boundaries of the discourse or the topics it might address, we chose documents with 
diction and patterns of word use that most closely resembled this vocabulary. Among 
these are books on anatomy, medicine, midwifery, and botany. 
The heterogeneity of our first subcorpus speaks to the far-reaching extent of 
anatomical discourse and description. The association of sweet and bread with pancreas, 
for example, provides a glimpse of the way body talk ranges beyond the human body and 
encompasses a wide range of topics, even the culinary. Descriptive patterns that 
characterize anatomical writing occur in texts as far afield as dentistry, such as Charles 
Allen’s The Operator for the Teeth (1686), medical tracts, like Nicolas Blegny’s New and 
Curious Observations on the Art of Curing the Venereal Disease (1676), chemical 
treatises, such as Thomas Emes’s A Dialogue between Alkali and Acid (1698), and 
pneumatical texts, like Robert Boyle’s A Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring 
and Weight of the Air (1662). Anatomical language even appears in recreational guides, 
like Richard Blome’s tract on “horsmanship, hawking, hunting, fowling, fishing, and 
agriculture.” 
To get a clearer general picture of the different contexts in which anatomical 
language was invoked, we sorted our corpus into groups and projected them onto a two-
dimensional graph. Figure 5.1 illustrates relations among the 100 books with word-
frequency counts most similar to words that appear in the context of pancreas. Each of 
the symbols represents a single document and each type of symbol represents texts that 
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share linguistic similarities. Most of the documents sort into two large groups made up of 
textbooks on anatomy, chirurgery (surgery), medicine, and chemistry. Closely related 
clusters include books on non-human anatomy, like zoology, botany, and entomology, as 
well as those on more specialized medical topics, including several on midwifery, such as 
Aristotle’s Master-piece, and a few individual works on topics like dentistry or the gout. 
The groupings suggest subtle commonalities and variations in the books’ diction. The 
botanist’s project of taxonomy is akin to the entomologist’s concern with cataloguing 
various parts of individual insects, so texts like Grew’s The Anatomy of Plants (1682) and 
Jan Swammerdam’s book on flies, Ephemeri vita (1681), are clustered together. We do 
not mean to suggest, however, that these groupings represent hard and fast distinctions. 
Each of the selected works blend into each other in many ways. Each of the larger groups 
include books on human anatomy, and all of the works feature anatomical writing in the 
broad sense that we are using it in this essay.  
Seventeenth-century literature is similarly heterogeneous, so there too we adopted 
a categorically neutral approach. Our literary subset was selected by culling 100 
documents most semantically similar to All the Histories and Novels Written by the late 
Ingenious Mrs. Behn (1698). First published by Samuel Briscoe, Histories and Novels 
contains twelve of Behn’s prose works as well as a brief biography of Behn and went 
through three editions between 1698 and 1700. Given Behn’s prominence in the critical 
tradition of the early novel, but without presuming to dictate what counts as literature, we 
consider her prose to be paradigmatic of a type of book published between 1640 and 
1699. The twelve most frequent words in Behn’s Histories and Novels, excluding 
stopwords, are love (1162), heart (648), great (542), prince (542), never (476), time 
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(474), himself (462), man (430), give (424), day (418), king (410), and little (410). The 
100 documents using the most similar vocabulary include Behn’s other works as well as 
most of her peers’. Among these are books by women writers like Jane Barker and 
Catharine Trotter, but men writers are present as well, including John Dryden, William 
Congreve, Charles Gildon, and Matthew Prior. Aristocratic poets like Sedley, Dorset, and 
Rochester appear, as do writers translated from French and Spanish. This sample is not 
meant to be an authoritative bibliography of seventeenth-century literature. The diction of 
John Milton’s and Katherine Philips’s poetry, for example, is too different from Behn’s 
for their works to have been included among the 100 most similar. Our goal was to find 
the documents that most closely resemble the discourse that literary scholars emphasize 
when writing the history of how bodies are represented in later seventeenth-century 
fiction. 
As with our collection of anatomical texts, we used word frequencies to create 
clusters of our fictional texts. As Figure 5.2 shows, word-use patterns sometimes align 
with contemporary generic divisions, but not always neatly and sometimes not at all. The 
largest and most distinct cluster is made up primarily of long romances translated from 
French, Spanish, and Italian sources, like those of Scudéry. Drama is scattered pretty 
evenly across the clusters. For example, Dryden’s comedy Marriage a la Mode (1673) 
and his tragedy Cleomenes (1692) are more lexically similar than they are different. 
Likewise, epistolary romances, such as Behn’s Love-Letters, and collections of love 
poetry both feature florid prose and a conventionalized vocabulary meant to express the 
torments of passion. They share much in common with travel narratives, such as John 
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Dunton’s A Voyage Round the World (1691) and Behn’s Oroonoko (1688). Poetry 
anthologies make up a closely related but distinct subgroup. 
In the analysis that follows, we will compare and contrast the two collections. We 
will begin by discussing the words most prevalent in each—although, as we will see, 
prevalence is a complex idea that can be modelled in different ways. Then we will 
examine and compare words’ collocation patterns in each context. We will show that 
some words, like heart, are used in predictably different ways while others, like 
scripture, are used similarly. Given the very different vocabularies of each collection, 
words of embodiment tend to occupy very divergent regions in semantic space. These 
divergences can in turn be measured. The 7,661 words that appear in both corpora were 
ranked by cross-domain similarity, showing which words are used consistently across 
anatomical and literary discourse and which were used most differently. These terms are 
then available for further analysis, allowing us to expose areas of conceptual divergence 
and overlap. 
As is probably clear, the mode of distant reading we practice in this essay is very 
different from those of Franco Moretti, Matthew Jockers, or Ted Underwood, for whom  
computational methods enable large-scale analyses that describe change over long 
periods of time.99 Our concerns are narrower and more precise, so we prefer the analogy 
to anatomy, where the goal is more simply to attend to details that might otherwise be 
overlooked. For this reason, some of the findings we present below will not seem 
surprising at first glance, but here, too, the analogy to dissection is helpful. When opening 
                                                          
99 See Moretti, especially chapter 3, “The Slaughterhouse of Literature.” See also Jockers 
and Underwood, especially chapter 6, “Digital Humanities and the Future of Literary 
History.” 
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a corpse, you are not surprised to find bones, muscles, and organs inside. Such systems 
are noted and delineated so that their connections and mutual operations can be 
identified. When analyzing a corpus, one should not be surprised by basic descriptive 
statistics. Collocation patterns are exposed so that their connotations and the assumptions 
underlying their use can be more accurately described.  
5.3 ANALYSIS 
We begin our demonstration of comparative textual anatomy by identifying the 
most prevalent and obvious differences across our two collections. Table 5.1 features 
three different measurements used to determine words’ significance: raw frequency, 
Mann-Whitney ranking, and z-score standardization. These three tests correspond 
intuitively to three different kinds of ‘aboutness’: raw frequency provides the most 
general picture of a collection’s vocabulary; Mann-Whitney shows which words come up 
most commonly as topics of discussion; and z-score standardization exposes words used 
with unusually intense focus.100 Based on raw frequency, the most common words in 
anatomical writing are highly general descriptive terms like being, out, and same, and, of 
course, parts, part, and body; the Mann-Whitney and z-score tests expose a language of 
comparative description (thin, easily, quantity, lower, observed, somewhat), general 
terms denoting physicality (substance, motion), and named anatomical parts (bones and 
vessels). In the literary subcorpus, little attention is paid to these kinds of terms. Instead, 
persons are rendered through ethical and social frames: raw frequency returns a general 
discourse of subjectivity (love, great, time, man, life), while Mann-Whitney and z-score 
                                                          
100 Many techniques for comparing corpora exist. For a comprehensive and synthetic 
survey, see Kilgarriff and Kilgarriff and Tony Rose. 
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tests draw out a language of friendship (friend, friends), ethical evaluation (fortune, 
happy, honour), mental states (thoughts, hopes), and sexuality (passion, affection). 
Concepts that denote embodiment are comparatively rare but can be glimpsed in 
sexualized terms like beauty, fair, bed, and eyes. 
Beyond mere frequency, we can also test to see which words are used most 
similarly across the two domains. In Figure 5.3 the y-axis displays the frequency of each 
term (combined over the two corpora) and the x-axis displays the semantic similarity 
across them, with ticks showing standard deviations from the mean. As anybody would 
expect, the word heart is used in very different ways. In the context of anatomy, heart 
appears when writers are discussing the circulatory system, so some of the most common 
words in textual segments that include heart are blood, motion, body, arteries, and veins. 
In literary discourse, by contrast, heart operates metaphorically and is usually bound up 
in a language of love. These differences can be measured, and in fact the two words 
(heart1 and heart2) have a similarity score of just .44, which means they share a little less 
than half of their context words in common. This is significantly below average. Across 
the 7,661 words used in both collections, the average similarity score is about .58, with 
most values falling between .5 and .65. Some words are almost identical. For example, 
words directly involving religion are used quite consistently regardless of context. 
Sentences that contain words like scripture (.80), hebrew (.80), and moses (.79) tend to 
be very similar, whether or not those sentences appear in anatomical or literary writing. 
On the other hand, words that are rare or archaic, or that are subject to alternate spellings, 
such as earle (.14) and councell (.16), vary most widely. In general, higher frequency 
words tend to be more similar, rather than less, because they regress toward a common 
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mean. Figure 5.3 displays the distribution of the total shared vocabulary of each corpus, 
highlighting terms that are either unusually similar or unusually distinct. The abstract 
language of subjectivity so prevalent in the literary corpus (love, man, first, self, good, 
men) includes, in fact, some of the most semantically consistent terms, while words like 
heart and blood, which have metaphorical connotations not relevant to anatomy, are 
among the most semantically disparate. However, not all corporeal terms are so different: 
notice, toward the lower right of the graph, the terms flesh and substance, which are, 
perhaps surprisingly, among the words with the most consistent signification. 
These general differences can be further specified by examining the conceptual 
structure of individual terms in each local context. (See Tables 5.2 and 5.3.) We begin 
with body and motion, which we know from previous scholars are likely to be 
qualitatively relevant. In both contexts, the term body has a very general, wide-ranging 
application, and so the terms in its conceptual neighborhood—those used most often in 
the same textual divisions—reach out toward the general themes of each corpus. In 
contrast, motion has a much more specific field of application. In anatomical writing, 
motion associates tightly with causal accounts of how force acts on bodies and their 
parts. In literary texts, motion is just as interesting and just as deeply implicated in the 
conceptual structure of embodiment. There, however, motion is bound up with 
descriptions of characters who trade looks with their eyes and who find beauty and 
honour by degrees. In both contexts, motion requires a vocabulary of measurement and 
comparison against which bodies as such become observable and knowable.  
The terms flesh, substance, and nerves point, in turn, to some of the most 
important areas of conceptual overlap between fictional and anatomical bodies. The 
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nerves are nodes where internal and external sensations meet. As the primary connection 
between the body and the brain, the nerves dictated one’s experience. Linking physiology 
to the passions, Descartes writes in The Passions of the Soul (1649): “Those we refer to 
things outside us, namely to the objects of our senses, are caused (at least when our 
opinion is not false) by those objects, which, exciting movements in the organs of the 
external senses, excite some in the brain too by the mediation of the nerves, which make 
the soul feel them” (31). Across both contexts, then, nerves are closely associated with 
the action of animal spirits, which connect, in anatomy, throughout the nervous system 
(spinal, brain, muscles) and in fiction to the outward expressions of what seems rational 
and sensitive. Within the fictional corpus, substance overlaps strongly with nerves and 
flesh, sharing many similar associations. The word flesh is one of our more curious 
findings. Anatomists didn’t use flesh to refer to muscles or tissue but to describe sexual 
morality, and when novelists and poets mentioned flesh, they mostly referred to food. 
Yet, the general diction of appetite and desire binds these two senses of flesh close 
together in vector space, and so flesh is one of the more consistent terms over the whole. 
These five keywords—body, motion, nerves, flesh, and substance—provide 
semantic anchors in the vector-space model around which a more general discourse of 
embodiment becomes visible. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 list the terms most semantically similar 
to these five keywords in both corpora. Figures 5.4 through 5.7 flatten word-use patterns 
down to two principal components, much like a word cloud, except that the position in 
the graph reflects semantic similarities among the terms.101 As such, they represent in 
graphical form the semantic structures of seventeenth-century body talk. Each graph 
                                                          
101 Lay 480-483. 
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represents the terms as composite entities (body and motion, and nerves, flesh, and 
substance, respectively) and displays the thirty terms that appear most closely in their 
shared vicinity.102 In Figure 5.4 we see that in anatomy the body operated primarily as a 
focal point for empirical inquiry. The cultural logic of the anatomical demonstration, 
inherited from Andreas Vesalius, structures the vocabulary surrounding body and motion, 
which is predominantly concerned with observation and empirical reasoning. Notice, for 
example, that body and motion are closely surrounded by a rich language of empirical 
description, with words connoting knowledge (consider, think, see, suppose, know, and 
believe) and causality (effects, effect, hypothesis) especially predominant. Outlying terms 
involving chemistry (acid, alkali, coagulate) suggest that they, too, appeared in textual 
segments that narrate the experience of scientific observation. 
As a physical object of flesh and substance the prepared body parts are exposed 
and named. Indeed, Figure 5.5 offers one of this essay’s few glimpses into the 
intoxicatingly rich diction of seventeenth-century anatomy. Because of the rich 
vocabulary of anatomical description surrounding nerves, flesh and substance become 
outliers and do not appear in the graph. What is left is a representation of the body as 
perceived by anatomists (notice that term appears near the top), who find categorically 
similar named body parts, like muscles, as well as kinds of nerves, glands, and vessels. 
Perhaps most interestingly, nerves, flesh, and substance connote the sensual experiences 
of the anatomists themselves, who often described body parts in terms of their taste and 
texture, which call our attention back to the messy and intrinsically physical experience 
                                                          
102 For the basic principles behind vector composition, see Erk. 
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of anatomical demonstration. In literature, by contrast, human bodies rarely taste or feel 
like anything at all.  
When bodies appear in poetry, drama, and fiction, they are most often connected 
to intersubjective experience. (See Figures 5.6 and 5.7). The key aspect to notice about 
Figure 5.6 is how it divides into roughly three parts. In the center, body and motion 
connect most closely to an abstract language of physical description, much like in the 
anatomical corpus. This abstract physicality bridges two very different concepts of 
embodiment. On the left, the language of intersubjective action connotes what bodies do; 
notice all the verbs. On the right are terms of physiology most common to literary texts of 
the period. In Figure 5.7, flesh and substance are similarly situated within the corpus, 
whereas nerves becomes an outlier and so becomes excluded from the plot. However, the 
physiological terms (spirits, rational, sensitive, etc.) that also appeared in Figure 5.6 
make their appearance here as well. Indeed, this cluster of terms can be understood as the 
conceptual hinge that binds together more abstract and volitional concepts of 
embodiment, from Figure 5.6, with the fleshy and substantive references here, which 
predominantly involve disease and disorder. 
Despite their differences, anatomy and fiction share one important feature. In 
both, the terms body and motion are surrounded by strong verbs that connote various 
ways of knowing. In anatomy, that knowledge is self-consciously empirical and involves 
observation and the testing of hypotheses. In fiction and poetry, that knowledge emerges 
among the interactions of the characters themselves, whose beliefs are tested against each 
other’s actions. In any case, bodies are objects to be observed and so they are enveloped 
in a language of knowledgeable discovery. 
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That said, actual discussion of named parts of the human body are rare in 
seventeenth-century fiction, and when specific organs are named they tend to be 
surrounded by a very thin and repetitive descriptive vocabulary. A novel might mention a 
character’s eyes or lips, but these words have very few synonyms and dissolve into a 
widely diffuse field of reference that devotes little sustained attention to corporeality as 
such. (See Table 5.4.) Associated with joy, trembling, love, and touch, lips and eyes 
denote a kind of psychosomatic physicality; one that is manifest through experience, 
usually desire, rather than through the depiction of recognizable, composite features. That 
is, lips and eyes are felt and known when they function as mediators between and 
registers of self and the outside world. While embodiment is represented through body 
parts, those parts become defined and relevant through their interaction with and reaction 
to others. 
The extrinsic and, in some ways, detached, experience of the body and its parts is 
likewise apparent in the use of bone. Like flesh, bone refers not to human bodies but to 
eating and cooking; that is, to animal bodies that have been cut up and served as food. 
Indeed, the underlying conceptual formation subtending flesh and bone suggests that 
dismemberment, consumption, and taste are more important aspects of the seventeenth-
century body than literary histories generally acknowledge. When animal bodies are 
included in that history, body parts often appear in discourse as objects to be consumed, 
as food. Butchering and preparing meat shares much in common with anatomical 
demonstration, of course, and those commonalities appear obliquely through the semantic 
data. One might say that the seventeenth-century body becomes socially realized when 
served on trays. 
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In the preceding discussion we have examined the semantic associations of each 
corpus separately. Where we have described areas of overlap, we have relied mostly on 
qualitative judgments. But such overlap can also be teased out statistically. Table 5.5 
displays only connections that are shared across both corpora. For each term, values 
display the product of the semantic similarities (s1s2) that separate it from the keyword in 
each corpus. For example, the similarity between body and great in the anatomical corpus 
is .62, and in the literary corpus, .81. Multiplied together, the result is a composite 
similarity score of .51. Only words that are significantly similar in both corpora are 
teased out by this method, which reveals what is most novel-like in the anatomical corpus 
and what is most anatomical in the literary corpus, thus exposing a common vocabulary 
of embodiment. As we have emphasized throughout this discussion, the terms body and 
motion share a very coherent semantic structure and operate in both literary and 
anatomical discourse as organizing abstractions. The terms substance, disease, and bones 
anchor conceptual clusters that together represent a pretheoretical experience of the 
human body as such. Although we have argued that body talk is rarely explicit in literary 
discourse, we also see that it operates throughout, if generally submerged at the surface 
level. When seen from a conceptualist perspective, the fictional body’s ‘meaning’ and 
‘being’ (to return to Erin Goss’s phrase) can no longer be placed in opposition but must 
be seen as deeply co-implicated and even mutually constitutive. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
The conception of the body as a mereotopological system—a collection of interrelated 
parts that never add up to their sum—is precisely why body becomes such a capacious 
construct. Because bodies are composites, made perceptible synecdochically through 
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their named parts, body functions as an abstract conceit. It organizes those parts and is 
known through them, but cannot integrate them back into a cohesive whole. As we have 
shown, parts beget more parts, swelling the terminology of the body. Organs become 
associated with their vascular structure rather than with the flesh surrounding them. 
Arteries, veins, and nerves are particularized and differentiated. In its hyper-materiality 
the body becomes weirdly immaterial. And because it does, body serves as an umbrella 
term and a theoretical frame that stands in for and encompasses all kinds of values. 
As an organizational conceit, body can, as we noted at the start of this essay, 
arrange not just its physiological parts but also the social order, forming a nexus between 
types of discourse and the larger scientific and literary milieu. Despite their differences, 
fictional and anatomical bodies point to ways of knowing that are both empirical and 
intersubjective—embodied knowledge is both physical and caught in a web of persons. 
Such knowledge hinges on abstraction. Because body points not just to one but to many 
things, seventeenth-century body talk constantly tests and traverses the boundaries that 
separate mind, substance, and sociality. Modelled computationally, the body gathers 
semantic parts that breathe, move, think, and act upon the world.
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Table 5.1 The most frequent and most distinctive terms in the anatomical and literary 
collections  
 
 
Anatomical Corpus Literary Corpus 
Frequency 
(1,000s) 
Distinctiveness 
(Mann-
Whitney) 
Distinctiveness 
(z-score) 
Frequency 
(1,000s) 
Distinctiveness 
(Mann-
Whitney) 
Distinctiveness  
(z-score) 
being 43.6 parts 7.1 bones 4.9 love 19.8 love 8.5 beauty 4.3 
parts 24.0 body 6.2 parts 4.7 great 11.6 friend 8.2 loves 3.8 
part 23.6 liquor 6.0 heat 4.6 time 10.7 fortune 8.0 fair 3.8 
out 23.5 thin 5.9 patient 4.6 man 10.2 happy 7.9 silent 3.7 
same 23.5 motion 5.9 lower 4.1 well 92.5 tell 7.8 yours 3.7 
body 22.7 substance 5.6 substance 4.1 know 85.3 gone 7.7 bed 3.6 
first 20.6 water 5.5 vessels 4.1 never 83.6 fair 7.6 passion 3.6 
blood 22.7 heat 5.4 bodies 4.0 good 82.1 friends 7.3 betray 3.5 
two 18.4 easily 5.4 solid 4.0 life 75.6 beauty 7.3 
affectio
n 
3.5 
great 18.3 quantity 5.4 motion 3.8 give 75.4 poor 7.3 wish 3.4 
made 17.3 lower 5.3 blood 3.7 little 71.6 honour 7.2 friend 3.4 
doth 16.8 observed 5.3 happen 3.6 king 69.8 thoughts 7.1 happy 3.4 
therefore 16.5 
somewha
t 
5.3 disease 3.6 day 67.7 hopes 7.1 fortune 3.4 
many 15.8 matter 5.1 becomes 3.6 come 67.6 hear 7.0 love 3.3 
water 15.8 vessels 5.1 body 3.5 heart 67.3 joy 6.9 eyes 3.3 
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Table 5.2 Terms most semantically similar to body, motion, flesh, nerves, and  
substance within the anatomical corpus 
 
 
body motion flesh nerves substance 
body 1.00 motion 1.00 flesh 1.00 nerves 1.00 substance 1.00 
without 0.70 moved 0.73 eating 0.57 nerve 0.59 part 0.52 
another 0.69 move 0.61 concupiscence 0.56 pair 0.50 parts 0.52 
parts 0.69 motions 0.54 regeneration 0.54 spirits 0.49 through 0.51 
same 0.68 same 0.54 sin 0.53 brain 0.48 self 0.50 
now 0.67 force 0.54 virgin 0.53 fibres 0.48 out 0.50 
bodies 0.67 body 0.53 innocency 0.52 carried 0.47 body 0.50 
whole 0.66 greater 0.53 eve 0.52 animal 0.46 without 0.50 
first 0.66 according 0.52 adam 0.52 nervous 0.43 another 0.49 
nothing 0.66 bodies 0.50 posterity 0.52 within 0.42 whole 0.49 
out 0.65 less 0.50 brutal 0.52 spinal 0.41 little 0.48 
nature 0.65 part 0.50 incarnation 0.51 muscles 0.40 same 0.48 
before 0.65 parts 0.50 chastity 0.51 distributed 0.40 accident 0.46 
part 0.64 cause 0.50 saved 0.51 flowing 0.39 whose 0.46 
Self 0.64 rest 0.49 forbidden 0.51 sent 0.39 thing 0.46 
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Table 5.3 Terms most semantically similar to body, flesh, motion, nerves, and  
substance within the literary corpus 
 
 
body motion flesh nerves substance 
body 1.00 motion 1.00 flesh 1.00 nerves 1.00 substance 1.00 
great 0.81 eyes 0.62 humours 0.61 spirits 0.44 humours 0.62 
making 0.80 nature 0.62 meats 0.56 sensitive 0.42 spirits 0.57 
man 0.80 degrees 0.61 parts 0.56 innated 0.41 meats 0.56 
giving 0.80 find 0.61 sharp 0.54 sharp 0.40 sharp 0.55 
never 0.79 never 0.61 spirits 0.54 rational 0.40 parts 0.55 
long 0.79 times 0.60 substance 0.53 meats 0.39 moisture 0.55 
good 0.78 body 0.60 animal 0.52 humours 0.38 moist 0.54 
well 0.78 hand 0.60 salt 0.51 animal 0.38 innated 0.54 
time 0.78 honour 0.59 sharpness 0.51 sharpness 0.38 rational 0.53 
way 0.78 part 0.59 rational 0.50 figure 0.34 sensitive 0.53 
manner 0.78 beauty 0.59 dry 0.50 vital 0.34 flesh 0.53 
two 0.78 found 0.59 especially 0.49 figures 0.34 animal 0.52 
away 0.78 way 0.59 created 0.48 actually 0.33 sharpness 0.52 
little 0.78 look 0.59 causes 0.47 outward 0.33 dry 0.51 
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Table 5.4 Representations of bodily organs in seventeenth-century fiction. Select 
semantic similarities across the literary subcorpus: heart, bone, lips, womb, and veins 
 
 
heart bone lips womb veins 
heart 1.00 bone 1.00 lips 1.00 womb 1.00 veins 1.00 
love 0.84 roasted 0.69 eyes 0.57 virgins 0.57 humours 0.49 
found 0.84 dish 0.58 joy 0.55 generation 0.52 cold 0.48 
eyes 0.81 capon 0.56 touch 0.55 bride 0.51 blood 0.47 
never 0.81 roast 0.55 love 0.54 mainly 0.51 heat 0.47 
look 0.80 lamb 0.53 hand 0.54 virgin 0.51 outward 0.46 
moment 0.80 boyled 0.52 happy 0.54 conception 0.50 parts 0.46 
fair 0.80 mutton 0.52 turn 0.53 naked 0.50 earth 0.46 
happy 0.79 dyet 0.50 trembling 0.52 husbands 0.49 nature 0.44 
tender 0.79 marrow 0.48 lovely 0.53 infants 0.49 work 0.44 
joy 0.78 oysters 0.46 even 0.52 modesty 0.49 once 0.42 
day 0.78 lace 0.45 fatal 0.51 women 0.48 substance 0.42 
honour 0.78 course 0.45 heart 0.51 sundry 0.46 through 0.42 
find 0.78 legs 0.44 never 0.51 male 0.46 force 0.42 
little 0.77 carcass 0.41 look 0.51 breasts 0.46 face 0.41 
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Table 5.5 Select overlapping semantic similarities across the literary and anatomical 
corpora: body, motion, substance, disease, and bones 
 
 
body motion substance disease bones 
body 1.00 motion 1.00 substance 1.00 disease 1.00 bones 1.00 
great 0.51 body 0.32 parts 0.28 ensue 0.25 bone 0.19 
part 0.49 motions 0.30 animal 0.18 cure 0.24 head 0.07 
way 0.49 part 0.29 body 0.16 diseases 0.22 part 0.07 
whole 0.49 force 0.29 spirits 0.16 distemper 0.21 called 0.07 
well 0.49 greater 0.27 matter 0.16 sick 0.21 lower 0.07 
nothing 0.49 way 0.27 figure 0.16 patient 0.20 two 0.07 
nature 0.48 parts 0.26 heat 0.15 humours 0.19 fingers 0.07 
manner 0.47 move 0.26 actually 0.15 malignant 0.18 middle 0.06 
little 0.46 nature 0.26 bodies 0.15 sometimes 0.18 third 0.06 
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Figure 5.1 Topical clusters in the anatomical corpus based on word frequency103 
                                                          
103 Note, the graph visually reduces multi-dimensional space into just two dimensions, so 
groups that appear to overlap are not actually contained within one another. 
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Figure 5.2 Topical clusters in the literary corpus based on word frequency104 
                                                          
104 Note, the graph visually reduces multi-dimensional space into just two dimensions, so 
groups that appear to overlap are not actually contained within one another. 
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Figure 5.3 Comparison between the two collections 
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Figure 5.4 Semantic neighborhood of the terms body and motion in the anatomical 
subcorpus
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Figure 5.5 Semantic neighborhood of the terms flesh, nerves, and substance in  
the anatomical subcorpus
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Figure 5.6 Semantic neighborhood of the terms body and motion in the literary 
subcorpus.
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Figure 5.7 Semantic neighborhood of the terms flesh, nerves, and substance in the literary 
subcorpus
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION
 
The study of women’s literature—from its hard-won inclusion in the canon and in 
classroom curricula to its place in scholarly criticism—has come a long way since the 
1980s. So far, in fact, that to focus on women’s literature is no longer a bold choice. 
Much of this progress is thanks to scholars such as Dale Spender, Sandra Gilbert, Susan 
Gubar, Janet Todd, Jane Spencer, Germaine Greer, and many others. The irony, as Isobel 
Grundy notes, is that women’s writing, finally accepted as a legitimate object of study, 
has come at a time in which literature, itself, is becoming more and more devalued (9). 
Presumably the same can be said for other discrete fields of study, such as African-
American and Lantinx literature. What, then, can late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-
century women writers teach us that is not already known or that is still considered 
valuable outside a select circle of people who are devoted to nurturing minds rather than 
pocketbooks? 
It seems to me that, despite their different strategies, all of the women in this 
particular study adopted a capacious view of imaginative writing—treating it as an object 
of aesthetic value, a gateway into cultural conversations, and an entree into intellectual 
and philosophical pursuits of all kinds. With atoms, blood, misguided scientists, moon-
men, giant flies, dissection, and celestial musings filling the pages of plays, poetry, and 
fiction written by women, seemingly no topic was off limits. And no wonder; in the 
seventeenth century natural philosophy and literature were complementary and, in some 
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sense, co-dependent rather than in competition. Consequently, the poetic imagination 
offered women opportunities to reimagine and reconfigure existing tropes in order to 
narrativize and write themselves into the scientific conversations that were impacting 
their worlds, intellectually as well as socially. Perhaps, like them, we as literary scholars 
should worry less about defending our turf, closing ranks and insisting on the importance 
of the Humanities writ narrowly, and instead open it up. Like the women writers in this 
study, we can use interdisciplinarity to our advantage. The strange and intoxicating brew 
of science and literature is but one of many areas ripe for further study. 
Undoubtedly, specialization—in literary periods, subject matter, even particular 
authors—has led to great advances in what we know, or think we know. Simultaneously, 
it has enabled English departments to create an identity distinct from that of departments 
of history (Underwood). More importantly, it has allowed us to give voice to a larger 
number of writers and thinkers, thereby disrupting a monolithic view of history, which, 
properly conceived, is really an overlapping set of histories. However, specialization has 
also come at some expense. It is now too easy to assume privilege for our set of concerns, 
too easy to claim priority for a writer or group of writers, and too easy to assert that a 
particular phenomenon originated within our period.  
The very nomenclature we use often exemplifies our stubborn insistence on 
clinging to areas of specialization and to claiming for them primacy. The “Scientific 
Revolution” serves as a particularly apt example, given the nature of this dissertation. As 
Steven Shapin has written, such phrasing assumes a “coherent, cataclysmic, and climatic 
event that fundamentally and irrevocably changed what people knew about the natural 
world and how they secured proper knowledge of that world” (Scientific 1). This event 
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supposedly took place between the late sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, ushering in the 
modern world. As we know, of course, no such singular event occurred. Instead, a 
diverse set of cultural practices and methods across time, space, and place brought about 
small revolutions, if they can even be called that; revolution implies change and many 
historians are quick to assert the continuity between the seventeenth century and earlier 
periods (Shapin, Scientific 3-4). So too, we know that the so-called scientific revolution 
did not come about because people of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries possessed 
a higher level of cognitive ability than their predecessors or were more technologically 
equipped. Although the first compound microscope wasn’t invented until 1590, in the 
West the rudiments of microscopic technology, for example, were present as early as the 
thirteenth century (Bardell). Nor did the advancement of knowledge in the seventeenth 
century represent a great rupture with that of previous centuries. And indeed, the cultural 
phenomena I discuss in this dissertation—the fractured and atomized view of knowledge 
and the confluence of literature and natural philosophy—are not isolated to the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, as scholars of the sixteenth and nineteenth 
centuries would be quick to point out, and rightly so. 
Unlike today’s scholars, seventeenth-century thinkers weren’t specialists in the 
same sense, as Margaret Cavendish’s The World’s Olio or the Royal Society’s “Scheme 
and Heads of Inquiry” demonstrate. And women, generally prohibited from receiving a 
formal education, were even less so. Nevertheless, great advances in knowledge 
occurred. It seems to me that one of the reasons they did so was precisely because of a 
lack of specialization. The view of knowledge as fractured and facts as mobile enabled a 
reordering of a mass of heterogeneous information and therefore of what was known. 
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Imaginative writing was especially conducive to this project of reorganization; through 
“hypothesis, stories of inventions, and the evolution of ideas through texts,” imaginative 
writing, according to Clare Brant, “has its own reordering” (73). Take, for example, Anna 
Letitia Barbauld’s “An Inventory of the Furniture in Dr. Priestley’s Study” (ca. 1770s). In 
it, Barbauld uses the meronymic nature of the inventory form to itemize the objects the 
study contains: “A group of all the British Kings” (l. 7), “A rare thermometer” (l. 25), “A 
blotted proof-sheet, wet from Bowling” (l. 35), “The Fathers, ranged in goodly row” (l. 
9), “Papers and books, a strange mixed olio” (l.29), and so forth. Through metaphor and a 
dense network of allusion Barbauld fuses scientific and poetic investigation; and, through 
regular meter and rhyme she transforms a “chaos dark” into an organized and 
recognizable form (l. 40). Undoubtedly this view of knowledge and poetics of scientific 
investigation was especially appealing to women, whose education was likewise often 
pieced together bit by bit. As this dissertation has shown, many writers of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, male and female, scientific and imaginative, reached centuries 
backward, exchanged information and ideas across the continent, and included within 
their work subjects that extend beyond what would seem to us to be their bailiwick. If 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century men and women didn’t care about crossing 
geographic and disciplinary boundaries or the heavy dross of time and somewhat 
arbitrary nature of periodization, why should we, the people who study their work, bother 
to? 
I return, then, to the question with which this conclusion opened. What can we 
learn from late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century women writers that we don’t 
already know? Why should we study women writers beyond continuing the project of 
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recovery, worthwhile in its own right, or for personal and/or intellectual interest? 
Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century women writers used literature as a kind of bricolage 
that allowed them to enter conversations crucial to debates about the natural world and 
therefore conversations crucial to their place within the social world. As such, they 
exemplify a kind of thinking that allows them to redraw the circle, putting themselves at 
the center rather than on the periphery. Likewise, women writers used the nascent 
practice of scientific description and emergent language of system to create new systems 
of knowledge as well as new ways of thinking and being. From them, we can learn a 
more flexible, expansive form of scholarship that invites in and engages with concepts, 
ideas, themes, texts, and material artifacts beyond the traditionally literary and outside 
our fields of specialization. If that makes us seem too close to historians or cultural 
theorists, then so be it. Paradoxically, then, focusing on seventeenth-century women’s 
writing teaches us, in some ways, how not to focus on seventeenth-century women’s 
writing as women’s writing and instead to see their voices as integral to rather than 
separate from the very culture that produced them.
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